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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation evaluates the economic and ethical considerations underlying the 
outsourcing of professional services such as finance and accounting. The dissertation is 
comprised of three separate, but related studies. The first study explores the adequacy of the 
disclosure rules recommended in the revised ethics rulings regarding disclosure of outsourcing 
relationships and the resulting ethical and economic repercussions for both, the AICPA members 
and their clients. The second study analyzes the disclosure rules recommended in the AICPA 
ethics rulings regarding disclosure of outsourcing relationships from an ethical standpoint. The 
third study adopts the perspective of the third party service provider. The third study analyzes the 
factors that provide a competitive advantage to leading service providers in accounting 
outsourcing markets in India. Taken together, these studies address issues that have not been 
addressed previously in accounting literature and will advance our understanding of a fast-
growing phenomenon, the outsourcing of accounting services. Finance and accounting 
outsourcing may strongly influence the choice of future organizational form and structure thus 
making it important to develop an early understanding of this industry. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation evaluates the economic and ethical considerations underlying the outsourcing 
of professional services such as finance and accounting. The dissertation is comprised of three separate, 
but related studies. 
Study One: 
An Experimental Investigation of the impact of the AICPA Ethics Rulings regarding disclosure of 
outsourcing relationships with third party providers 
 
The first study explores the adequacy of the disclosure rules recommended in the revised ethics 
rulings regarding disclosure of outsourcing relationships and the resulting ethical and economic 
repercussions for both, the AICPA members and their clients. The study examines the behavior of the 
clients of CPA firms that are outsourcing returns within the realm of the contract entered into for tax 
return preparation and analyze the repercussions of two contractual issues, disclosure and pricing on 
both contracting parties. Specifically, this study presents direct evidence using experiments, about how 
individual taxpayers might react to disclosures made by tax preparers regarding their outsourcing 
relationships with third party service providers. The primary issues addressed in this study are: 
members’ responsibilities to their clients, the scope of their contract and the resulting contracting 
problems; and members’ motivations to conceal privately held information suggesting opportunistic 
behavior by AICPA members. The study brings forth important public policy implications for 
protection of consumers who constitute the most vulnerable targets with regard to the detrimental 
effects of offshoring. The findings of this study may lead regulators to review the adequacy of the 
disclosure rules and may induce the recommendation of changes.  
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Study Two: 
The Commercialization Project: The AICPA rhetoric surrounding the tax return preparation 
outsourcing disclosure rules 
 
The second study analyzes the disclosure rules recommended in the AICPA ethics rulings 
regarding disclosure of outsourcing relationships from an ethical standpoint. The purpose of this 
analysis is to study the commercialization of the accounting profession using Giddens (1990) theory of 
trust and expert systems and Parker’s (1994) private interest model in the context of the AICPA’s 
revised ethics rulings regarding the disclosure of outsourcing of tax return preparation. Specifically, I 
intend to explore the mechanics and the rhetoric employed by the AICPA to revise the ethics rulings 
(No.112, No.12, and No.1). The primary issues addressed in this study are: members’ motivation to 
avoid full disclosure in order to further their private interests to preserve their socio-economic status 
with the use of the code of ethics as an instrument that aids promotion of members’ private interests; 
public confidence in the accounting profession and possible impairment of trust; and the 
commercialistic outlook of the profession and heightened concern with being more profitable. The 
paper attempts to enforce the view that professional change is a diffuse political process addressing 
multiple potential constituencies and not necessary, evolutionary, or motiveless. 
Study Three: 
Sustaining competitive advantage in Finance and Accounting outsourcing markets: A case study of 
leading third party service providers 
 
The first two studies approach the issue of accounting services outsourcing from the 
perspective of the outsourcer, whereas, the third study adopts the perspective of the third party service 
provider. The third study analyzes the factors that provide a competitive advantage to leading service 
providers in accounting outsourcing markets in India. I develop a theoretical model that examines the 
factors that enable service providers to maintain market share, by recognizing the issues that endanger 
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the survival of finance and accounting outsourcing and by developing competencies to address these 
issues.  In doing so, I examine issues that have received little prior theoretical or empirical attention. 
The method adopted in my study is theory generation in the manner written by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), Mintzberg (1979) and Miles and Huberman (1984) based on case study evidence of three 
leading FAO service providers in India. 
Overall Contribution 
 Taken together, these studies address issues that have not been addressed previously in 
accounting literature and will advance our understanding of a fast-growing phenomenon, the 
outsourcing of accounting services. Finance and accounting outsourcing may strongly influence the 
choice of future organizational form and structure thus making it important to develop an early 
understanding of this industry. The remainder of this dissertation presents each of the three studies in 
detail. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  STUDY ONE:  AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE 
IMPACT OF THE AICPA ETHICS RULINGS REGARDING DISCLOSURES OF 
OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THIRD PARTY SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
Introduction 
Recently, members of the U.S. Congress, the media, and state and federal regulators have debated a 
number of issues regarding the responsibilities of businesses to disclose to their customers and clients 
when they outsource services or production to other countries (AICPA, 2004b). As a result, the AICPA 
Professional Ethics Executive committee (hereafter PEEC) began a project to assess whether or not the 
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (the “Code”) sufficiently addresses the members’ obligations 
when outsourcing services to third party service providers (hereafter TPSP) (AICPA 2004b). The 
PEEC examined the effect that outsourcing of accounting and tax services has on integrity, objectivity, 
compliance with standards and confidential client information, and issued an Exposure Draft in early 
2004.  
The PEEC received 49 comment letters to that Exposure Draft. Some minor modifications were 
made to the Exposure Draft based on the feedback received and the final ethics rulings were issued on 
October 28, 2004. The new pronouncements took effect for all professional services performed on or 
after July 1, 20051. The new requirements (Ethics Ruling No. 112 under Rule 102, Ethics Ruling No. 
12 under Rule 201 and 202 and Ethics Ruling No.1 under Rule 301) state that if the member intends to 
use the services of a TPSP, the client should be informed and be given the opportunity to ask questions 
concerning the use of the service provider. Additionally, members must enter into contractual 
agreements with any TPSP to maintain confidentiality of the clients’ information (See Appendix A).  
                                                 
1 They do not apply to professional services that are performed pursuant to agreements that are in existence on June 30, 
2005 that are completed by December 31, 2005. 
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Previously, the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (the Code) did not require disclosure to the 
client when a TPSP is used, whether domestically or overseas (AICPA, 2004b). In determining 
whether the Code was sufficient or needed to be amended, the PEEC considered a number of ethical 
issues concerning the use of TPSPs, including whether a new ethics ruling under Rule 102 – Integrity 
and Objectivity, should be issued to require that, prior to disclosing confidential client information to a 
TPSP, a member should inform the client that he or she plans to use a TPSP in providing professional 
services to the client (AICPA, 2004b). The revision of the ethics rulings pursuant to the issuance of the 
exposure draft seems to reinforce the AICPA’s agreement with the stance that it is their responsibility 
to disclose to their clients when they outsource services to other providers domestically or to providers 
in other countries. However, the revised rulings in their current format may not be able accomplish this 
stated objective due to ambiguous phrasing. 
The lack of specificity is indicated by the lack of differentiation made in the revised rulings 
between outsourcing domestically and outsourcing overseas, also known as offshoring2. With the 
current disclosure requirement, the clients of the firm are informed that a TPSP may prepare the returns. 
It is not necessary to inform the client of the geographical location of the TPSP. The TPSP may be 
within the US or the return may be offshored to a remote location such as India (AICPA, 2004a). This 
can be considered a significant area of concern because there are ethical and economic considerations 
involved in offshoring of professional services such as tax return preparation that are distinctly 
different from outsourcing returns within the US (FDIC, 2004; GAO, 2005). A number of studies have 
confirmed that the level of risk is elevated when the third party provider resides overseas. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) conducted a study with regard to the associated risks of 
offshoring by financial institutions from a safety and soundness perspective and with particular 
                                                 
2 Outsourcing of returns involves partnering with a service provider located within the US whereas offshoring of tax return 
preparation involves partnering with an outsourcing facilitator situated overseas. 
 12
emphasis on the threats posed to customer privacy in June 2004. Their findings recommended 
disclosure of undisclosed third-party contracting arrangements since they may increase risk in 
outsourcing relationships. This potential increase in risk occurs regardless of whether the undisclosed 
third party resides domestically or offshore; however, inherent outsourcing risks may be amplified due 
to unique country risk when the third party is an offshore vendor.  
Aron et al. (2205) conducted a study that summarizes the risks associated with outsourcing, 
domestically and overseas. They concluded that there are certain risks associated with outsourcing 
domestically such as strategic risks (caused by deliberate activities of vendors to exploit clients as part 
of a profit-maximizing strategy), operational risks (that may arise due to a breakdown in operations at 
the vendor location) and long-term intrinsic risks of atrophy (with the passage of time, an activity that 
is outsourced in its entirety may cause the company to lose the core group of people who were familiar 
with the activity).  In addition to all of the above risks of outsourcing domestically, offshoring involves 
additional risks. These are intrinsic risks of location, caused simply by moving activities to remote 
locations. Some of these are geopolitical risks; for example, moving activities to India creates an 
exposure to the potential of violent escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan. The other forms 
of intrinsic risk of location are equally familiar, such as sovereign risk or exchange-rate risk (Aron et 
al., 2005). 
In addition to the above mentioned general risks of offshoring, offshoring risks that are specific to 
tax return preparation are the competence of the preparers and the protection of information sent 
outside the immediate control of the CPA firm. Arguably, CPA firms may have adopted measures to 
ensure that preparers are competent and client information is protected thereby ensuring that clients’ 
interests are protected no less than if the CPA firm had prepared the return in-house. However, the 
focus of this study is not whether offshoring of tax returns is more risky than outsourcing domestically 
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or whether the CPA firms have adequately managed the additional risks that arise from offshoring. The 
focus of this study is whether disclosure which is made to the clients regarding offshoring of their 
returns is adequate. Ethics dictate that clients of the tax firms should be provided with disclosures that 
are adequate enough to make an informed decision about whether their returns should be prepared in-
house or outsourced domestically or offshored, based on their own assessment of the risks involved in 
each scenario. 
The reasons underlying clients’ decision regarding whether or not to favor outsourcing or 
offshoring may vary. Clients may have different perceptions about information security and privacy 
risks and may have different attitudes towards risk. Further, clients may be more opposed to offshoring 
of returns due to patriotic concerns (Robertson et al., 2004). The wrenching events of recent years have 
intensified patriotism throughout the United States and many U.S. workers have lost jobs to cheaper 
third-world labor (Shamis et al., 2005). Other concerns about offshoring are the privacy and security 
risk of posting confidential client information to an overseas facilitator’s website. Most taxpayers do 
not want their sensitive tax return information ever made public (Soled, 2005).  
On the other hand, some clients may favor lower fees that may be offered as a result of the lower 
expenses incurred by the firms when returns are outsourced or offshored. One of the greatest 
motivations for the CPA firms to outsource preparation of tax returns, domestically or overseas, is cost 
arbitrage (Lombardo 2003). The ability to reduce expenses through reduced staff, whether full-time or 
temporary is an advantage that is common to both outsourcing and offshoring of services. The tax 
preparers may pass on a portion of these cost savings to their clients in the form of reduced fees which 
may be lucrative to clients who value cost savings. In case of offshoring of returns there are some 
added benefits over and above outsourcing such as the practical efficiency afforded by an overseas 
workforce coupled with the advent of technology that enables speedy data transfer. The time-zone 
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differences create virtual twenty four hour operations since the daily close of operation in the U.S. 
accounting firms is marked by the start of the work day for overseas accountants. Thus, offshoring can 
improve client service by speeding the delivery of completed returns (Robertson et al. 2004).   
In conclusion, it should be the client’s prerogative to make the decision about whether their return 
should be outsourced, offshored or prepared in-house, given all the relevant information and after they 
weight the costs and benefits involved. The AICPA’s decision to offshore returns without client 
consent could be an attempt to use their expertise to make decisions in lieu of their clients who may 
not possess, in the AICPA’s opinion, the knowledge, expertise or requisite information to make their 
own decisions (Dwyer and Roberts, 1998). The purpose of this study is to explore the adequacy of the 
disclosure recommended in the revised ethics rulings and the resulting ethical and economic 
repercussions for both, the AICPA members and their clients. I examine the behavior of the clients of 
CPA firms that are outsourcing returns within the realm of the contract entered into for tax return 
preparation and analyze the repercussions of two contractual issues, disclosure and pricing on both 
contracting parties. Specifically, this study presents direct evidence using experiments, about how 
individual taxpayers might react to disclosures made by tax preparers regarding their outsourcing 
relationships with TPSPs. I build my hypotheses using the theory of social contracts (Oosterhout et al., 
2006) and search theory of economic rationality (Stigler, 1961) to analyze the reaction of individual 
taxpayers to the disclosure strategy and the pricing strategy adopted by the tax preparers.  
The primary issues addressed in this study are: members’ responsibilities to their clients, the scope 
of their contract and the resulting contracting problems; and members’ motivations to conceal privately 
held information suggesting opportunistic behavior by AICPA members. This study is important for 
several reasons. First, it contributes to the contractualist business ethics literature by empirically testing 
the Oosterhout et al. (2006) contract model in the tax return offshoring setting. Second, it uses social 
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contract theory to understand the contract between taxpayers and tax preparers. Thus far the notion of 
social contract has been explored in tax research in relation to tax compliance and tax evasion 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Frank, 1993 and Vihanto, 2003). This stream of research is centered on 
the contract between the governments, which serves as the agent liable for enforcing the tax rules and 
entitled to use force toward this end, and the taxpayer. The contractual issues between the tax preparers 
and the taxpayers are at the forefront of the offshoring practice and an investigation into the finer 
nuances of this relationship will problematize the disclosure strategy adopted by the tax preparers, i.e., 
the AICPA members. Third, it identifies economic motivation for the AICPA members not to 
voluntarily disclose information about offshoring tax returns. By doing so, the study brings forth 
important public policy implications for protection of consumers who constitute the most vulnerable 
targets with regard to the detrimental effects of offshoring. The findings of this study may lead 
regulators to review the adequacy of the disclosure rules and may induce the recommendation of 
changes. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a background of the outsourcing and 
offshoring phenomenon and the shortcomings identified in the revised AICPA ethics rulings. Section 3 
describes the Oosterhout et al. (2006) theory of social contracts and Stigler’s search theory of 
economic rationality followed by development of testable hypotheses. Section 4 details the 
experimental methods. The analysis of results will be presented in Section 5. The paper will conclude 
with a discussion and conclusion in Section 6. 
Background 
The succeeding discussion provides a background of the practice of outsourcing and offshoring and 
elaborates on the distinction between outsourcing domestically versus offshoring of tax returns. This 
background highlights the reasoning behind disclosure. This discussion is followed by a description of 
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the varied concerns brought forth by the revised ethics rulings and their inability to address the key 
concerns of disclosure of confidential client information to bring forth possible shortcomings of the 
revised rulings in their current format.  
Outsourcing and Offshoring: Pros and Cons 
Dun & Bradstreet estimates that outsourcing, a practice that commenced approximately thirty years 
ago, has grown exponentially, and generating revenues up to $4 trillion a year (Fortune, 2005). A 
survey of Outsourcing World Summit attendees established that outsourcing of finance, accounting, 
sales, tax and marketing services is presently taking precedence over IT, manufacturing, and real-estate 
facilities services, which were traditionally, the most outsourced functions (Fortune, 2005). The 
ascension of the number of companies that adopt outsourcing as a mode of cutting costs in order to 
focus on core competencies has led to a consequent ramping up of  proposed U.S. state and federal 
laws to limit outsourcing and offshoring (Hrivnak, 2005). Outsourcing and offshoring of professional 
services have raised ethical questions regarding integrity, objectivity, disclosure, and client 
confidentiality (Mintz, 2004). Tax return preparation is recognized as, perhaps, the predominant 
product of outsourcing to date (Cook et al. 2005). Professional services such as tax return preparation 
have been offshored to foreign locations such as India amid concerns regarding confidentiality and 
security of confidential client information (McGee, 2005).  
Outsourcing of returns involves partnering with a service provider located within the US whereas 
offshoring of tax return preparation involves partnering with an outsourcing facilitator situated 
overseasi. The pros and cons of the outsourcing practice are discussed below. The proponents of 
outsourcing of tax compliance work explicate a number of reasons for the popularity of the practice 
(McGee, 2005). For example, outsourcing can disengage accounting professionals from devoting time 
to routine tasks to offering an extended orbit of client services, minimize the burden of recruiting 
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professionals, promote cost economies, and accelerate the delivery of client returns (Robertson et al., 
2004). Alternately, there are concerns that outsourcing limits the tax preparation experience of entry-
level accountants and may be lead to decreased staff morale due to staff concerns about layoffs 
(Robertson et al. 2004). Further, technology capability may act as a deterrent to effective outsourcing 
because firms are required to have technology capabilities, including hardware, data storage, software, 
and knowledgeable people, to move manual processing to a web-based processing system. 
 Offshoring of tax returns encompasses not only the pros and cons of outsourcing but other unique 
costs and benefits as well. Offshoring offers further benefits such as alleviation of temporary shortages 
of available tax professionals in the US (eAccounting, 2004).  Critics of offshoring claim that one of 
the greatest concerns about offshoring is the privacy and security risk of posting confidential client 
information such as social security numbers to an overseas facilitator’s website (Robertson et al., 2004). 
However, some AICPA members argue that the concerns regarding the security and confidentiality of 
data are unfounded. They insist that reputable TPSPs institute security measures that far exceed the 
measures applied by numerous accounting firms within the U.S. (AICPA 2004c) The production 
facilities operate in an altogether paperless environment and admission of any kind of stationary or 
personal effects, such as purses and brief cases, into the production area is prohibited. Further, lack of 
removable media devices on staff computers, restrictions on storing of client data on the hard drive, 
lack of email capability, instant messaging capabilities, restricted access to the internet and Non-
Disclosure agreements greatly minimize the risk of data tampering and identity theft (Appendix MM, 
AICPA, 2004b).  
Regardless, there may be clients who do not condone the transmission of their confidential 
information to a third party who is not directly supervised by their CPA. U.S. laws that protect 
information and safeguard privacy do not have extra-territorial application resulting in the U.S. 
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government, corporations and U.S. citizens becoming increasingly dependent on foreign laws to 
protect their interests (IEEE, 2004)3. The risk posed to these interests by individuals and organizations 
who would take advantage of weak laws, loopholes and limited access to enforcement is not 
insignificant (IEEE, 2004). Other concerns are political instability in the country of the service 
providing company which may lead to interruptions in processing operations.  
Finally, clients of the tax firms may have patriotic concerns about the offshoring of tax preparation 
work (Robertson et al., 2004). The wrenching events of recent years have intensified patriotism 
throughout the United States and many U.S. workers have lost jobs to cheaper third-world labor. 
Clients may view offshoring as yet another myopic approach that needlessly diminishes the U.S. job 
market (Shamis et al., 2005). The results of a survey, conducted to gather evidence on taxpayers’ 
perceptions concerning public accountants’ disclosure of tax return preparation outsourcing, indicate 
that greater than 84% of the respondents, who availed the services of a tax-preparer, considered 
offshoring of their returns to be a significant cause for concern (Brody et al., 2006). The above 
discussion reinforces my argument that offshoring of returns raises concerns that are distinct from 
outsourcing domestically. It imbeds a degree of skepticism into the AICPA’s claims that the taxpayers 
are indifferent between outsourcing and offshoring of their tax returns (AICPA, 2004b). 
 Ethics Rulings under AICPA’s Rule 102 and Rule 201, 202 and 301: Shortcomings in the disclosure 
rules. 
The revised AICPA ethics rulings contain provisions that may provide different interpretations to 
different readers. The inadequacies in the rulings are instrumental in the germination of the contracting 
problems that arise subsequently. Contracting problems may frustrate the expectations of contracting 
parties inducing them to end the contract. Therefore, gaining an understanding of the shortcomings in 
                                                 
3 The IEEE, a non-profit organization, is the world's leading professional association for the advancement of technology 
and stands for Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 
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the rulings may be an important step towards reducing informational asymmetry between the client and 
the AICPA member.  The shortcomings identified in each of the revised rulings are discussed below. 
Rule 102 - Integrity and Objectivity: Ethics Ruling No. 112.    Use of a Third-Party Service Provider to 
Assist a Member in Providing Professional Services  
 
Rule 102, ET 112 (See Appendix A) was issued to provide guidance with respect to a member’s 
responsibilities when using TPSPs to provide professional services to clients. The new requirements 
mandate that AICPA members must inform clients, preferably in writing, when they use TPSPs to 
provide professional services such as outsourced bookkeeping, tax-return preparation, consulting and 
attestation services excluding administrative support services (AICPA 2004a). An analysis of the 
comment letters brought forth the criticisms forwarded by some of the AICPA members against the 
rulings in their current format. The Professional Conduct Committee of the California Society of 
Certified Public Accountants criticized the method of disclosure which leaves the form of disclosure to 
the member’s discretionii. The method of disclosure should require mandatory disclosure in a written 
form that is acknowledged by the client (Appendix HH, AICPA 2004b). 
The disclosure should include the geographic location of the TPSP without specifically revealing 
the identity of the third party. (Appendix HH, AICPA 2004b). A contractual agreement with a foreign 
entity such as a firm based in India may be difficult to enforce as a practical matter. Therefore, 
disclosure of confidential information to a foreign entity should be required to be disclosed to a client. 
Another criticism of the ruling was forwarded by the Information Technology Executive Committee 
pronouncing that the rule does not describe what a TPSP “is”; it describes what it “is not.” (Appendix 
QQ, AICPA 2004c). Also, the format of the current disclosure allows the disclosure to be made as a 
part of documents such as a tax organizer or in the standard privacy policy letters thereby reducing its 
accessibility to the taxpayers. 
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Rule 201—General Standards and Rule 202—Compliance with Standards ET 12.    Applicability of 
General and Technical Standards When Using a Third-Party Service Provider  
 
Rule 201 and Rule 202, ET 12 (See Appendix A) specify the responsibility an AICPA member in 
public practice has for complying with general and technical standards when using a TPSP to provide 
professional services. The rules specify that members remain responsible for providing adequate 
oversight for all services performed by TPSPs and they must adequately plan and supervise such 
services and obtain sufficient relevant data to support the work product. One of the shortcomings of 
this ruling was underscored by the Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee of the 
Florida Institute of CPAs. Though the committee agreed that the member should assume responsibility 
it elaborated the difficulty of operationalizing the assumption of responsibility.  
In asking a member to be responsible for the “adequate oversight of all services performed by the 
TPSP and for ensuring that all professional services are performed with professional competence and 
due professional care” it appears that the AICPA expects the TPSP to adhere to the standards that the 
member is bound by in regard to ethics (Appendix EE, AICPA 2004b). The California Board of 
Accountancy criticized the ruling by arguing that it is important to emphasize the member’s direct 
responsibility for safeguarding outsourced client information because of the potential for identity theft 
and other financial fraud that could be committed once documents are sent to TPSPs. (Appendix FF, 
AICPA 2004b). 
 Rule 301 - Confidential Client Information ET 1.    Use of a Third-Party Service Provider to Provide 
Professional Services to Clients or Administrative Support Services to the Member  
 
Rule 301, ET 1 (See Appendix A) states that a member should enter into a contractual agreement 
with the TPSP to maintain the confidentiality of the client’s information, and should use reasonable 
care to determine that the third-party has appropriate procedures in place to prevent unauthorized 
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release of confidential client information to others. These provisions are challenging for several 
reasons that are brought forth in the following arguments. The members of Information Technology 
Executive Committee argued that members may lack the technical competence to review the 
procedures in place to prevent unauthorized release of confidential client information, and moreover, 
most TPSPs would not allow their procedures to be reviewed, as that would be considered a breach of 
best practices. (Appendix QQ, AICPA 2004b).  
The Texas State Board of Public Accountancy believes that a confidentiality agreement with a 
TPSP is not an adequate substitute for client consent when services are to be rendered by the TPSP and 
that provider is outside of the jurisdiction of the United States legal system. Further, the board 
recommends requiring a confidentiality agreement between the member or member’s firm and an 
administrative support TPSP when that provider would have access to confidential client information, 
since there is no required disclosure of such arrangements to the client. (Appendix RR, AICPA 2004b). 
Thus, the AICPA may be free riding on claims of professional care, responsibility, and due diligence 
by passing on the responsibility to the TPSPs and may be taking advantage of the information 
asymmetries that exist due to the inability of the clients to monitor their activities.  
 
Hypotheses Development 
 
In this study, I use both economic-based and sociology-based theories to develop three sets of 
hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses provides taxpayers’ reactions to the disclosure strategy adopted 
by the AICPA member. The second hypothesis provides taxpayers’ reactions to the pricing strategy 
adopted by the AICPA member. The third hypothesis addresses the possibility of an interaction 
between the disclosure strategy and pricing strategy on the reactions of taxpayers. The theory of social 
contracts (Oosterhout et al., 2006) provides the theoretical understanding underlying the first set of 
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hypotheses and drives the disclosure strategy variable. Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) have argued that 
the rules of business ethics should be based on norms determined by communities since communities, 
geographic or other reference groups determine what is appropriate. In the context of the ethical norms 
related to the conduct of AICPA members, the ‘‘community’ involves any combination of stakeholders 
such as clients, the business community, and regulators. The focus of this study is the AICPA members 
and how their code of ethics should reflect responsibilities to a particular set of stakeholders, their 
clients.  
Hypothesis 1: Taxpayers’ response to firm disclosure strategy 
Social contract theory is grounded in the appealing idea that human interaction and association 
should be guided and constrained only by those norms and institutions that freely consenting agents 
could and possibly would agree to if they had the choice (Hampton, 1993). Oosterhout et al. (2006) 
direct our attention to two behavioral assumptions that economic organization theory has identified as 
highly relevant in the context of contracting (Williamson, 1985). The first is that contractors may 
sometimes be subject to overly self-regarding or opportunistic tendencies that lead them to exploit the 
freedom they enjoy in moral free space by unjust means (Williamson, 1985). The second is that 
contractors are subject to bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1998) or cognitive limitations that 
interfere with their ability to rationally devise norm-generating contracts within moral free space. They 
confront these two behavioral assumptions with two normative expectations guiding all contractual 
relations, reciprocity and effectiveness. 
This produces an idealized set of four contracting problems representing their version of the state 
of nature: the predicament in which contractors find themselves when there is no internal morality of 
contracting in place to guide and constrain their behavior. The four general contracting problems that 
contractors must strive to avoid when engaging in extant contracting practices are desolation, 
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deception, defeasance, and defection. These problems are studied in context of the current study and 
three contractual problems existing in the social contract between the AICPA member and the client 
are identified. Each of these problems corresponds to the contracting problems identified by 
Oosterhout et al. (2006) and is discussed in detail below. Figure 1 provides the framework to guide the 
first hypothesis. This figure indicates that the AICPA member-client relationship is indicative of three 
contracting problems: veiling the identity of the TPSP, Lack of specific client consent, and concealing 
privately held information. An analysis of contracting problems helps identify the possible motivations 
underlying the recommended disclosure strategy in the revised ethics rulings.  
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Table 1. Disclosure (D) Scenarios 
a Assessment of the likelihood that the taxpayer will return to the same CPA firm the following year for 
tax return preparation. 
 Disclosure in 
AICPA 
recommended 
format 
Disclosure that 
returns are 
outsourced to an 
overseas TPSP 
Disclosure that 
returns are 
outsourced to a 
domestic TPSP 
Disclosure that 
returns are 
prepared in-
house 
 (returns are 
offshored) 
(returns are 
offshored) 
(returns are 
outsourced) 
(returns are 
not outsourced 
at all) 
Pricing (P) 
     Strategy 
 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
 
     Fee Decrease  
     (P1) 
 
 
Case 1  
P1D1 
 
 
 
Case 2 
P1D2 
 
Case 3 
P1D3 
 
Case 4 
P1D4 
No Change 
    (P2) 
 
 
Case 5 
P2D1 
 
Case 6 
P2D2 
 
Case 7 
P2D3 
 
Case 8 
P2D4 
Veiling the Identity of the TPSP 
The problem of desolation is described as veiling the identity of the TPSP in the tax offshoring 
scenario and is situated in the upper left hand corner of the Oosterhout et al. (2006) model (See Figure 
1).The problem of desolation suggests that that a contract will not come into being unless all parties 
anticipate some gain from it. Yet the behavioral condition of bounded rationality may limit the ability 
of potential contractors to envision such gains. In the context of tax return offshoring, the AICPA 
member will definitely reap economic gains. However, the contractual problem of desolation arises 
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because the client may perceive offshoring as not beneficial to him or her. The question that arises is 
why the client believes that offshoring is not beneficial. Before returns were offshored, the client 
substituted the identity of the AICPA member as a proxy for quality, which guarantees a certain 
minimal level of performance, since his or her bounded rationality limits his or her knowledge of the 
quality of tax returns. After returns are offshored, if the identity of the AICPA member is substituted 
by a TPSP, the client may perceive quality of tax return to be lower. Thus, he or she may want to 
rescind the contract. To avoid this problem, the member prefers to veil the identity of the TPSP. 
The AICPA members fear that once the identity of the TPSP is revealed, the clients will not return 
to the firm the following year leading to loss of revenue. The primary motivation for adoption of a 
disclosure strategy by the AICPA member that veils the identity of the TPSP is to maximize the 
likelihood of clients returning to the CPA firm the following year for tax return preparation. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that per AICPA members’ beliefs, revealing the identity of TPSP will lower the client’s 
likelihood of returning to the CPA firm causing the AICPA to favor the disclosure strategy in the 
AICPA format which conceals the identity of the TPSP over the strategy of full disclosure that reveals 
that the returns are being offshored.  
Failure to procure Specific Client Consent 
  The term defeasance indicates the possibility of a contractual scheme becoming maladapted to 
contractors’ interests because of unforeseen contingencies. This happens, for example, when the 
conditions under which they gave their consent change dramatically while the contract itself provides 
no provision for such contingencies. Ultimately, the central question is whether a contract is still 
binding under dramatically changed circumstances. Failure to procure specific client consent 
characterizes the contracting problem of defeasance in the tax return offshoring setting and is situated 
in the bottom left hand corner of the Oosterhout et al. (2006) model (See Figure 1). At the time of 
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entering into the contract for preparation of tax returns, the client has an expectation that the return will 
be prepared by or under the supervision of the AICPA member. The terms under which consent was 
given change dramatically when returns are offshored. Procuring specific client consent would 
diminish the defeasance problem but according to the AICPA member, it may also reduce the 
effectiveness with which services may be rendered.  
The AICPA’s reluctance to secure client consent evidences their intention to extend the scope of 
the contract entered into without solidarity of contracting parties. The AICPA’s reluctance to secure 
specific client consent is revealed in their reaction to the proposed IRS rulings regarding the offshoring 
of tax returns. The proposed IRS disclosure expressly states that if the tax return preparer is located 
outside of United States then the taxpayer’s written consent will be required prior to offshoring the 
returns. The logic forwarded by the IRS is that it is difficult to enforce legal action against a provider 
located outside the US jurisdiction hence the tax payers should be aware of the increased risks faced by 
them in the event of offshoring. The AICPA’s concern is that if the IRS regulation is passed, the clients 
may not concede to the offshoring decision which will reduce the effectiveness with which the 
members can provide the service and result in loss of clients who do not approve of offshoring of 
returns. They discouraged the IRS from passing a regulation requiring disclosure by appealing to 
arguments of efficiency and simplicity in the filing process. Procuring specific client consent is the 
second factor that is instrumental in lowering the likelihood of the client returning to the same CPA 
firm the following year for tax return preparation and hence, the AICPA will favor the disclosure 
strategy in the AICPA format that conceals information about the offshoring of returns over strategy of 
full disclosure that discloses offshoring of returns. 
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Concealing Privately held Information  
Reciprocity is also threatened by calculated efforts of some contracting parties to mislead or 
confuse others (Williamson, 1985).Contractors are vulnerable to partner opportunism as a consequence 
of ex ante information problems (Akerlof, 1970), a form of information asymmetry whereby one party 
is better informed about its own motivations and qualifications than other contractors. The term 
deception is used to denote the contracting problems whereby all deliberate efforts to mislead 
contracting partners are made before they commit themselves to a binding agreement. The AICPA is 
guilty of concealing clues that would make it evident to the client that the terms of engagement have 
been altered. The AICPA’s attempt to mislead their clients is revealed by their reluctance to disclose 
information about the geographical location of the service provider. The PEEC believes that when a 
client hires a member or his or her firm to perform professional services, the expectation is that the 
services will be performed by the member or partners or employees of the firm (AICPA, 2004c). Yet, 
this expectation seems to be subordinated to the appeal of offshoring of tax return preparation which is 
advantageous to the members. 
By concealing information about the risks faced by the clients and equating outsourcing 
domestically to offshoring, the AICPA members may be making a deliberate attempt to obfuscate their 
clients before engaging in a binding agreement with them. Concealing privately held information 
characterizes the contracting problem of deception in the tax return offshoring setting and is situated in 
the upper right hand corner of the Oosterhout et al. (2006) model (See Figure 1).The problem of 
deception will be overcome if the AICPA reduces the dysfunctional ex ante information asymmetries 
so that the opportunity to exploit proprietary information does not result in abusing their commitment 
to their clients. Concealing privately held information is the third factor instrumental in lowering the 
client’s likelihood of returning to the same CPA firm the following year for tax return preparation 
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leading the AICPA member to adopt a disclosure strategy in the AICPA format that conceals 
information regarding the offshoring of return preparation versus the strategy of full disclosure.   
The above discussion describes how the three contracting problems conjoin to identify the 
motivations of the AICPA members not to disclose offshoring information. The AICPA members want 
to maximize the taxpayer’s likelihood of returning to the same firm the following year for tax return 
preparation because losing repeat customers will hurt their socio-economic interests. The taxpayer’s 
likelihood of returning is hypothesized to be a function of the disclosure strategy adopted by the 
AICPA member. The AICPA member will react favorably to a disclosure strategy that maximizes the 
likelihood of returning and will be averse to any disclosures that lower the likelihood of returning. The 
likelihood of returning is influenced by client’s averseness to offshoring of tax returns. The more 
averse the client is to the practice of offshoring, the greater is the AICPA member’s incentive to 
conceal privately held information about offshoring. Hypothesis 1 tests the main effect of the 
disclosure strategy factor on the likelihood of returning. Accordingly, the first hypothesis of this study 
is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that taxpayers will return to the CPA firm for tax return preparation is 
lower when there is disclosure that returns are being offshored than when there is disclosure of 
outsourcing in the AICPA format 
 
From the above, one can argue that if the returns were prepared in-house, the likelihood of the client 
returning to the firm the following year would be higher, than if returns were outsourced or offshored. 
The disclosure strategy that discloses that returns are prepared in-house is a control condition thus 
facilitating a comparison of the client’s response to outsourcing and offshoring of returns. 
Hypothesis 1a: The likelihood that taxpayers will return to the CPA firm for tax return preparation is 
higher when returns are prepared in-house than when there is disclosure that returns are being 
offshored. 
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Hypothesis 1b: The likelihood that taxpayers will return to the CPA firm for tax return preparation is 
higher when returns are prepared in-house than when there is disclosure that returns are being 
outsourced. 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Taxpayer’s response to firm pricing strategy 
In this section, I appeal to Stigler’s search theory of economic rationality in order to understand the 
taxpayer’s behavior in response to pricing strategy. The tax payers are sensitive to the disclosure 
strategy as well as changes in fees. Given the requisite information, the pricing strategy of the tax 
preparer will have a bearing on the taxpayer’s likelihood of returning to the same firm in the following 
year. Fishman and Hagerty (2003) analyze a market in which all customers know whether information 
has been disclosed, but some customers lack the technical expertise necessary to interpret the 
information, therefore they are categorized as uninformed. This lack of expertise may be due to 
consumers having neither the time nor the education to become knowledgeable enough to understand 
the information. In their model, with uninformed customers who cannot observe product quality, 
pricing decisions of sellers are strategic as well (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003).  
When price is better known than quality, consumers may use three choice strategies under 
uncertainty: best value, price-seeking, and price aversion (Gordon, 2005) Best value is choosing the 
brand with the least overall cost in terms of price and expected quality; price-seeking is choosing the 
highest priced brand to maximize expected quality; price aversion is choosing the lowest priced brand 
to minimize immediate costs. The three choice strategies arise from three different research paradigms: 
best value from the economic theory of rationality, price-seeking from research on inference, and price 
aversion from research on risk aversion. Rationality is a set of principles that describe the normatively 
best or utility maximizing choice.  
Stigler (1961) is usually referred to as the first paper in search theory of economic rationality. The 
typical case considered in search theory is described as follows. A consumer wants to buy a unit of a 
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certain commodity. Clearly, he prefers to do so at the lowest available price in the market. 
Unfortunately, he does not perceive all ruling prices with certainty, and there are costs such as money, 
time, and disutility attached to actions that improve the perception of his transaction opportunities, i.e., 
searching for lower prices. Both the returns of search in the form of lower prices and the costs of 
search will also depend on the consumer's preferences. Economic behavior implies that a consumer 
does search, and thus does change his perspective on his opportunities, as long as he perceives this to 
be advantageous to him. As a result, agents do not necessarily buy at the lowest price available in the 
market, but at the lowest price they perceive in their opportunity set, while better opportunities might 
be available ‘just around the corner'.  
In this study, the behavior of the taxpayers in response to the firms’ pricing strategies is understood 
by appealing to the search theory of economic rationality (Stigler, 1961). A rational self-interest 
maximizing individual will favor lowest price available in the market given a set of opportunities. Thus, 
it is hypothesized that decrease in fee will be viewed favorably by taxpayers and will increase their 
propensity to return to the same firm for tax  return preparation the following year in all the three cases, 
outsourcing within the US, offshoring, and returns are prepared in-house, as opposed to no change in 
fees. Thus, the likelihood of the client returning to the same firm the following year for tax return 
preparation will be influenced by the pricing strategy adopted by the AICPA member. Reduced fees 
may signal to the taxpayers that a portion of the cost savings is being passed on to them and may 
moderate the negative effect of the offshoring disclosure making them less averse to offshoring. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 states that likelihood of returning under decreased fees will be significantly higher than 
likelihood of returning under no change in fees.  Accordingly, the second hypothesis of the study is 
stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood that the customer will return to the CPA firm for tax return preparation 
the following year is higher when the fee is decreased the following year than when there is no change. 
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Hypothesis 3: Interaction effect between Pricing strategy and disclosure strategy 
 
An interaction effect between pricing strategy variable and disclosure strategy variable is 
hypothesized as described in the model below. The specific nature of the interaction, if any, will be 
examined by conducting post hoc analyses. 
 
Likelihood of returning = Disclosure Strategy * Pricing strategy * (Disclosure strategy*Pricing 
strategy) where the last term on the right hand side of the equation is the interaction term. 
Accordingly hypothesis 3 of the study can be stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Pricing strategy moderates the relationship between disclosure strategy and the 
likelihood that the customer will return to the CPA firm for tax preparation the following year.  
 
 
Research Methods 
The experiment focuses on likelihood judgments made by the taxpayers about returning to the 
same firm for tax return preparation. One reason for choosing a likelihood judgment task is to capture 
the reasoning embedded in the taxpayers’ response to the disclosure strategy and the pricing strategy 
adopted by the AICPA member. The results of the experiment will bring forth the concerns that the 
taxpayers may have regarding offshoring of their tax returns and assess whether the currently revised 
rulings adequately address those concerns. The disclosure strategy and pricing strategy are the 
independent variables. The dependent variable is the subject’s assessment of the likelihood of returning 
to the same firm the following year for tax return preparation. 
 Subjects 
Subjects were recruited by students in four undergraduate accounting classes. Students were 
offered extra credit points for recruiting eligible participants. An eligible participant was described as 
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an “US citizen over age 18 who has filed tax returns for at least two years”. The participants were 
seated in an auditorium and were given thirty minutes to complete the questionnaire. The total number 
of respondents recruited was 258. 10 of the respondents did not pass the manipulation check questions 
and were eliminated. 5 respondents were eliminated due to incomplete responses leaving a total of 243 
respondents. Respondents were asked the following question: “Have you or a family member ever 
been terminated from a job because your employer outsourced your position to a TPSP”. An 
affirmative response to the question was presumed to signify the presence of personal prejudice 
towards outsourcing. 24 respondents gave positive responses to this question and were subsequently 
eliminated resulting in a final sample of 219 useable responses. 
 Instrument 
The questionnaire required the subjects to make decisions about their likelihood of returning to the 
same CPA firm the following year for preparation of their tax returns denoted as L(R), based on the 
pricing strategy and the type of disclosure given to them. The two pricing strategies and four disclosure 
strategies gave rise to eight versions of the same questionnaire. The questionnaire was prepared in two 
parts. Part one provided details about the following hypothetical case scenario: 
Mckinsey & Pullen LLP is one of United States' largest accounting firms offering a wide range of 
services such as audit, accounting services, tax return preparation, estate and financial planning. M&P 
serves clients from approximately 100 offices across the United States. You have been using the 
services of M&P LLP to prepare your tax returns since 1998. Your adjusted gross income for the 
recent tax year, 2006, was approximately $170,000, including $8,000 of investment income. You have 
approximately $18,000 in itemized deductions.  
The 2005 tax returns were completed on a timely basis, and you were satisfied with the quality of 
the services rendered by M&P. In 2005, M&P did not outsource tax return preparation, and all 
individual tax returns were completed in-house by company employees. M&P charges clients for their 
services based on the actual billable time spent on their jobs. Billable time includes all preparation 
work, consultations, research, phone calls, e-mails and a review of the tax preparer’s work. In 2005, 
M&P sent you an invoice for tax preparation fees and expenses in the amount of $1,200. 
In January 2007, you receive a notice from M&P reminding you of the documentation needed from 
you in order to prepare your 2006 return. The notice also states that since you are one of their long-
term clients, in an attempt to demonstrate to you how much they value your business, you will receive 
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a discount of 20% of the amount of the total tax return preparation fees that will be charged for the 
2006 tax returns. 
Versions 1-4 included a price decrease (20%) representing pricing strategy I which was fee 
decrease. Versions 5-8 did not include any discount on fees representing pricing strategy II which was 
no change in fees charged from the previous year. Further the case scenario in version 1 included the 
following paragraph which is the disclosure format recommended by the AICPA when returns are 
outsourced to a TPSP: 
M&P may from time to time, and depending on the circumstances, use third-party service providers in 
serving your account. M&P may share confidential information about you with these service providers, 
but will remain committed to maintaining the confidentiality and security of your information. Further, 
M&P will maintain internal policies, procedures and safeguards to protect the confidentiality of your 
personal information and will enter into confidentiality agreements with all service providers to 
maintain the confidentiality of your information. M&P will take reasonable precautions to determine 
that they have appropriate procedures in place to prevent the unauthorized release of your confidential 
information to others. In the event that M&P is unable to secure an appropriate confidentiality 
agreement, you will be asked to provide prior consent to the sharing of your confidential information 
with the third-party service provider. Furthermore, the firm will remain responsible for the work 
provided by any such third-party service providers. 
The above format discloses that the return will be outsourced to a TPSP but does not reveal the 
location of the TPSP. The language used in the case was adopted from a sample notification disclosure 
document released by the AICPA (AICPA, 2005). This disclosure could lead respondents to assume 
that returns are outsourced or offshored or not outsourced at all. The use of ‘may’ informed them of 
possibility that returns may be outsourced but at the same time is not conclusive. Since the location of 
the TPSP is not mentioned, some respondents will make assumptions about whether returns are 
outsourced domestically or overseas. The response to disclosure strategy I (D1) in version 1 helped 
gauge the impact of the AICPA recommended disclosure in terms of the other forms of disclosure on 
the clients.  
Respondents were then asked “Please circle below the percentage that most adequately represents 
the probability that you would continue to retain the services of M&P to prepare your 2006 tax return. 
Responses were recorded on a ten point scale with 0% = definitely will not retain and 100% = 
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definitely will retain. This question served as a dependent variable. The next question probed the 
reasons for their answer in the previous question. Respondents were asked to list the extent of 
importance that the factors, fee decrease, confidentiality of data, and quality of tax returns prepared by 
the tax preparer had, in making their decision. The responses were recorded on a 7 point likert scale 
with 1 = not very important and 7= very important. They were also asked to list any other reasons that 
may have influenced their decision-making. Version 2 was identical to version 1 with the exception it 
included the following statement: “The notice also stated that M&P uses the services of a third party 
service provider located in India in serving your account”. This statement expressly states the location 
of the TPSP and intends capturing the respondent’s reaction to disclosure relating to their return being 
sent overseas and represents disclosure strategy II (D2). In version 3 this statement was substituted by 
the following statement: “The notice also stated that M&P uses the services of a third party service 
provider located in US in serving your account”. This statement expressly mentions that the TPSP is 
located within US and intends to differentiate between the respondent’s reaction to the return being 
outsourced overseas versus being outsourced domestically and represents disclosure strategy III (D3). 
Version 4 was a control condition and expressly stated that returns were prepared in-house by the 
employees of M&P. This statement represents disclosure strategy IV (D4). 
Part two of the experiment materials included a post experiment debriefing questionnaire, 
demographic questionnaire, patriotism scale and risk aversion scale. The post experiment de-briefing 
questionnaire included questions that directly asked the respondent about their views regarding 
overseas outsourcing of their returns. They were asked if they believed that outsourcing of their returns 
would lower the quality of tax return preparation. Further, they were asked to express their agreement 
with the following statement: “Confidentiality of my personal data will be safe if I use a tax preparer 
who transfers my tax information, under his or her supervision, to a third party provider located 
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overseas for completion of my tax return”. Similarly, other statements inquired if they agreed that the 
preparer should ask for their specific consent when using the services of a third party provider and 
whether the preparer is behaving unethically when he or she sends their information, without the 
respondent’s knowledge, to a third party. Further, they were asked if they believed that the fees 
charged for the return should be decreased when returns are outsourced.  
The demographic questionnaire included a question regarding the political ideology of the 
participant. Other questions explored whether the participant or any family member had been 
terminated from a job due to the employer outsourcing the position to a TPSP. This question was 
designed to detect and eliminate respondents that may hold biased views towards outsourcing due to 
personal prejudices thus skewing validity of the results. Level of patriotism was measured after the 
experiment is conducted by recording participants’ responses using a CETSCALE (Shimp and Sharma, 
1987). The CETSCALE (See Appendix D) is a psychometrically rigorous scale for measuring a 
concept termed as “consumer ethnocentrism”. “Consumer ethnocentrism” represents the beliefs held 
by American consumers about the appropriateness, indeed morality, of purchasing foreign-made 
products. From the perspective of ethnocentric consumers, purchasing imported products is wrong 
because, in their minds, it hurts the domestic economy, causes losses of jobs, and is plainly unpatriotic. 
The participants’ attitude towards risk was also measured by using the risk scale component of the 
Jackson personality inventory measure. 
The participant could not refer to part one while answering part two and they were asked to answer 
part two only after they placed part one back into the envelope. This was done to ensure that their 
initial responses would not be affected by the questions in the debriefing questionnaire. The eight 
versions of the case were arranged serially. An equal number of cases were prepared and distributed to 
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ensure that each of the groups had equal ns. The participants were assigned at random to a particular 
version. 
Analysis of Results 
 
A two-way ANOVA was used to examine H1 through H3. The ANOVA includes the following 
two factors: (1) disclosure strategy variable with four levels and (2) pricing strategy with two levels. 
The dependent variable is each individual's likelihood of returning score. The results of the ANOVA 
are presented in Table 2. 
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 Table 2.Two-way analysis of variance results for client’s likelihood of returning to the same CPA firm the following year 
Tests of Between subjects effects 
Source  
  
   
   
  
Type III
Sum of 
Squares 
 Df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 34843.405(b) 7 4977.629 8.024 .000 .210 56.171 1.000 
Intercept 691053.349 1 691053.349 1114.051 .000 .841 1114.051 1.000
DisclosureStrategyIV 33300.214 3 11100.071 17.894 .000 .203 53.683 1.000
PricingStrategyIV 236.315 1 236.315 .381 .538 .002 .381 .094
DisclosureStrategyIV * 
PricingStrategyIV 
1425.179 3 475.060 .766 .514 .011 2.298 .213
Error 130884.677 211 620.307        
Total 856550.000 219         
Corrected Total 165728.082 218         
a Computed using alpha = .05 
b R Squared = .210 (Adjusted R Squared = .184) 
 38
Hypothesis 1 (H1) predicts that the likelihood that taxpayers will return to the CPA firm for tax 
return preparation is lower when there is disclosure that returns are being offshored than when there is 
disclosure of outsourcing in the AICPA format. Table 2 indicates that the disclosure strategy variable 
had a statistically significant main effect. A statistically significant difference among the means of the 
four disclosure strategy levels was found F (3,211) = 17.894, p< 0.000. As Table 3 indicates, the mean 
likelihood of returning ratio for disclosure strategy II (D2) (i.e. when subjects receive disclosure that 
their returns are outsourced to an overseas location) was 40.875 whereas the mean likelihood of 
returning ratio for disclosure strategy 1, D1 (i.e. when subjects receive disclosure of outsourcing of 
their returns’ in the AICPA recommended format) was 55.362. This result is consistent with H1 and 
therefore hypothesis 1 is supported. Post hoc comparisons for the disclosure strategy variable are 
presented in Table 4. These tests reveal that a significant difference (p< 0.013) exists between D1 and 
D2 suggesting that there is a significant difference in the client’s reaction to information disclosed in 
the AICPA recommended format versus disclosure that clearly states that the returns are being 
outsourced overseas. 
Table 3.Estimated Marginal Means for Disclosure Strategy Variable 
 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Disclosure Strategy (IV) Mean    Std. Error
           Lower     
Bound 
         Upper  
Bound 
1 55.362 3.399 48.662 62.062 
2 40.875 3.330 34.310 47.440 
3 53.613 3.392 46.927 60.298 
4 75.186 3.363 68.556 81.816 
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 Hypothesis 1a (H1a) predicts the clients will prefer to have their returns prepared in-house than by 
a TPSP that is located overseas. Table 3 indicates that the mean likelihood of returning ratio for 
disclosure strategy IV (D4) (i.e. when subjects receive disclosure that their returns are prepared in-
house by employees of the firm) was 75.186 whereas the mean likelihood of returning ratio for D2 was 
55.362. Table 4 reveals that an examination of the Student Newman-Keuls post hoc tests indicates that 
a statistically significant difference (p< 0.000) exists between D4 and D2. This result is consistent with 
H1a and therefore hypothesis H1a is supported. Hypothesis 1b (H1b) predicts the clients will prefer to 
have their returns prepared in-house rather than being outsourced to a provider located within the US. 
Table 3 indicates that the mean likelihood of returning ratio for D4 which was 75.286 is significantly 
different from the mean likelihood of returning ratio for disclosure strategy III (D3) (i.e. when subjects 
receive disclosure that their returns are outsourced domestically) which  was 53.613. This result is 
supported in Table 4 which reveals that a statistically significant difference (p< 0.000) exists between 
D4 and D3. This result is consistent with H1b and therefore hypothesis H1b is supported. 
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 Table 4. Multiple Comparisons (Post Hoc) 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 
(I) Disclosure 
Strategy (IV) 
(J) 
Disclosure 
Strategy 
(IV) 
Mean 
Differenc
e (I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
2 14.57(*) 4.750 .013 2.27 26.87
3 2.04 4.793 .974 -10.38 14.45
1 
4 -19.63(*) 4.771 .000 -31.98 -7.27
1 -14.57(*) 4.750 .013 -26.87 -2.27
3 -12.53(*) 4.750 .044 -24.83 -.23
2 
4 -34.20(*) 4.728 .000 -46.44 -21.95
1 -2.04 4.793 .974 -14.45 10.38
2 12.53(*) 4.750 .044 .23 24.83
3 
4 -21.66(*) 4.771 .000 -34.02 -9.31
1 19.63(*) 4.771 .000 7.27 31.98
2 34.20(*) 4.728 .000 21.95 46.44
Tukey 
HSD 
4 
3 21.66(*) 4.771 .000 9.31 34.02
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicted that likelihood of returning under decreased fees, pricing strategy I 
would be significantly higher across all the levels of disclosure strategy than likelihood of returning 
under no change in fees.  However, Table 2 reveals that the pricing strategy variable does not have a 
significant main effect on client’s likelihood of returning F (1, 211) = .381, p= 0.538. The mean 
likelihood of returning under pricing strategy I was 57.299 whereas the mean under pricing strategy II 
was 55.218. Thus, there was no statistically significant difference among the means of the two pricing 
strategy levels. These results are not consistent with H2. Therefore, H2 is not supported. An interaction 
was predicted between the disclosure strategy levels and pricing strategy levels is predicted by 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). However, as indicated in Table 2, this interaction was not statistically significant F 
(3,211) = .766, p = 0.514. Therefore H3 is not supported. 
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 Additional analyses 
Table 5. Demographic Data 
 
Gender Number of subjects 
Highest Degree 
acquired 
Number of 
subjects 
Annual 
Income 
Number of 
subjects 
Males 119 High School 116 <15000 122 
Females 100 Undergraduate 76 15000 – 49999 66 
  Graduate 22 50000 – 74999 11 
  Other 5 >75000 18 
 
Table 5 reports demographic information about the respondents. Forty-five percent of the 
respondents were female. Fifty-three percent of the sample had at least a high school degree, thirty-five 
percent had a bachelor’ degree and twelve percent had graduate and other degrees. Fifty-six percent of 
the sample reported income under $15,000, thirty percent earned between $15,000 and $50,000, and 
the remaining fourteen percent reported income over $50,000. Ninety percent of the sample had filed a 
tax return in 2005 and forty-two percent reported using a paid preparer for filing their tax return. The 
average age of the respondents was 25 and the average full time work experience was five years. The 
average number of years that the respondents had been filing tax returns was seven years. 
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Table 6.Direct Measures of Client’s Attitude towards Outsourcing and Offshoring 
Questions Scale D1P1 D2P1 D3P1 D4P1 D1P2 D2P2 D3P2 D4P2 Total
2.b.How important was the following factor in making your 
decision: Confidentiality of data 
1-7 
5.63 5.93    5.93 NA 5.00 4.38 5.08 NA 5.32
2. c. How important was the following factor in making your 
decision: Quality of tax returns prepared by TPSP 
1-7 
6.00 5.90    5.65 NA 5.84 6.32 6.04 NA 5.96
25.If a tax preparer uses the services of a TPSP located within the 
US, the quality of my tax returns will be lower, higher or same 
1-3 
2.16 2.07  2.00 2.00 2.04 1.81 1.85 2.11 2.00
26.If a tax preparer uses the services of a TPSP located overseas, 
the quality of my tax returns will be lower, higher or same 
1-3 
1.36 1.79  1.29 1.32 1.69 1.70 1.48 1.46 1.51
27. Confidentiality of my personal data will be safe if I use a TPSP 
who transfer my information, under his or her supervision, to a 
TPSP located in the US for completion of my tax return 
1-7 
3.80 4.31  4.18 3.92 3.89 4.00 4.19 4.21 4.06
28.Confidentiality of my personal data will be safe if I use a TPSP 
who transfer my information, under his or her supervision, to a 
TPSP located overseas for completion of my tax return 
1-7 
5.12 4.79  5.21 5.38 4.89 5.37 4.70 5.00 5.06
29. If I use a tax-preparer to prepare my tax return, that preparer 
should ask for my specific consent when using the services of a 
third party provider located in the U.S. 
1-7 
1.88 2.38  2.11 1.96 2.24 1.74 2.07 2.18 2.07
29. If I use a tax-preparer to prepare my tax return, that preparer 
should ask for my specific consent when using the services of a 
third party provider located overseas. 
1-7 
1.64 2.52  2.07 2.00 1.62 1.70 2.22 1.89 1.96
31. If  I use a  tax-preparer to prepare my tax return, that preparer is 
behaving unethically if the preparer sends my confidential 
information without my knowledge to a third party provider located 
within the U.S. 
1-7 
2.48 2.66  2.25 2.35 2.03 2.26 2.41 2.43 2.36
32. If  I use a  tax-preparer to prepare my tax return, that preparer is 
behaving unethically if the preparer sends my confidential 
information without my knowledge to a third party provider located 
overseas. 
1-7 
2.08 2.72  2.18 2.12 1.52 1.81 2.22 2.21 2.11
33. If my tax return is outsourced to a provider located within the 
US, the fees for my return should decrease. 
1-7 
2.72 3.86  3.29 3.31 3.21 3.04 3.23 3.46 3.26
34. If my tax return is outsourced to a provider located overseas, the 
fees for my return should decrease. 
1-7 
2.16 3.31  3.18 3.27 3.31 2.93 2.92 3.04 3.01
 
Table 6 reports the results of the questions used to directly measure the respondents’ 
attitudes towards concerns related to the outsourcing and offshoring of their tax returns. 
On average, respondents considered confidentiality of their data (mean 5.32 on a 7 point 
scale, where 1 = not very important and 7 = very important) and quality of the tax returns 
prepared by the TPSP (mean 5.96 on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not very important and 7 
= very important) as important factors in making their decision to return to the same firm. 
Respondents’ believed that if their return was outsourced within the US to a TPSP, the 
quality would be lower (mean 1.51 where 1= lower quality, 2 = same quality and 3 = 
higher quality) whereas if it was outsourced overseas, quality would be even lower (mean 
1.51).They displayed strong agreement with the statement that asked whether the 
respondent’s specific consent should be secured before outsourcing their returns within 
US (mean 2.07 where 1 = strongly agree and 7 = strongly disagree) and whether the 
preparer is behaving unethically by not procuring the respondent’s consent (mean 2.36). 
 
Table 7.OLS Regression analysis for patriotism, risk aversion and political ideology 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
   B 
Std. 
Error              Beta t-statistic         Sig.        B 
Std. 
Error 
(Constant) 50.933 14.587  3.492 .001   
Patriotism IV -.924 .305 -.401 -3.033 .004 .926 1.080
Risk aversion IV .513 .721 .091 .712 .480 .996 1.004
 
Political 
Ideology IV 3.513 2.644 .176 1.328 .190 .923 1.083
 
They displayed even stronger agreement with the statement that asked whether the 
respondent’s specific consent should be secured before outsourcing their returns overseas 
(mean 1.96) and whether the preparer is behaving unethically by not procuring the 
respondent’s consent (mean 2.11). They disagreed with the statements that asserted that 
confidentiality of their data would be safe if their returns are outsourced within US (mean 
4.06) and even more so, if the returns were outsourced overseas (mean 5.06). Lastly, 
when asked if fees should be decreased when returns were outsourced within US, they 
displayed moderate agreement (mean = 3.26) though they displayed stronger agreement 
for fee reduction when returns are outsourced overseas (3.01).  
To further investigate, the reasons underlying the client’s averseness to offshoring, 
three factors were considered. These factors were respondent’s level of patriotism, 
respondent’s attitude towards risk and respondent’s political ideology. These factors may 
provide further insights on underlying factors that may explain the respondents’ 
averseness to offshoring. I employed an OLS regression to test if there is a causal 
relationship between patriotism, risk aversion, political ideology and likelihood of 
returning (See Table 7). The coefficient for patriotism is negative and statistically 
significant. The coefficient value is -.401 (p = 0.004) which suggests that there is a strong 
negative correlation suggesting the higher the level of patriotism, the lower will be the 
likelihood ratio and vice versa. The risk aversion variable (p = .480) and political 
ideology variable (p = .190) were not statistically significant suggesting that these factors 
did not impact the respondents’ likelihood of returning. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings and implications of this study have to be considered within the context 
of its strengths and limitations. Laboratory experiments have the potential for high 
internal validity due to the controlled environment within which the decision-making 
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behavior can be studied (Rutledge and Karim, 1999). Consequently, one must exercise 
caution in generalizing the results to other groups and situations. In experiments of this 
type, the case situations are simplified abstractions of real world situations (Rutledge and 
Karim, 1999). Therefore, although due care was taken to ensure that all necessary and 
relevant information was included, the cases remain abstractions. 
The AICPA revised its ethics rulings in order to ensure that if the member intends to 
use the services of a TPSP, the client should be informed. The revised rulings do not 
differentiate between disclosures of outsourcing of tax returns within the US versus 
offshoring. This could be considered a significant area of concern because there are 
ethical and economic considerations involved in offshoring of returns that are distinctly 
different from outsourcing returns within the US. The economic issue is whether the 
client makes different decisions once they find out that their returns are being offshored. 
If clients decide not to return to the CPA firm the following year, it is evident that CPA 
firms would lose revenue. Therefore, the CPA firms have strong economic motivation to 
not disclose the location of the TPSP in order to retain their clientele. The ethical concern 
central to this issue is the CPAs ‘professional responsibility to their client. The pursuance 
of economic gains over public interest may endanger the credibility of the firm and 
damage the reputation of the entire professional body. The findings of this study confirm 
that the taxpayers are not indifferent between outsourcing and offshoring of their returns, 
as suggested by the AICPA ethics rulings, and would prefer disclosure in clear simple 
terms, unlike the disclosure format recommended by the AICPA.  
.  This study uses a laboratory experiment to consider this conflict by examining the 
effect of various disclosure strategies and pricing strategies on the client’s likelihood of 
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returning to the same CPA firm the following year for tax return preparation. Three 
research hypotheses were developed and tested in a laboratory experiment. Four levels of 
disclosure strategies were manipulated to test for a main effect on client’s likelihood of 
returning. Based on the first and second hypotheses, main effects for the disclosure 
strategy variable and pricing strategy variable were expected. Further, in conjunction 
with the third hypothesis, an interaction was predicted between disclosure strategy levels 
and pricing strategy levels. A statistically significant main effect was found for the 
disclosure strategy variable on the client’s likelihood of returning. This result provides 
support for H1, H1a, and H1b suggesting that clients are sensitive to the kind of 
information that is provided to them and change their decisions based on the information 
provided.  
The average likelihood of the client returning to the firm was significantly lower 
when there was disclosure that returns are being offshored (40.875) than when there is 
disclosure in the AICPA format which conceals the location of the TPSP (55.362). This 
result confirms the prediction made in this study that the AICPA disclosure is not 
adequate, is misleading and attempts to conceal valuable information. The AICPA 
members want to maximize the taxpayer’s likelihood of returning to the same firm the 
following year for tax return preparation because losing repeat customers will hurt their 
socio-economic interests. Thus, the AICPA member will react favorably to a disclosure 
strategy that maximizes the likelihood of returning and will be averse to any disclosures 
that lower the likelihood of returning. Moreover, the client’s likelihood of returning under 
the AICPA disclosure format (55.362) is similar to the client’s likelihood of returning 
under disclosure that returns were outsourced within US (53.613). This result suggests 
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that clients are interpreting the AICPA disclosure as their returns are being outsourced 
within US and not overseas. This would be a logical assumption since the AICPA 
disclosure does not reveal the location of the TPSP in any clear terms. H1a and H1b 
clearly bring forth the client’s preference to have their return prepared in-house by 
employees of the CPA firm than have it outsourced to a TPSP within US or overseas. 
Pricing strategy did not a significant effect main effect on likelihood of returning. H2 
predicted that decrease in fee will be viewed favorably by taxpayers and will increase the 
likelihood of returning to the same firm for tax  return preparation the following year in 
all the three cases, outsourcing within the US, offshoring, and returns are prepared in-
house, as opposed to no change in fees. However, H2 was not supported. H3 predicted an 
interaction effect between disclosure strategy levels and pricing strategy levels. The most 
important implication from this study is that the level of disclosure can influence clients’ 
decisions. However, the AICPA have failed to recognize the need for adequate disclosure 
and insist that the ethics rulings in their revised format address the needs of the public. 
The results of this study suggest that the AICPA recommended disclosure format is 
incomplete and need to be revised to include information about the location of the TPSP 
and maybe, even, include a requirement to procure the client’s specific consent before 
outsourcing their returns. Findings from such research could produce considerable 
benefits to the business community. The study brings forth important public policy 
implications for protection of consumers who constitute the most vulnerable targets with 
regard to the detrimental effects of offshoring. The findings of this study may lead 
regulators to review the adequacy of the disclosure rules and may induce the 
recommendation of changes. 
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 CHAPTER THREE:  STUDY TWO:  THE COMMERCIALIZATION PROJECT: 
THE AICPA RHETORIC SURROUNDING THE TAX RETURN PREPARATION 
OUTSOURCING DISCLOSURE RULES. 
Introduction 
I understand that outsourcing of work has been going on for a long time, however, 
I do believe that this information should be made available to the client and 
his/her consent obtained prior to using a third party, especially if the third party is 
located in a foreign country.  If this information is not disclosed to the client, I 
believe this issue is a time bomb waiting to go off.  It is only a matter of time 
before clients discover that outsourcing to foreign countries is being widely 
utilized, which will add another scar to the public image of CPAs (AICPA, 
Appendix D, 2004b)
Recent scandals such as Enron, Worldcom and the demise of Arthur Andersen have 
intensified debates about the commercialization of accounting. Such debates emphasize 
the importance of further examining the practices of accountants and auditors, and not 
relying on the discursive claims of professional associations and leaders of the industry 
that they are indeed professional (Simmons and Neu, 1997). When the accounting 
practitioners talk about being enterprising and modern, it would be useful to examine 
whether claims to professional values might be a strategy to be commercial (Cooper and 
Robson, 2006). Appeals to such forms of social and cultural capital can be an effective 
strategy for professionals in developing their business and being profitable (Cooper et al., 
1996). It will be beneficial to conduct studies that show that commercialization is not 
necessarily an antithesis to professionalization but examine the work practices and client 
relations of professional organizations, particularly how claims to be commercial and 
professional are selectively used in such organizations (Alvesson and Karreman, 2004). 
This paper aims its focus on the activities of one such professional organization, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). In the last few decades, 
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professional accountants have been successful at expanding their jurisdiction to several 
other domains, such as those of management advisory services and state auditing (Power, 
1997, Sikka and Wilmott 1997). However, accountants in North America recently 
experienced significant difficulties with several jurisdictional claims sponsored by their 
accounting institutes, such as the Webtrust e-commerce seal of assurance (Gendron and 
Barrett, 2004) and the AICPA global credential project (Shafer and Gendron, 2005) and 
the Vision Project (Fogarty et al., 2006). The Vision document was prepared for a 
profession that envisaged free floating expertise. By contrast, the profession now faces 
unprecedented constraints in the United States and a series of regulatory reviews 
elsewhere, as governments and regulators in many countries seek to proactively take up 
the lessons of the Enron imbroglio (Fogarty et al., 2006).  
The public accounting profession in the US suffered a major setback since Enron, 
Worldcom and other accounting scandals resulted in the passage of the Sarbanes- Oxley 
Act of 2002, the most wide-ranging federal statutory intervention in US capital markets 
and the accountancy profession since the 1930s. The new Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board forbids financial information system design and implementation, record 
keeping, internal auditing, management and HR functions, investment banking, legal and 
expert services unrelated to auditing and can forbid  any other line of business by rule, 
making the entire scope of services a regulated phenomenon (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Section 201). Having fought off regulation in vain, AICPA President and CEO 
Barry Melancon now acknowledges that the accounting profession faces a great crisis and 
it is essential to restore the profession’s most priceless asset––their  reputation and their 
credibility and ability to self-regulate (Melancon, 2002).  
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However, the AICPA is once again in the midst of a controversial issue which is 
overseas outsourcing of tax return preparation, also known as offshoring, and whether, 
the fact that tax return preparation services are being offshored, should be disclosed to the 
client (AICPA, 2004a, IRS, 2006). Recently, members of the U.S. Congress, the media, 
and state and federal regulators have held open discussions about the responsibilities of 
businesses to disclose to their customers and clients when they outsource services or 
production to other countries (AICPA, 2004b). Risks to privacy and the inability of the 
individuals and the government to seek redress for privacy violations and data security 
breaches have been addressed by organizations such as the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as well as in extensive press coverage 
(PRC, 2006).  
Consequently, the AICPA Professional Ethics Executive committee (hereafter PEEC) 
began a project to assess whether or not the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (the 
“Code”) sufficiently addresses the members’ obligations when outsourcing services to 
third party service providers (hereafter TPSP) (AICPA, 2004b). The PEEC examined the 
effect that outsourcing of accounting and tax services has on integrity, objectivity, 
compliance with standards and confidential client information and issued an Exposure 
Draft in early 2004. It received 49 comment letters to that Exposure Draft. Some minor 
modifications were made to the Exposure Draft based on the feedback received and the 
final ethics rulings were issued on October 28, 2004. The new pronouncements took 
effect for all professional services performed on or after July 1, 20054. The new 
requirements (Refer Table 1) state that if the member intends to use the services of a 
                                                 
4 They do not apply to professional services that are performed pursuant to agreements that are in existence 
on June 30, 2005 that are completed by December 31, 2005. 
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TPSP, the client should be informed and be given the opportunity to ask questions 
concerning the use of the service provider. Additionally, members must enter into 
contractual agreements with any TPSP to maintain confidentiality of the clients’ 
information.  
A glaring feature of the AICPA’s revised ethics rulings is that no distinction has been 
drawn between a domestic TPSP and a TPSP that is located overseas. The AICPA’s 
blanket disclosure format seems to suggest that there are no significant differences 
between outsourcing domestically and offshoring and that detailed disclosure of 
offshoring is unnecessary and not a cause for concern. The AICPA’s arguments seem to 
serve as a defense by an association that has indeed proactively revised the ethics rulings 
while struggling to regain the ability and the credibility to self regulate. However, the 
revision could be serving more as an attempt at gaining legitimacy for the propriety of the 
new activity and less as an honest attempt at being candid about the nature of the activity. 
The public interest orientation of professions dictates that the clients have a right to know 
if their confidential information is being sent overseas outside the US jurisdiction where 
privacy and security law do not apply. The revision may reflect the accounting 
profession’s continuing deep-rooted concern to further its own economic and social self-
interests over the public interest. 
The purpose of this analysis is to study the commercialization of the accounting 
profession using Giddens (1990) theory of trust and expert systems and the private 
interest model (Parker, 1994) of accounting profession’s ethical claims in the context of 
the AICPA’s revised ethics rulings regarding the disclosure of outsourcing of tax return 
preparation. Specifically, I intend to explore the mechanics and the rhetoric employed by 
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the AICPA to revise the ethics rulings (No.112, No.12, and No.1) relating to disclosures 
made to clients by tax firms regarding outsourcing of tax returns to TPSPs. The issues 
that are central to this study are the members’ motivation to avoid full disclosure in order 
to further their private interests to preserve their socio-economic status with the use of the 
code of ethics as an instrument that aids promotion of members’ private interests; public 
confidence in the accounting profession and possible impairment of trust; and the 
commercialistic outlook of the profession and the heightened concern with being more 
profitable. The paper attempts to enforce the view that professional change is not 
necessary, evolutionary, or motiveless but instead is a diffuse political process addressing 
multiple potential constituencies (Radcliffe et al. 1994). 
Gidden’s theory of trust and expert systems is used in this study to examine trust 
issues between the lay person, i.e. the client, and experts systems, i.e. accounting systems 
and also trust issues within the members of expert systems. This study also uses the 
private interest model (Parker, 1994) of accounting profession’s ethical claims to 
understand how the latent private interest role of the ethical codes may supersede the 
manifest public interest role. Evidence was gathered through a latent content analysis of 
archival material supplemented with interviews with overseas TPSPs. Finally, I examined 
archival material until a point of evidential saturation was attained (Lincoln and Gupa, 
1985 and Van, 1988). Archival material took the form of public records (Denzin, 1978) 
as well as business press coverage of the events examined (Freidson, 1984). Public 
material included: Exposure draft of omnibus proposal of professional ethics division 
interpretations and rulings, Comment letters received in response to the exposure draft, 
Ethics rulings under the AICPA code of conduct and IRS Revenue rulings, AICPA 
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comments in response to the IRS proposed regulations, FDIC report, GAO report, 
speeches by AICPA members, and hearing archives of the subcommittee on oversight of 
the House Committee on Ways and Means. Press coverage involved articles, editorials, 
and advertisements in various journals. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide a background of offshoring 
and the issues and events surrounding the revision of the AICPA ethics rulings regarding 
disclosure of outsourcing tax returns. Section 3 discusses the theory employed and 
methods, which consist of latent content analysis of archival material supplemented by 
interview data. In section 4, I present the analysis of the three major issues underlying the 
AICPA’s revised ethics rulings. The final section discusses the paper’s main findings and 
implications of my research. 
Background: Offshoring and the events leading to the AICPA rulings 
The succeeding discussion provides a background of the practice of offshoring and 
brings forth the distinction between outsourcing domestically versus offshoring followed 
by an examination of the discourses surrounding the revision of the AICPA ethics rulings. 
The aim of this examination is to understand the issues and events surrounding the 
revision of the rulings.  
Offshoring of tax returns: background 
The trend of outsourcing preparation of income tax returns overseas, particularly to 
India, began about five years ago and shows no signs of abating (Soled, 2005). There are 
a number of reasons for the growing popularity of this practice. The primary reason is 
cost arbitrage. Offshored tax returns can be prepared in a cost-efficient manner by a 
highly skilled workforce (Soled, 2005). The second reason is the practical efficiency 
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afforded by an overseas workforce coupled with the advent of technology that enables 
speedy data transfer. The time-zone differences create virtual twenty four hour operations 
since the daily close of operation in the U.S. accounting firms is marked by the start of 
the work day for overseas accountants. Thus, offshoring can improve client service by 
speeding the delivery of completed returns (Robertson et al. 2004). Thirdly, offshoring is 
designed to reduce the tax season pressures that have long plagued public accounting. 
Finally, the accounting firms want to maintain their competitive edge (Soled, 2005). The 
large accounting firms fear that if competitors offshore and they do not, they may 
ultimately price themselves out of the marketplace. (Soled, 2005).  
One of the greatest concerns about offshoring is the privacy and security risk of 
posting confidential client information such as social security numbers to a facilitator’s 
website. Clients may not be in favor of their information being sent to a third party who is 
not directly supervised by their CPA. A second concern about offshoring is that it limits 
the tax preparation experience of entry-level accountants (Robertson et al. 2004) 
Decreased staff morale and staff concerns about layoffs are also important challenges to a 
firm considering offshoring tax services. Firms may also be concerned that political 
instability in the country of the service providing company may interrupt processing 
operations. Another barrier to effective offshoring is technology capability. Firms must 
have the technology capabilities, including hardware, data storage, software, and 
knowledgeable people, to move manual processing to a web-based processing system. 
Finally, clients and CPAs may have service quality or patriotic concerns about the 
offshoring of tax preparation work (Robertson et al., 2004). The wrenching events of 
recent years have intensified patriotism throughout the United States since many U.S. 
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workers have lost jobs to cheaper third-world labor. There are AICPA members who are 
of the opinion that clients may view offshoring as yet another myopic approach that 
needlessly diminishes the U.S. job market (Shamis et al., 2005).  
The offshoring of tax preparation services raises several legal and ethical concerns. 
Legally, a key question relates to the potential liability the U.S. tax preparer incurs when 
hiring foreign subcontractors to process tax returns for U.S. taxpayers. Ethically, a 
primary question concerns whether the tax preparer has a duty to disclose to clients the 
use of offshore tax preparers (Bierce, 2004a). The offshoring of tax returns has invoked 
mixed reactions. Federal agencies, regulators, academics and the media have attempted to 
address the looming threats of this fast-growing practice that accompany the unconcealed 
gains (GAO, 2005; IRS, 2005; PRC, 2006; AICPA, 2004b; Robertson et al., 2004; Soled, 
2005, and Reeves 2004). The AICPA standpoint on the practice of offshoring is that it is 
an economic activity that is imperative for economic development. The AICPA describes 
offshoring of tax returns as an improvement of work processes and a step towards the 
adoption of modern business practices in today’s global marketplace (AICPA, 2006). 
There are a number of regional and local accounting firms located in border states that 
have significant cross-border working arrangements with professionals located in Canada, 
Mexico and Latin American countries. The AICPA claims that from their perspective, the 
AICPA ethical rules will safeguard confidential taxpayer information and at the same 
time, be flexible enough to promote productive economic relationships between countries 
(AICPA, 2006). 
The AICPA asserts that offshoring is a part of the process of changing market 
conditions. In an AICPA leadership speech Robert Bunting, Chair of the AICPA at a 
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SEC-PCAOB Conference, campaigned change as inevitable and desirable and urged the 
AICPA in the spirit of a great profession to embrace the change rather than shy away 
from it: 
Perhaps more than anything else, we must always keep in mind another need: The 
need to be able to change. Great professions don’t just accept change. They don’t just 
embrace it. Great professions initiate change – for their own good, for the public good, 
and for the good of the future. Change can be a tough road to travel. But it is also a 
necessary road to travel. It takes us where we want to go. One of my priorities is to 
ensure that the AICPA takes that road. My goal is to ensure that the AICPA is an 
organization that continues to promote change, rather than recoils from it – because 
that is what great professions do” (AICPA, 2004d). 
 
The issues  surrounding the revision of the AICPA Ethics Rulings 
The process of preparing income tax returns has gone through dramatic changes. In 
the mid-1970s, outsourcing of electronically filed returns and other tasks involved in 
preparation of tax returns would be considered a newfangled practice (Coustan, 2006). 
Presently, tax return preparation is being recognized as, perhaps, the predominant product 
of outsourcing to date (Cook et al. 2005). Though, offshoring opens up avenues for 
increased revenues and speedy delivery of returns, there may be unintended 
consequences to modifying business processes which expose firms’ offshoring tax returns 
to additional business risks. The AICPA is faced with a business opportunity while 
concurrently managing its currently precarious position on an ongoing basis. Past 
scandals and loss of reputation dictate the importance of maintaining credibility to be 
able to self-regulate (Melancon, 2002). 
Therefore, unlike in the past, the AICPA decided to take action proactively and 
review the code of conduct regarding disclosure of outsourcing of tax returns to 
determine whether the code was sufficient or needed to be amended.  The AICPA 
spearheaded the effort as evidenced in their introduction to the exposure draft that stated: 
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As a result of recent discussion and debate by members of Congress, the media, 
and state and federal regulators about the responsibilities of businesses to disclose 
to their customers and clients when they outsource services or production to other 
countries, the PEEC began a project to assess whether or not the AICPA Code of 
Professional Conduct (the “Code”) sufficiently addresses our members’ 
obligations when outsourcing services to third-party service providers (AICPA, 
2004b). 
 
The PEEC appointed a task force in January 2004 to consider what changes, if any, 
should be made to their Code of Professional Conduct in connection with the use of third 
party providers. Concurrently, other government agencies were conducting studies to 
address concerns regarding the impact offshoring may have on privacy of data (FDIC, 
2004). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) conducted a study with regard 
to the associated risks of offshoring by financial institutions from a safety and soundness 
perspective and with particular emphasis on the threats posed to customer privacy in June 
2004. Their findings recommended disclosure of undisclosed third-party contracting 
arrangements since they may increase risk in outsourcing relationships. This potential 
increase in risk occurs regardless of whether the undisclosed third party resides 
domestically or offshore; however, inherent outsourcing risks may be amplified due to 
unique country risk when the third party is an offshore vendor. Their recommendation is 
that financial institutions that outsource data to domestic vendors should be aware when 
domestic vendors have in turn subcontracted out that same work to overseas or domestic 
third parties (FDIC, 2004).  
The Committee on Ways and Means and its Subcommittees under the House of 
Representatives conducted oversight hearings during the 108th Congress invited 
comments from committee members regarding tax practitioners and their professional 
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responsibility regarding outsourcing and offshoring of tax returns (Committee on Ways 
and Means, 2004).  
On August 9, 2004, an exposure draft was issued by the PEEC. The draft contained a 
number of important proposals for review and comment by the AICPA’s membership and 
other interested parties regarding pronouncements for possible adoption by the PEEC. 
Despite the widespread agreement among various federal agencies (PRC, 2004; FDIC 
2004) as suggested in the foregoing discussion over the increased risks that are associated 
with offshoring, the PEEC maintained the position that outsourcing domestically and 
offshoring have been, and should be given, equal weight (AICPA, 2004b).  The language 
they used suggests that the PEEC would use the same standards for outsourcing as they 
would for offshoring. This logic is evident in the following statement of the exposure 
draft: 
Although the media and representatives of our federal and state governments have 
focused on the issue of “offshoring,” the committee believes that guidance 
concerning the use of third-party service providers should apply equally to service 
providers located domestically and abroad (AICPA, 2004b). 
 
The following comment by Ochsenschlager, vice president of taxation at the AICPA, 
resonates with similar intent that the disclosure will disclose offshoring of tax returns but 
will not be restricted to that. It will go a step further and include disclosure of outsourcing 
to domestic service providers as well: 
But under the AICPA rule, the outsourcing doesn't necessarily have to be overseas. 
If it's outsourced anywhere, overseas or domestically, it has to be disclosed 
(Coombes, 2006). 
 
The PEEC invited the AICPA members to submit their comments to the draft and all 
comments received were considered by the committee at an open meeting scheduled on 
October 28, 2004. A number of the members of the AICPA were not in agreement with 
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the revisions suggested in the exposure draft and stated their reservations in the form of 
comment letters (AICPA, 2004c). However, the majority seemed to support the ruling 
since the AICPA has approximately 350,000 members but only forty nine comment 
letters were received. Out of the forty nine letters, only twenty four supported disclosure 
of offshoring and felt that there was too much latitude regarding the nature, content, and 
form of the disclosure. Some minor modifications were made to the Exposure Draft based 
on the feedback received and the final ethics rulings were issued on October 28, 2004. 
The new pronouncements took effect for all professional services performed on or after 
July 1, 20055. The revised rulings (Refer Table 1) state that if the member intends to use 
the services of a TPSP, the client should be informed and be given the opportunity to ask 
questions concerning the use of the service provider. Additionally, members must enter 
into contractual agreements with any TPSP to maintain confidentiality of the clients’ 
information. 
Pursuant to the revision of the AICPA rulings, the IRS, in December 2005, issued a 
press release entitled “IRS Issues Proposed Regulations to Safeguard Taxpayer 
Information”. The stated purpose of the IRS regulations (Refer Appendix A) is to prevent 
offshore outsourcing of tax return preparation without the taxpayer’s knowledge, as well 
as to “update” regulations that had not been revisited since the 1970s (Nolte, 2006). The 
proposed rules have a separate customer consent provision that applies to return preparers 
who outsource their work overseas. The efforts of the AICPA to storm ahead with the 
offshoring of returns will be decidedly stalled by the proposed IRS regulations that are 
awaiting approval. Tax laws are a powerful tool for public policy and can promote or 
                                                 
5 They do not apply to professional services that are performed pursuant to agreements that are in existence 
on June 30, 2005 that are completed by December 31, 2005. 
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impede virtually any type of investment or commercial opportunity (Bierce, 2004b). The 
IRS ruling is in direct conflict with the AICPA’s interests and the AICPA in their 
comments to the IRS adopts a stance which is completely opposed to the stance of full 
disclosure that the IRS is advocating (the kind one would have expected the AICPA to 
have suggested). A detailed analysis of the opposing viewpoints is presented in section 4. 
The importance of distinguishing between outsourcing and offshoring risks was also 
brought forth in a report to Congressional Committees called “Offshoring of services: an 
overview of the issues’ presented by the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO, 2005). The report outlined the potential impact of offshoring on the average U.S. 
standard of living, distribution of income, and security. The report stated that experts 
express varying degrees of concern about the impact offshoring may have on personal 
privacy when medical and financial records become accessible in overseas locations. 
Privacy advocates, academics, and offshoring researchers have noted concerns with the 
possibility that personal information sent to foreign locations could be improperly 
released, leading to identity theft, diversion of funds, and breaches of confidentiality 
(GAO, 2005).  
The IRS regulation is being opposed by consumer groups, the media, and the AICPA 
but for different reasons. Numerous comments have been received on the proposed rules 
and a public hearing on them was scheduled for April 4, 2006. After the hearing, the 
Treasury Department and IRS consider all comments and finalize a rule that takes them 
into account. On April 6, 2006, Thomas J. Purcell, (Chair, Executive Tax Committee, 
AICPA) in his testimony to the committee on Ways and Means during the 109th congress, 
commented on the IRS proposed changes to section 7216 regulations asserting that the 
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proposed regulations are drafted in a manner that adds unnecessary and extremely 
burdensome steps to the current tax return processes used by many professional service 
providers. The proposed IRS regulation has not yet been implemented and it is expected 
that the national debate between the AICPA and the IRS will be on-going. The political 
and social environment described in this section provides the backdrop against which the 
AICPA revised the ethics rulings regarding disclosure of outsourcing to TPSPs.  
Research issues and methods 
Research Issues 
Based upon an analysis of three major issues implicit in the revised ethics rulings, it is 
possible to explain the AICPA members’ stance regarding disclosure of offshoring of tax 
returns. These issues are: furthering members’ private interests to preserve their socio-
economic status with the use of the code of ethics as an instrument that aids promotion of 
those private interests; public confidence in the accounting profession and possible 
impairment of trust; and the commercialistic outlook of the profession and the heightened 
concern with being more profitable. Two theoretical tools are useful in understanding the 
revised ethics rulings: Parker’s (1994) private interest model of ethics and Giddens’ 
discussion of expert systems. This study employs the private interest model (Parker, 
1994) of accounting profession’s ethical claims to understand the manifestation of the 
private interest role that is fulfilled by ethical codes. The private interest can be defined 
as the latent motivation of ethical codes to protect the interests of the professional 
accounting body corporate and its individual members (Parker, 1994).  
The public interest may be defined as both a manifest and latent motivation of ethical 
codes to protect the economic interests of professional members’ clients and of third 
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parties who place reliance on the pronouncements and advice delivered by both the 
professional body and its members. Third parties may include corporate shareholders, 
borrowers, lenders, regulators, government, social interest groups, or any other member 
of the public (Parker, 1994).  The pursuance of private interest over public kindles issues 
of trust between the client and the CPA firm. These issues of trust are examined with the 
help of Giddens’ explanations of how lay people come to accept accountancy’s expertise 
as applying to a broader range of activities and problems. For Giddens, the transference 
of expertise from one area to another indicates that lay acceptance can act at a very 
general level, without clear knowledge of what it is a profession or expert system knows  
or does, and with a general  faith in expert systems overall. A detailed analysis of the 
issues described above with the help of the two theoretical tools follows in section 4. 
 Content analysis 
Evidence was gathered through a latent content analysis of archival material 
supplemented with interviews. According to Berg (1989, p. 107), latent content analysis 
represents an “interpretive reading of the symbolism underlying the physically presented 
data” and thus focuses on “the deep structural meaning conveyed by the message”. 
Although there are dangers inherent in the drawing of inferences from such symbolism, it 
is nevertheless a very useful approach in examining archival material complicit in the 
exercise of power and exertion of influence (Merton, 1968, pp. 366–370). These dangers 
may, however, be mitigated by incorporating independent, corroborative techniques to 
methodologically triangulate on the phenomena of interest, as well as including detailed 
excerpts from material examined to substantiate interpretations (Berg, 1989, p. 107). 
Within my work, I attempted to ensure the trustworthiness of findings in several ways. 
 67
Multiple sources of archival material were examined whenever possible. Therefore, not 
only were AICPA releases and rulings examined, but also press coverage of these rulings. 
I also believed that it was important to include within this paper exact, relatively lengthy, 
quotes from archives in order to avoid the potential flaw of quoting out of context and to 
substantiate interpretations. Finally, I examined archival material until a point of 
evidential saturation was attained (Lincoln and Gupa, 1985 and Van, 1988).  
Archival material took the form of public records (Denzin, 1978) as well as business 
press coverage of the events examined (Freidson, 1984). Public material included: 
Exposure draft of omnibus proposal of professional ethics division interpretations and 
rulings, Comment letters received in response to the exposure draft, Ethics rulings under 
the AICPA code of conduct and IRS Revenue rulings, AICPA comments in response to 
the IRS proposed regulations, FDIC report, GAO report, speeches by AICPA members, 
and hearing archives of the subcommittee on oversight of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means. Press coverage involved articles, editorials, and advertisements appearing in 
the CPA Journal, Accounting Technology, Insight, Newsreleasewire, Outsourcing Law, 
Journal of Accountancy, Market watch, Accounting Today, and Journal of Accountancy.  
Articles were identified using on-line search engines on newspaper, trade journals, 
professional publications, academic journal websites, social sciences research network, 
and general searches on library websites. I also collected and examined information on 
the AICPA website for press releases and pronouncements in relation to the revised 
ethics ruling. The articles were organized according to the issue they related to and were 
examined in detail to obtain some understanding of the core issues underlying the 
revision of the ethics rulings. The AICPA ethics rulings, press releases, comments made 
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to other agencies and discourses surrounding these events were carefully analyzed to 
unveil the hidden meaning, if any, embedded in the AICPA’s actions. 
Interview evidence 
Interviews were conducted with three leading TPSPs to obtain first-hand data 
regarding the security procedures in place. Since security of confidential client 
information is one of the greatest concerns that the client has when data is offshored, 
discussions with the providers will provide valuable insights as to the validity of these 
concerns. The providers are located in India and since majority of the returns are 
offshored to India (Soled, 2005), this site was most relevant to the study. The three cases 
were selected from a list of fourteen leading suppliers that provide finance and 
accounting outsourcing services, compiled by the FAO Research Inc.  
The interviews were semi-structured and the results of the interviews were used to 
corroborate the conclusions reached by conducting content analysis. The questionnaire 
consisted of a small number of open-ended questions. The interviews were tape recorded 
and transcribed. The typical interview was sixty minutes; the length varied from thirty 
minutes to ninety minutes. Members of the top management team as well as managers at 
operational levels were interviewed. Questions were directed at determining the specific 
risk reduction strategies that were adopted by the service provider to mitigate client’s 
risks associated with confidentiality of their data. The service providers were asked how 
specific risks are identified and whether controls established are maintained to the level 
specified by the client. Questions were asked to gain an understanding of how the TPSP 
specifically deals with issues such as risk mitigation, business continuity, privacy, and 
information security.  
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The reading of the transcripts focused on identifying the measures adopted by the 
TPSPs to ensure that the information transmitted to them remains secure. The purpose of 
the interview evidence was to provide objective evidence so that the reader may form 
their own opinion about the procedures in place for the safe custody of data. The 
evidence however is anecdotal and does not represent all the service providers that may 
be used by the AICPA members. The interview data represents procedures that are being 
followed at leading TPSPs and it is not necessary that all overseas TPSPs adopt similar 
measures. However, it helps to provide insights about the best possible safety measures 
that can be adopted when returns are outsourced. One of the primary concerns underlying 
the issue of disclosing the outsourcing of tax returns is the transmitting of confidential 
client information to an overseas location. If there is no significant threat to 
confidentiality of information, then the AICPA may be justified in assuming that there is 
no additional threat posed to clients and specific client consent is not necessary. Thus, the 
interview will help to substantiate the validity of the claims made by the AICPA 
regarding the security and confidentiality of client’s data. 
 
The Study: Analysis of the Issues 
In the following section, the three issues that are identified as problematic in the 
revised ethics rulings are analyzed. The first issue which is the AICPA members’ 
furthering their private interest over the public interest is interrelated to the second issue 
which is the resulting loss of trust in the accounting profession. The AICPA members can 
advance their private self-interest over public interest only to the detriment of the trust 
that is vested in the profession (Brien, 1998). One may argue that the AICPA’s decision 
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to offshore returns without client consent is only an attempt to use their expertise to make 
decisions in lieu of their clients who do not possess the knowledge, expertise or requisite 
information to make their own decisions. By doing so, the AICPA members are engaging 
in professional paternalism. Paternalistic behavior toward an individual is philosophically 
undesirable because it restricts the individual’s autonomy and the individual’s ability to 
make informed decisions (Dwyer and Roberts, 1998). Paternalism is defined as “the 
interference with a person’s liberty of action, justified by reasons referring exclusively to 
the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of  the person being coerced” 
(Dworkin, 1971, p.108).  
Professional paternalism is criticized because it devalues client autonomy (Dwyer and 
Roberts, 1998). The AICPA’s refusal to disclose information about the geographical 
location of the TPSP represents unjustified professional paternalism. Morevoer, refusal to 
disclose this information can also be interpreted as mystification of these practices arising 
from a self-interested need to maintain secrecy. This paper provides an opportunity to 
study a profession as it seeks to push the boundaries of its domain even when that 
stretches the limits of public interest. The revision of the ethics rulings can be 
comprehended as another initiative in the long line of initiatives (Fogarty et al., 2006; 
Gendron and Barrett, 2004; Barrett and Gendron, 2005; and Shafer and Gendron, 2005) 
revealing the third issue analyzed in this study which is the accounting profession’s 
preoccupation with being commercial and profitable. 
Furtherance of Private interest versus Public interest 
The first issue that is addressed in this study is the possibility that the AICPA 
members are furthering their private interest over the public interest. Parker’s (1994) 
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private interest model provides a framework to help understand the motivations 
underlying the furtherance of the AICPA members’ private interest. One of the frequently 
cited characteristics of a profession is the existence of professional codes, often in the 
form of codes of ethics. Ethical codes are promulgated with the manifest objective of 
facilitating professional self-control as well as expressing and strengthening the 
community orientation of profession members (Barber, 1965). The Ethical codes have 
been observed to fulfill a number of private interest roles. These appear to be interrelated 
and focused upon the maintenance of professional authority. An examination of the key 
roles of the ethics codes helps us to understand them as interrelated component concepts 
of a private interest model of the roles served by ethical codes (Parker, 1994). 
Professional Insulation: The underlying intent of this role is to maintain the profession's 
internal control over its own members and its own overall agenda, to protect members 
from the vagaries of control attempted or exercised by external parties, and to enhance 
the accounting profession's perceived authority in the business and general community. 
Hence the role of professional insulation contributes directly to the role of interference 
minimization, self-control and professional authority. 
Interference minimization: The underlying intent of this role is to facilitate the 
profession's own self-control (rather than being controlled by other parties such as 
government or its agencies) and avoid counter-threats to the accounting profession's 
professional authority, prestige and influence in the business and general community. 
Hence the role of interference' minimization contributes directly to the roles of self-
control and professional authority. 
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Self-control: The underlying intent of this role is to minimize the State's potential or 
actual regulation of the accounting profession, maintain profession member solidarity and 
restrain any temptation for members to publicly criticize each other or their profession 
and retain the profession's own perception of its professional authority, via self-regulation. 
Hence the role of self-control contributes directly to the roles of interference 
minimization and professional authority. 
Professional Authority: The underlying intent of this role is to legitimize the profession's 
claimed territory and right to practice, secure public trust and approbation for the 
accounting profession and control the type of work and resulting economic rewards 
available to the accounting profession. Hence the role of professional authority 
contributes directly to the role of socio-economic status preservation. 
Socio-economic status preservation: The underlying intent of the role of socioeconomic 
status preservation is to secure social legitimation and prestige for the accounting 
profession, protect the economic interests of profession members, and maintain members' 
ability and rights to earn economic rewards while supporting the accounting profession's 
pursuit of public trust and respect. Hence the role of socio-economic status preservation 
contributes directly to the role of professional authority. From the foregoing discussion, a 
private interest model of professional ethics conceptualizes five interrelated roles that 
ethics fulfill in serving the private interest of the accounting profession: 
The model is represented in Fig. 1.  
……. Insert Fig. 1 here……..  
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The linkages between its components are derived from the manifest and latent intentions 
underpinning each role. Figure 1 depicts the five private interest roles served by 
accounting ethics codes and their hypothesized interrelationships.  
The AICPA revised its new ethics rulings to serve its private interests roles  which are 
ensuring professional insulation, facilitating interference minimization, exerting self-
control, maintaining professional authority and preserving socio economic status. The 
AICPA’s proactive attempt to revise the ethics rulings evidences the desire of the AICPA 
to invoke the professional insulation and self-control role of ethical codes. Ethical 
violations have often been evaluated and redressed within the profession, based on the 
argument that outside parties lack the requisite knowledge to make proper evaluations 
(Mckinlay, 1973). Professional insulation is a role served by ethical codes constructed 
partly with a view to insulating the AICPA from observation and evaluation by outside 
parties. The existence of such formal codes is intended to dissuade such parties from any 
desire or felt need to scrutinize closely the profession's activities. Self-control retains the 
AICPA's ability to exercise control over its own activities and members. The revision of 
the ethical codes provides a potential signal to external parties that the profession 
perceives itself to be effectively regulating its own activities and hence the inference that 
no further external regulation of the accounting profession is necessary.  
Interference minimization is an ethical code role of avoiding or minimizing 
interference in what the accounting profession regards as its own domain including type 
and scope of work undertaken, style of organization adopted, position in the business 
community and regulation of its own members and activities. For example, the PEEC 
states in the exposure draft that the committee remains committed to the belief that 
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disclosing confidential client information to TPSPs used in providing a professional 
service to clients would not constitute a release of confidential client information, and 
thus does not require specific client consent. Thus, the AICPA has chosen to extend the 
scope of the contract entered into between the client and the member by including a third 
party without the consent of the client. Such an act provides professional insulation thus 
promoting interference minimization and self control. The IRS’s proposed amendment to 
IRC 7216 will require the specific consent of the client and is in direct conflict with 
professional insulation and hence professional authority. The AICPA has been adamant 
in expressing its concerns regarding the IRS’s new rules fearing that this potential erosion 
of professional insulation will diminish their professional authority. In a testimony before 
subcommittee on oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, the Executive 
Tax Committee Chair argued that the AICPA ethics rules are more in line with modern 
business practices than what is provided for under the IRS proposed regulations. The 
AICPA’s opposition to the IRS amendment is evident in the following statement that 
appeared in an article titled “AICPA urges IRS to reconsider proposed disclosure” 
(AICPA, 2006a): 
We are particularly concerned about the extent to which the proposed regulations 
fashion an entirely new consent regime for any return preparation activities that 
involve parties located outside the borders of the United States. The proposed 
regulations are drafted in a manner that adds unnecessary and extremely 
burdensome steps to the current tax return processes utilized by many 
professional service providers. It appears that at the very time the IRS is 
eliminating barriers to the achievement of its goal for increasing electronic filings 
and payments, the agency is incongruously making it more complex for its 
partners -- the professional providers of tax assistance and return preparation -- to 
sustain their current professional business processes. 
 
The AICPA strongly encourages the IRS to adopt the various approaches 
suggested by our comments, as attached. If that is not acceptable, we urge the IRS 
to engage the professional service provider industry in a substantive discussion 
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prior to issuing final regulations about how to best ensure the requisite security of 
tax information in the context of today’s modern (global) business practices. 
 
The tone of the revised rulings suggest that the AICPA members are aware of their 
professional responsibility to the client and remain responsible even when a TPSP is used, 
thereby reminding regulators, members and federal agencies of their position in the 
business community and their ability to self-regulate. Claims made by the AICPA about 
‘reasonable assurance’ and ‘due diligence’ are reflective of the professional authority role 
of the ethics rulings that emphasizes the supposed unique technical knowledge base of 
the accounting profession along with its resulting authority to exclusivity and 
professional judgment in its claimed domain. Professional authority is also invoked by 
the AICPA by reminding regulatory agencies of the stature of the profession. Burns and 
Haga (1977) contend that the profession ultimately employs intimidation whenever its 
autonomy or authority is seriously threatened by outside parties. The following statement, 
made by Thomas J. Purcell, Chair, Executive Tax Committee of the AICPA in his 
testimony before the subcommittee on oversight of the house committee on ways and 
means is reflective of the AICPA’s attempt to assert its authority as described in Parker’s 
model (Committee on Ways and Means, 2006): 
The AICPA is the national, professional organization of certified public accountants 
comprised of approximately 330,000 members.  Our members advise clients on 
federal, state, and international tax matters and prepare income and other tax returns 
for millions of Americans.  They provide services to individuals, not-for-profit 
organizations, small and medium-sized businesses, as well as America’s largest 
businesses.  It is from this broad base of experience that we offer our comments 
today on the IRS budget and the 2006 tax filing season. 
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In the following statement, the AICPA continues to flaunt their professional authority 
vis-à-vis the authority of other regulatory agencies (Committee on Ways and Means, 
2006): 
The AICPA applauds Commissioner Everson’s commitment to high standards for tax 
professionals and his efforts to upgrade the Office of Professional Responsibility.  In 
this context, we have a longstanding track record of establishing high professional 
standards for our CPA members, including the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct 
and enforceable Statements on Standards for Tax Services. 
 
Ethical codes may also play a role in safeguarding the socio-economic position of a 
profession's members. In preserving the socio-economic status of the accounting 
profession, ethical codes routinely include rules pertaining to member competition, 
service pricing policies, handing over clients between members, and tending practices. 
While professional insulation, self-control, professional authority, and interference 
minimization may be latent objectives underlying the AICPA’s motivation to revise the 
rulings, the socio-economic status preservation role of the ethical codes may be the 
manifest objective of the revised rulings. Thus, the AICPA may be attempting to preserve 
members’ socio-economic status with the use of the code of ethics as an instrument that 
aids promotion of members’ private interests. The AICPA’s preoccupation with 
preserving and sustaining their members’ business practices in order to keep them 
competitive seems to override their obligation to reveal information to the taxpayer. The 
following statement brings forth the above argument (Committee on Ways and Means, 
2006): 
We recommend that, instead of the regime outlined in the proposed regulations, the 
IRS incorporate in the final regulations, the approach the AICPA has adopted for its 
members.  Specifically, as described in our June 6, 2005 letter to IRS Commissioner 
Mark W. Everson, the AICPA has adopted two new and one revised ethics rulings, 
regarding a CPA’s responsibilities when outsourcing services to third-party service 
providers whether domestic or offshore.  These provisions, as described in more 
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detail below, provide a balanced approach for protecting taxpayer information while 
accommodating modern business practices. The proposed regulations prescribe 
dramatic differences in the forms of consent; i.e., based on whether the professional 
services are rendered from within the U.S and its territories or are provided (in whole 
or in part) from overseas; the regulations create rules that are significantly out of step 
with modern business practices.   
 
The discussion above reminds us that the codes of ethics, in either a regulatory or 
self-regulatory regime are ineffective in promoting ethical behavior unless they are 
promoted, implemented and enforced. The code of ethics is a practical measure to 
promote trustworthiness of the members of the profession. In order to promote trust the 
profession must develop a culture of trust (Brien, 1998). A culture of trust has two 
elements. First, various beliefs, norms and values that focus on trust and exemplify it 
such as respect for individuals, sincerity, honesty, community service and a commitment 
to the profession's clients. Second, specific institutions that promote trust through their 
actions which includes codes of ethics, education programs, disciplinary bodies, 
adjudication and interpretation bodies, working in conjunction to articulate a professional 
ethic (Brien, 1998).  
The trust that grounds any sort of cooperation is not unperceptive and is not invested 
unconditionally. The agent’s activities continue but mechanisms exist to deal with 
untrustworthy behaviors such as education, opprobrium, criticism and exclusion which 
can be invoked in appropriate circumstances (Brien, 1998). Therefore, impairment of 
trust in the accounting profession and the resulting loss of public confidence draw our 
attention to the fact that the profession is not invulnerable to scrutiny or immune from 
accountability and stands to face consequences for pursuing unethical behavior. 
Cultivating trust enables the profession to pursue the ideal of professionalism which can 
be pursued by an organization only if it is trusted since it assumes self-regulation, a 
 78
strong ethic and an altruistic orientation. Familiar features of professional life, such as 
autonomy and self-regulation are not simply the result of a specific bargain struck 
between the profession and society but are also a part of what it is to be a profession, and 
arise, in modern societies, as an act of trust on the part of society when the profession is 
constituted or from its ongoing maintenance (Brien, 1998). Thus, society must trust the 
profession in order for it to be in a position to move towards the professional ideal; and 
the profession must actively cultivate a culture of trust in order to attain the professional 
ideal. 
Impairment of Trust and loss of public confidence 
Trust issues between the lay person and expert systems 
Giddens (1990, p.33) describes trust in modernity as related to absence in time and in 
space. There would be no need to trust anyone whose activities were continually visible 
and who’s thought processes were transparent, or to trust any system whose workings 
were wholly known and understood. According to Giddens, it has been said that trust is 
“a device for coping with the freedom of others”, but the prime condition of requirements 
of trust is not lack of power but lack of full information. Trust relations, therefore, are 
basic to the extended time-space distanciation associated with modernity. The AICPA 
acknowledges that trust invested in the profession must be nurtured (AICPA, 2004d): 
We must remember that of all of our assets, none is more precious than the 
position of trust we occupy in the marketplace. Regulators play a vital role for our 
profession. But the role of the regulator is to set the minimum requirements for 
protecting the public interest and disciplining those who fail to meet them. Our 
professional goal must go beyond that.  
 
Giddens (1990, p.88) distinguishes between trust in systems versus trust in persons. 
Giddens notes that trust in systems takes the form of faceless commitments, in which 
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faith is sustained in the workings of knowledge of which the lay person is largely 
ignorant while trust in persons involves facework commitments, in which indicators of 
integrity of others (within given arenas of action) are sought. The AICPA members enter 
into facework commitments with their clients when they agree to prepare the client’s tax 
return. They are entrusted with the preparation of tax returns with a generalized sense of 
trust that confidentiality of client information will be maintained and all professional 
services will be performed with professional competence and due professional care. 
Clients might not have an expectation that a member would use a TPSP to assist the 
member in providing the professional services (AICPA, 2004). The AICPA seeks to 
remedy any loss of trust due to the expansion of the range of activities agreed upon by 
requiring the members to adequately plan and supervise the services provided by the third 
party provider and obtain sufficient relevant data to support the work product. However, 
the client may consider the act of offshoring of returns as a breach of trust vested in the 
member.  
Giddens highlights the role of risk in potentially upsetting the acceptance of expert 
systems. He uses Luhman, (1988) and Luhman, (1979) observations to argue that trust is 
different than confidence in that trust implies an awareness of the risk that trust might be 
misplaced. This suggests that people consciously consider alternatives in deciding to take 
certain actions. Consequently, impairment of public confidence in the accounting 
profession can have dire consequences with the client opting out of the relationship due 
to loss of trust. The revised rulings can be understood as seeking to redirect expert 
systems across distanciated time–space, so lay people come to accept accountancy’s 
expertise as applying to a broader range of activities such as offshoring of tax returns.  
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For Giddens the transference of expertise from one area to another indicates that lay 
acceptance can act at a very general level, without clear knowledge of what it is a 
profession or expert system actually knows or does, and with a general faith in expert 
systems overall. Expert systems have no distinct knowledge base which can be reliably 
invoked for future services since the scope and nature of these services cannot be fully 
known in advance.  
Just as Giddens envisages reliance on expert systems as a leap of faith (Giddens, 
1990), so the revised rulings explicitly calls for a leap of faith from taxpayers in 
accepting the offshoring of their returns without their specific consent. The AICPA’s 
reassurance that the TPSP will adhere to the standards set for the AICPA is arguable. 
This sentiment was echoed by Kathryn Means, CPA, Chair, FICPA Accounting 
Principles and Auditing Standards Committee in a comment letter to the exposure draft 
as: 
The Committee agreed that the member should remain responsible but believed that it 
would be difficult for a member to be responsible for the “adequate oversight of all 
services performed by the third-party service provider and for ensuring that all 
professional services are performed with professional competence and due professional 
care”. It appears that the AICPA is asking the third-party service provider to adhere to the 
standards that the member is bound by in regard to ethics. 
 
Similarly, disturbances to this general faith are of acute importance because they 
threaten the generalized trust which might ordinarily flow to accountancy’s claims to 
expertise. This trust does not require specific knowledge, but rather a general, pragmatic 
sense of functionality.  
Giddens emphasizes that trust in abstract systems does not presuppose any encounters 
at all with the individuals or groups who are in some way responsible for them. But in the 
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large majority of instances such individuals or groups are involved as access points of the 
abstract system. Giddens (1990, p.86) also notes that, at access points, a clear distinction 
can be made between ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ performances since control of the 
threshold between frontstage and backstage is part of the essence of professionalism.  He 
argues that a clear distinction between the front and backstage reduces the impact of 
imperfect skills and human fallibility that might otherwise undermine the expert’s 
trustworthiness, something that those working at access points usually wish to minimize 
by concealing what occurs behind the scene and away from public view. Rhetorical ploys 
employed by the AICPA to enlist the support of its audiences for the revised rulings 
incorporates such key terms as: “responsible”, “honest and candid”, “due care ”, 
“balanced approach”, “modern business practices”, “”, “productive economies”, 
“extremely burdensome”, “unnecessarily complicated”, “global marketplace” which help 
set up the frontstage for the offhshoring practice. Robert bunting, Chair, AICPA 
reinforces the frontstage of the AICPA in his leadership speech with comments such as: 
Objective advice, reliable financial information, efficiency, transparency and 
accountability are important to all institutions – and the mission of our members is to 
provide them.  
 
As emphasized by Giddens (1990, p.88): 
Access points are points of connection between lay individuals or collectives and 
representatives of abstract systems. They are places of vulnerability for abstract 
systems, but also junctions at which trust can be maintained or built up.  
 
Thus, statements made by a AICPA member to argue that the reputable outsourcing 
providers apply security measures that far exceed the measures taken by many accounting 
firms in the U.S. are representative of the accounting profession at an access point 
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attempting to bring the skepticism of the lay person to rest as evidenced in the following 
statement: 
The outsource providers operate their production facilities in a totally paperless 
environment.  This strictly means that paper is absolutely not allowed in their 
production area.  They do not allow pens, pencils, note pads or paper of any kind. 
Their staff members are not allowed to bring purses or brief cases into the production 
area. They have no removable media devices on their staff computers and no client 
data is ever stored on their hard drives. The preparation staff has no email capability, 
no instant messaging capabilities and very restricted access to the internet. In addition 
the staff is required to sign strict Non-Disclosure Agreements that prevent them from 
even discussing clients’ data unless it is specifically related to work currently being 
preformed. Therefore, the security measures taken by leading outsourcing providers 
assure the highest level of security possible for the client’s data. (Appendix MM, 
AICPA, 2004c).  
 
The claims of rigorousness of the security structure of the TPSP enforce the front 
stage of the practice to help promote trustworthiness in the AICPA members’ claims to 
expertise and reduce the impact of the possibility of human errors and imperfect skills. 
The position of the AICPA regarding client’s confidential information seems to endorse 
the view that the TPSPs are competent and have procedures in place to maintain security 
that are heartwarmingly reliable. This sentiment was amplified by Ochsenschlager, vice 
president of taxation at the AICPA, who explained that, while he doesn't necessarily 
promote sending tax returns overseas, he did note that an AICPA member visited an 
Indian-based accounting-outsource firm and found that the company was abiding by 
stronger security measures than most U.S. accounting companies (Coombes, 2006). 
However, the truth in the assertions of the AICPA is debatable. As Giddens notes, experts 
can get things wrong, by misinterpreting or being ignorant of expertise they are presumed 
to possess (Giddens, 1990, p.86). 
The above discussion about security and confidentiality of client information is 
supported by data from interviews conducted with three leading TPSPs regarding the 
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security and privacy measures that are in place in their organizations. The aim of the 
investigation was to obtain firsthand information about the systems installed and 
procedures followed by the TPSPs to ensure confidentiality and security of client 
information. Since the security of client information is at the heart of the offshoring 
controversy, in-depth interviews with service providers provided valuable insights which 
may not be revealed by a mere examination of archival documents. The providers were 
located in India and since majority of the returns are offshored to India, this site was 
considered as most relevant to the study.  When asked how the providers specifically deal 
with issues such as risk mitigation, business continuity, privacy, and information security, 
Provider 1 explained there are many ways one can mitigate risk associated with 
information security and privacy of data. Starting with physical entry into the 
organization which is regulated at the reception desk, the kind of equipment that is 
allowed into the premises, such as a USB device or a camera phone, is also strictly 
monitored. Provider 1 stated that few companies implement the standards as strictly as 
they do though a lot of companies make tall claims about their security procedures: 
Regarding Indian BPO providers, we are the number one company that implements 
security procedures.  A lot of organizations say they do but they don’t actually 
implement it. We actually implement it. For e.g. any e-mails coming into or going out 
of the organization, from an external email server, are tracked. Basically, the contents 
are tracked and if the content is extremely confidential, which is identified by the 
system itself, the mail is held in our server and our information security team takes 
care of these types of risks. They identify and classify these risks. We have physical 
security measures at the reception desk. Not just random selection, but each and every 
person has to have their bag checked before entering the premises and undergo a 
physical scan by metal detectors. Secondly, any type of equipment coming in or 
going out are scanned by metal detectors. We have CCT detectors and cameras in the 
server rooms and our server rooms are biometric, which means that access is allowed 
by scanning the index finger of the authorized person. Even the IT head cannot enter 
the server room without proper authority and reason. Regarding identity fraud, there 
is a card reader that reads the access card and cameras can see who has entered, if 
there is a problem the card is sent to the checker and even if the senior manager wants 
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to take a client to the server room, email permission is required which can be 
approved only by the IT head. The system is bureaucratic but it is required. If you go 
around the premises, you will see on each wing there is a lot of security because we 
protect our clients’ information. We also feared that adjacent buildings could observe 
the goings-on of our organization and with the help of good technology and cameras, 
could take snap shots of the interiors. To avoid this risk, we have installed glass 
where outsiders cannot see what’s going on in the organization. Back to information 
security, a lot of email sites are blocked and not everybody has access to the internet. 
Only senior management and process related people do. 
 
Provider 2 elaborated the security procedures instituted by them to address concerns 
regarding privacy and security of information. They had similar provisions for 
information security as described by Provider 1 above. However, Provider 2 explained 
that assertions that data is safe and information security procedures are sufficient may not 
satisfactorily alleviate client concerns. The following excerpt describes the measures 
adopted by provider 2 to ensure safety of client information: 
In order to mitigate client concerns regarding information security satisfactorily, we 
have gone for certification. Certifying mitigates at least 80% of clients’ concerns. 
Along with certification, we have to be assessed with BSI which involves a lot of 
compliances from IT perspective, physical security perspective, business contingency 
plan, and disaster recovery. Next, the trick is how you maintain that. So we have 
periodical assessments done by the BSI at our cost to make sure we are still in 
compliance. Now this gives a lot of comfort to the client. Client XYZ is the best 
example. XYZ signed the contract with us 4 months ago after we got the BSI 
certification. They waited until we got the certification. It was of such importance to 
them. The certification is like a check list of all the areas that we need to be complaint 
with. BSI gave us 6 months. They take a look at each and every process and they tell 
us, here you are fine but here you have holes and you need to plug this and this is how 
you plug it and then they come back and revaluate us. Finally their staff from UK 
comes down and does the final assessment of the entire process and then they certify 
us, so this is how it is taken care of. Morevoer, assessments are done periodically. 
i.e.every six months... some companies do it on a yearly basis but our clients are not 
happy with that because they might say in 3 months you may plug out all the holes 
but what about the other 9 months the holes are exposed. Now we are doing it every 6 
months. So at least we maintain those standards 
 
So this takes care of security risk and business contingencies and disaster recovery, 
logical security in case of information systems, physical security, hacker prevention 
for data in case of health care clients, we provide training for HIPA compliance. So 
the client issue is paid a lot of attention.  
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Finally, the following excerpt describes the measures adopted by Provider 3 to ensure 
safety of client information: 
The way we have tackled identity frauds and data base hackers is, we do not bring 
any data into the premises. We restrict printing. Our clients’ premises are extremely 
paper based and the first thing we tell them is if you have to work with us, we will not 
be printing anything for you. We will be printing paper only if it is absolutely 
required and once the work is done, we will immediately shred the paper. There are 
clearly defined polices on printing and shredding. Secondly, no camera phones are 
allowed on the floor and no access is granted to 3rd party networks like yahoo or 
hotmail etc. Again, in some cases if the client is comfortable, they can provide access. 
The standard is that we do not provide it. We do not enable floppy drives nor do we 
enable our USB ports. The preferred mode is to work on CITRIX where we cannot 
store anything even on the local drives so we have shared drives at the client site. 
Everything is stored at the clients’ site. We prefer not to store anything at our end. 
Further, we make sure that everyone understands their responsibility, the sensitivity 
around the data that they are handling and they understand what it is that they need to 
do. We have policies such as everyone has to swipe their card when they are getting 
in. We sensitize people to ensure they follow those policies and if they are not 
followed, there are rules for non-compliance. For e.g. we are handling client ABC’s 
entire process and there is a lot of sensitive information. So if you come around at 
year end, or quarter end, or month end of ABC, nobody other than provider 3 
employees that are dedicated to ABC’s team are allowed, not even our managing 
director can enter the ABC floor. That is the kind of security we have.  
 
The above discussion seems to corroborate the AICPA’s assertions about security of 
data but we must bear in mind that the above providers are one of the fourteen leading 
providers in India. As specifically mentioned by Provider 1, security measures followed 
at other TPSP may not be identical or as rigorous as security measures in these 
organizations.  
Trust issues within the members of expert systems: 
Giddens (1990, p.87) notes that trust mechanisms do not relate only to the connection 
between lay persons and experts. They are also bound up with the activities of those who 
are “within” abstract systems. He argues that codes of professional ethics, in some cases 
backed by legal sanctions, form one means whereby the trustworthiness of colleagues or 
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associates is internally managed. Giddens emphasizes (1990, p.26) that all disembedding 
mechanisms, both symbolic tokens and expert systems, depend upon trust. Disembedding 
is explained as the “lifting out” of social relations from local contexts of interaction and 
reembedded in other circumstance thus allowing their migration to broader contexts. 
Reembedding here represents a means of anchoring trust in the trustworthiness and 
integrity of colleagues. The analysis of the trust relationships within the AICPA provides 
insights about trust and distrust relationships among different sub-groups. In the ensuing 
discussion, I draw on Giddens’ theoretical developments to problematize the linkages 
between the accounting experts and their system of expertise. 
Offshoring of tax returns is a divisive issue among the accountants in US. The elites 
and the non-elites have systematically different agendas and perspectives, especially 
about the prospects of professional change. This is a clear feature of the peculiarly 
fragmented organization of the US accounting profession (Fogarty et al., 2006). 
Accountants working in industry have a different sense of their responsibilities than those 
working in large firms, who again have different values than those who work in smaller 
public offices or those in the public, voluntary or community sectors (Hastings and 
Hastings, 1970). ). How practitioners come to see themselves, their identity as individual, 
public sector, or corporate accountants and auditors, and what this means in terms of their 
allegiances and concerns, inter-relate with regulatory processes and impacts how rules are 
operationalized (Cooper et al. 2006).  
The AICPA has approximately 350,000 members. Forty nine comment letters were 
received in response to the exposure draft proposing revisions to the rulings. Members of 
small firms that do not outsource tax returns and non-practicing members criticized the 
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practice of offshoring arguing that it reduces the overall trustworthiness of the profession. 
Concerns voiced by Corey Bidne, AICPA member were: 
If this information is not disclosed to the client, I believe this issue is a time bomb 
waiting to go off.  It is only a matter of time before clients discover that outsourcing 
to foreign countries is being widely utilized, which will add another scar to the public 
image of CPAs.  As CPAs we are charged with restoring investors faith after the 
wake of Enron and MCI, telling clients upfront that a third party may be used as part 
of the process is a preventative measure that we should take”(Appendix D, AICPA 
2004c) 
 
Extending this view, Michael Cummins, CPA reasoned that: 
 
I think a contractual agreement with a foreign entity such as a firm in India would not 
be possible to enforce as a practical matter. So I think any disclosure to a foreign 
entity should be required to be disclosed to a client (Appendix G, AICPA 2004c). 
 
James Mckeown, CPA, stated that: 
 
Disclosure to the client in "broad language" is unacceptable professional behavior.  
Also telling them a third-party "may be used," when one will be, is not the right thing 
to do (Appendix M, AICPA 2004c). 
 
Lawrence Yoder, CPA, observed that: 
So I am commenting that this exposure draft is too soft on the profession. We all 
know that outsourcing leads to more return for large firms while costing jobs here in 
America. Why not outsource locally? Not overseas (Appendix Y, AICPA 2004c). 
 
The above excerpts from the comment letters are indicative of the negative sentiment 
shared by the members of small accounting firms towards offshoring of returns. In 
contrast to the position of the small accounting firms is the position of the large 
accounting firms, who are, not surprisingly supportive of offshoring practice and opposed 
to disclosure of the same. This stand was evident in the argument forwarded by LBMC, 
one of the largest regional firms in Tennessee which was also voted the 6th largest firm in 
the south-east and the 54th largest firm in the United States. LBMC strongly opposed the 
requirement describing it as an obstacle to practicing CPAs who are trying to be 
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successful and competitive and focusing unnecessarily on the negative. Says David 
Morgan, member of the LBMC team in his response to the exposure draft, 
I am very concerned about anything that makes practicing CPAs non-competitive. On 
the one hand we cry about workload compression, not being able to find staff and 
working to many hours.  On the other hand, we keep making it harder for practicing 
CPAs to be successful and competitive by constantly focusing on the negative 
(Appendix C, AICPA 2004c) 
 
Supporting this argument was Warren Averett, the largest locally owned CPA firm in 
Alabama that has been ranked by many groups as one of the Top 100 CPA firms in the 
United States. In the past tax season they outsourced approximately 350 1040s and are 
planning to outsource approximately 500 to 750 returns in current year. Their response to 
the exposure draft read: 
Because of the positive effect outsourcing has on our firm, the improved quality of 
work life it allows us to provide to our employees, the enhanced review capabilities 
that lead to a quality end product and the extreme security measures taken by 
outsource providers, we believe that there should be no additional disclosure required 
by firms that utilize an outsource service provider. It is further our opinion that the 
proposed changes to this rule will change the nature of the ruling from its original 
purpose of protecting consumers from having their data misused (Appendix MM, 
AICPA 2004c). 
 
The AICPA in support of the large firms forwarded the argument that the disclosure 
of offshoring is counter-productive and impedes economic development. The AICPA 
explained that firms with global capabilities have adopted an entire range of sophisticated 
business protocols to ensure that they can enter and enforce an entire range of contractual 
obligations and duties.  To suggest otherwise, particularly in the explicit fashion 
described by the proposed IRS revenue procedure is, to badly misrepresent the 
capabilities and motivations of the vast majority of firms engaged in providing tax 
services and filing support across international boundaries (AICPA, 2006). This argument 
 89
was evidenced by the following comment on the proposed IRS regulations, REG -
137243-02, requiring disclosure of offshoring of tax return preparation. 
The AICPA is also concerned that the proposed regulations (as currently drafted) do 
not recognize or adequately reflect the various forms under which large accounting 
and legal firms are organized in today’s global marketplace; a circumstance that 
complicates both the domestic disclosure and potentially the offshore disclosures.  In 
this context, we believe the proposed regulations should be modified (for purposes of 
offshore disclosures) to permit the use of a consent embodied in the traditional 
engagement letter used by an accountant or attorney as opposed to the explicit 
consent otherwise required by prop. reg. section 301.7216-3 (AICPA, 2006). 
 
The AICPA seems to be concerned about the complicated circumstances the large 
firms operate in and it is not clear how changing the form of disclosure will uncomplicate 
those circumstances. The above quote seems to be urging the IRS to skirt the issue by 
requiring the disclosure to be in a form that can be conveniently buried in the engagement 
letter or the tax organizer. Thus, the AICPA reproduces the front stage within the abstract 
system of the profession by managing the trust and distrust relationships between the 
small and large accounting firms to promote the overall trustworthiness of the profession.  
 The above analysis also brings forth the observation that a lay person’s faith in expert 
systems would lead one to believe that the role of the revised ethics rulings is to consider 
service to the public as the dominant force guiding the performance of professional duties. 
The public view of the professional/client/public triad is one of professional obligation to 
present information in which the public can place its trust. If the public perceives, 
whether correctly or not, that the professional has allowed information to be presented 
which has slanted or shadowed the truth so as to render it less than trust worthy, the 
expectations of the public have not been met and there is the potential for a loss of trust in 
the profession (Lindblom and Ruland, 1997). In discharging their professional 
responsibilities, members may encounter conflicting pressures between the fulfillment of 
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the public interest and the private interest role of the profession. The revised ethics 
rulings further members’ private interests providing testimony to the undeniable trend of 
commercialization of the accounting profession witnessed in the last decade. 
Commercialization of the accounting profession 
Hanlon’s work on the role of accountants in the labor process of modern capitalism 
has the considerable virtue of raising often neglected questions about  the profession as a 
business that pursues profit, and one that shifts its activities depending on the specific 
form that capital accumulation takes in different places and times ( Hanlon, 1994, 1996, 
1997). While Hanlon’s work concentrates on the role of firms in commercialization, 
much of the literature on the accounting profession and commercialization has 
emphasized the role of professional bodies. Robson et al. (1994) extensively explore the 
ways in which British professional bodies articulated an increasingly commercial role for 
their members and how this interacted with their claims to be professional and acting in 
the public interest. Radcliffe et al., (1994) take the analysis further by pointing out that 
the UK professional bodies worked hard to construct themselves, at least discursively, as 
enterprising organizations. Finally, Hanlon (1998) has extended the argument about 
commercialization, by pointing out that the attempt to be ‘enterprising’ can result in 
serious cleavages in the service class. Since the demise of Arthur Andersen and the series 
of accounting scandals, debates about commercialization have intensified. Mitchell and 
Sikka (2004), Zeff (2003a, 2003b) and Wyatt (2004) claim that the commercialization of 
the Big Four went too far and regulatory structures are needed to curb past excesses.  
Such debates emphasize the importance of further examining the practices of 
accountants and auditors, and not relying on the discursive claims of professional 
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associations and leaders  of the industry that they are indeed professional (Simmons and 
Neu, 1997). It would be useful to examine whether claims to be ‘gentlemanly’ and 
professional values might be a strategy to be commercial. Appeals to such forms of social 
and cultural capital can be an effective strategy for professionals in developing their 
business and being profitable (Cooper et al., 1996). Rather than producing a conception 
that commercialization may be antithetical to professionalization , studies of  accounting 
and audit practices will benefit from examining the work practices and client relations of 
professional organizations (firms and associations) (Cooper and Robson, 2006) and 
particularly how claims to be commercial and professional are selectively used in such 
organizations (Alvesson and Karreman, 2004). While current research focuses on 
historical analyzes, there is important work to be done in analyzing current developments, 
relating to the role of the accounting profession in commercialization (Cooper and 
Robson, 2006).  
In this study, I analyze whether the underlying motivation of the accounting 
profession in revising the ethics rulings regarding disclosure of outsourcing is economic 
and commercial or is a proactive attempt at being genuinely ethical. The revised rulings 
contain ambiguous wording which can result in different interpretations to different 
readers. For example, the rulings do not reveal whether the return will be outsourced or 
offshored in any clear terms. Concerns regarding the format of the disclosure were 
brought forth in comment letters to the exposure draft. Adrian G. Lyman, CPA, stated in 
his letter to the AICPA (AICPA, 2004b): 
In my opinion, the committee is too accommodating in its conclusion that "guidance 
concerning the use of third-party service providers should apply equally to service 
providers located both domestically and abroad." To conclude that the public, the best 
interests of which our profession still purportedly serves, will make no distinction 
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between domestic service centers and those located abroad is simply nonsense. Worse, 
it is a position which has potentially disastrous implications to the profession. The 
industry has taken some hits lately in consumer confidence, and the incomplete 
disclosures recommended by the foreign service centers offering off-shore 
"outsourcing" can only contribute to the perception that CPAs are more concerned 
about the letter of the law than its spirit. 
 
Rodney S. Conant, CPA stated in his comment letter: 
 
I was proud until I read how you propose to allow a member to disclose his use of 
“third-party providers.”  The use of the term “broad language,” which would inform the 
client that “a third-party service provider may be used” is utterly whimpish.  Why waste 
your time and member dues coming to that conclusion?  If a client has a right to know, 
we should be honest and candid with the client. While the AICPA uses the term 
“transparency” and “clear understanding” with clients while addressing issues such as 
independence and peer review, why now are you taking a position that the form of 
disclosure could be buried in small print in a document that has other purposes.  If we 
are to be “honest and candid” this disclosure should be obvious and clear.  It should not 
be a part of an organizer or in the standard privacy policy letters that no one reads. 
 
 The language recommended in the revised rulings requires that the member ‘should’ and 
not ’must’ disclose that a TPSP may be used thereby shifting the onerous concern of 
disclosing to the member’s discretion. Further, the disclosure format requires that the 
member state that the return ‘may’ be outsourced to a TPSP. The disclosure is 
unintelligible since it enshrouds the AICPA member’s intent to outsource and the identity 
of the TPSP. These observations are brought forth from close scrutiny of the following 
excerpt of the revised ruling 112: 
Before disclosing confidential client information to a third-party service provider, 
a member should inform the client, preferably in writing, that the member may 
use a third-party service provider (AICPA, 2004a). 
 
Curt Eakin, C.P.A., Chairperson of The Professional Conduct Committee of the 
California Society of Certified Public, voiced the committee’s concerns regarding the 
disclosure format in their comment letter to the exposure draft: 
We believe that the method of disclosure should not be left to the discretion of the 
member. If we, as a profession are to maintain integrity and objectivity in the minds 
of our clients and the public, we need to not hide the fact that we are using a third 
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party service provider. If we fear that this disclosure will drive away clients and 
therefore do not wish to make it known as a profession, we are not acting in the 
public interest.  
 
In the revised ethics rulings, the AICPA asserted that offshoring does not result in 
release of confidential client information and thus should not require specific client 
consent. Although seemingly forthright, the AICPA’s insistence on discouraging specific 
client consent signals an insidious agenda. On one hand, the AICPA upholds the 
profession’s obligation to be candid and honest with the client and insists on the client’s 
right to know if a TPSP is being used. On the other hand, the final rulings do not require 
specific disclosure of offshoring since the PEEC noted that they believed it was 
appropriate to focus on the ethical issues when a member uses the services of a TPSP and 
not to address the geopolitical concerns associated with outsourcing. Thus, the ruling 
merely called for disclosure in some general sense (“preferably in writing”). (Brody et al 
2006). The above rationale does not address the fact that the geopolitical concerns 
themselves have ethical implications. The recommended disclosure withholds vital 
information about the geographical location of the service provider. The AICPA ensured 
that the revised rulings disclose as little information as possible in as vague terms as 
possible. The following excerpt from the exposure draft details the AICPA’s claimed 
commitment to being honest and candid about any information shared with a TPSP. 
The committee remains committed to the belief that disclosing confidential client 
information to third-party service providers used in providing a professional service 
to clients would not constitute a release of confidential client information, and thus 
not require specific client consent. The committee does however believe that a client 
has a right to know, and the profession an obligation to be honest and candid with a 
client, if the client’s confidential information may be shared with an entity that is not 
under the member’s or his or her firm’s control, or with an individual not employed 
by the member or member’s firm. Accordingly, the committee is proposing a 
requirement that a member disclose the use of third-party service providers utilized in 
the provision of professional services to clients (AICPA, 2004). 
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The above statement by the AICPA is unquestioningly motiveless and wholly 
representative of the AICPA’s desire to serve the public better. Implicit in the AICPA’s 
act though is the real motive that completely contradicts their assertions. The public 
interest ideal is being touted to buy legitimacy for its activities so that the activities can 
continue unaltered. The AICPA wants to continue outsourcing the returns to a foreign 
country and has once again marginalized public interest in the face of members’ self-
interests. The AICPA’s concern with sustaining business practices and with 
uncomplicated procedures for disclosure of offshoring is also evidenced in their response 
to the proposed IRS regulation for disclosure of offhshoring of tax returns. In REG-
137243-02, the Internal Revenue Service proposed amendments to the regulations under 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 7216.  Section 7216 imposes criminal penalties on 
tax return preparers who make unauthorized disclosures or uses of information furnished 
to him or her in connection with the preparation of an income tax return6 (IRS, 2006). 
The IRS revision to the proposed regulations has raised a furore for a number of different 
reasons among a number of different groups. The consumer groups believe that requiring 
specific consent would result in release of confidential client information instead of the 
intended effect of safeguarding the client’s privacy. The proposals have set off some 
apparently unexpected protests from several consumer protection groups, basically 
concerned that the proposals make it too easy for taxpayers to unknowingly grant 
permission for disclosure of their tax information.  
There have been suggestions that the proposed revenue procedure was influenced by 
lobbying from major tax return preparation companies. Critics of the proposal, including 
                                                 
6 6 See IRS Notice 2005-93, Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 2005-93, page 1204. Notice 2005-93 is also 
found at irs.gov at the following URL:  http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-05-93.pdf   
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the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, the National Consumer Law Center and the 
Consumer Federation of America, focus on the possibility that taxpayers very often do 
not read every document that is put before them in the tax preparer's office. They are 
concerned that taxpayers will be unwittingly signing away disclosure of some of their 
most confidential personal and financial information. (Jones and Luscombe, 2006) 
Not surprisingly, the major consumer-based tax return preparers who will benefit from 
the sale of this data (such as H&R Block and Jackson-Hewitt) have remained quiet. No 
doubt, they hope this issue gets no more attention than the misleading IRS 
announcements expect to receive. No one should sign consent to have one’s tax 
information used by others (Nolte 2006). 
Amid the outburst of reactions of various parties to the IRS proposal, the AICPA’s 
reaction to the proposal is noteworthy. The AICPA, unlike the other agencies, did not 
object to the form of the suggested IRS disclosure. The AICPA objected to the very fact 
of requiring disclosure deeming the IRS’s measures as extreme and unnecessary. The 
AICPA submitted Comments to the IRS on March 8, 2006 on “Proposed Regulations, 
REG-137243-02: Regarding Guidance to Facilitate Electronic Tax Administration- 
Updating of Section 7216 Regulations”. This document is particularly incriminating and 
brings forth the duplicitous approach being adopted by the AICPA to address the 
offshoring disclosure issue. The AICPA recommended that, instead of the regime 
outlined in the proposed regulations, the IRS incorporate in the final regulations, the 
approach the AICPA has adopted for its members.  Specifically, as described in their 
June 6, 2005 letter to IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson, the AICPA mentioned that it 
had adopted two new and one revised ethics rulings, regarding a CPA’s responsibilities 
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when outsourcing services to third-party service providers whether domestic or offshore.  
The AICPA stressed that their provisions provide a more balanced approach for 
protecting taxpayer information while accommodating modern business practices 
(AICPA, 2006): 
In contrast to the requirements set out under prop. reg. section 301.7216-2(d), the 
AICPA’s ethics rule on outsourcing does not require the preparer to obtain the written 
consent of the taxpayer prior to any disclosure to another preparer.  While we are 
conceptually supportive of the IRS’s underlying policy goals with respect to 
protecting the confidentiality of a taxpayer’s tax return information, especially when 
involving the disclosure of tax information to a preparer located overseas, we believe 
the AICPA ethics rules (regarding outsourcing services to third-party service 
providers) are more in line with modern business practices than what is provided for 
under prop. reg. section 301.7216-2(d) (AICPA, 2006). 
 
Thus, the AICPA’s heightened concern with being commercial than professional once 
again reveals their modernizing ambitions taking precedent over their public interest role.  
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The primary aim of this study was to examine the commercialization of the 
accounting profession using Giddens (1990) theory of trust and expert systems and 
Parker’s (1994) private interest model in the context of the AICPA’s revised ethics 
rulings regarding the disclosure of outsourcing of tax return preparation. The paper draws 
on evidence regarding the revision of the ethics rulings 12, 112 and 1 under rule 102, 201 
and 301 respectively. This encompassed examining the discourse surrounding the 
revision of the rulings using media coverage and AICPA and other regulatory agencies’ 
pronouncements and augmenting this examination with in-depth interviews conducted 
with top management members of three leading TPSPs located in India. This 
investigation allowed me to scrutinize whether the disclosure recommended in the 
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revised rulings is adequate and serves the public interest claims made by the AICPA. 
This study adds to the stream of research (O’Dwyer, 2003) that represents a direct 
response to Sikka’s (2001, p759) call for instigation of research “which scrutinize the 
rhetoric and public interest claims of accountancy bodies”. Further, this examination 
addresses Cooper and Robson’s (2006) observation that, rather than producing a 
conception that commercialization may be antithetical to professionalization , studies of  
accounting and audit practices will benefit if work practices and client relations of 
professional organizations are examined. 
In this study, three issues that are identified as problematic in the revised ethics 
rulings are analyzed. The first issue which is the AICPA members’ furthering their 
private interest over the public interest is interrelated to the second issue which is the 
resulting loss of trust in the accounting profession. The AICPA members can advance 
their private self-interest over public interest only to the detriment of the trust that is 
vested in the profession (Brien, 1998). One may argue that the AICPA’s decision to 
offshore returns without client consent is only an attempt to use their expertise to make 
decisions in lieu of their clients who do not possess the knowledge, expertise or requisite 
information to make their own decisions. By doing so, the AICPA members are engaging 
in professional paternalism. Paternalistic behavior toward an individual is philosophically 
undesirable because it restricts the individual’s autonomy and the individual’s ability to 
make informed decisions (Dwyer and Roberts, 1998). The AICPA’s refusal to disclose 
information about the geographical location of the TPSP represents unjustified 
professional paternalism. Morevoer, refusal to disclose this information can also be 
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interpreted as mystification of these practices arising from a self-interested need to 
maintain secrecy. 
Analysis of the public interest role of the AICPA versus private interests was done 
with the help of Parker’s (1994) private interest model of professional accounting ethics. 
The AICPA revised its new ethics rulings to serve its private interests roles  which are 
ensuring professional insulation, facilitating interference minimization, exerting self-
control, maintaining professional authority and preserving socio economic status. The 
AICPA’s proactive attempt to revise the ethics rulings evidences the desire of the AICPA 
to invoke the professional insulation and self-control role of ethical codes. The analysis 
brought forth the AICPA’s preoccupation with preserving the socio-economic interests of 
its members along with other latent objectives such as interference minimization and 
professional insulation to help promote their professional authority. However furtherance 
of members’ private interest will lead to impairment of trust in the accounting profession 
and the resulting loss of public confidence draw our attention to the fact that the 
profession is not invulnerable to scrutiny or immune from accountability and stands to 
face consequences for pursuing unethical behavior.  
Thus, the second issue, public confidence in the accounting profession and possible 
impairment of trust is understood in terms of work by Giddens (1990) and his discussion 
regarding trust issues between lay persons and expert systems and within members of 
profession. This examination brings forth the observation that a lay person’s faith in 
expert systems would lead one to believe that the role of the revised ethics rulings is to 
consider service to the public as the dominant force guiding the performance of 
professional duties. However, the revised ethics rulings further members’ private interests 
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providing testimony to the undeniable trend of commercialization of the accounting 
profession witnessed in the last decade which is the third issue identified in the study. 
The public interest ideal is being touted to buy legitimacy for its activities so that the 
activities can continue unaltered. The AICPA wants to continue outsourcing the returns 
to a foreign country and has once again marginalized public interest in the face of 
members’ self-interests. As stated by Jim Rigos, CPA in his comment letter to the 
exposure draft: 
 For once we had the chance to be on the right side and demonstrate that the AICPA 
serves the public interest by being ahead of the curve. I am disappointed (AICPA, 
2004c). 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  STUDY THREE:  SUSTAINING COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE IN FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING OUTSOURCING MARKETS: 
A CASE STUDY OF LEADING THIRD PARTY SERVICE PROVIDERS  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) refers to the transfer of the optimization and 
management of one or more information intensive business process to an external 
provider, who, in turn, owns and administers the selected processes based on specific 
performance criteria (Mani et al., 2006). BPO is a heterogeneous and rapidly growing 
offshore market with a projected annual growth rate of 60 percent (Tapper, 2004). Brown 
and Stone (2004) reported that BPO accounted for 34 percent of the global outsourcing 
contract value in 2004 and projected that BPO services would grow from $1.3 billion in 
2002 to $4.3 billion in 2007. Growing organizational investments in BPO provide 
testimony to the strategic role played by BPO in modern business practices. In less than 
half a decade, offshoring of BPO, particularly to India, has risen dramatically as the 
industry has gone from its infancy to the second largest and single fastest growing 
industry in India (Aron et al., 2005).  
When a company embarks upon the preliminary assessment stage of what to 
outsource, functions such as IT, Human Resources, and Finance are often outsourced 
together. Frequently, IT and Human Resource functions are outsourced first followed by 
finance and accounting (Finance and Accounting Outsourcing Market Review Report, 
2006). Although outsourcing of routine accounting functions is gaining momentum, the 
passing of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act (2002) has engendered uncertainty among the top 
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executives in finance departments because of its increased emphasis on financial controls, 
making it imperative to reconsider the functions that should be outsourced. The Finance 
and Accounting outsourcing (hereafter FAO) markets, being in their nascent stages, are 
confronted with unique constraints and risks that are absent in mature IT outsourcing 
markets (Masur, 2006). A survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit conducted on behalf 
of Accenture Finance Solutions determined that greater emphasis on corporate 
governance and increased direct control of finance processes was acting as a deterrent to 
outsourcing of finance functions. (Accenture finance solutions Report, 2004).  
Due to the recent wave of high profile accounting scandals such as Enron, MCI 
WorldCom, business executives have heightened their concern towards the completeness 
and accuracy of the financial reports that they publish (Defond et al., 2005). There are, 
consequently, serious apprehensions about FAO due to the increased possibility of loss of 
control, which in turn could weaken corporate governance and result in breaches of 
compliance with regulatory requirements. This argument may lead one to conclude that 
FAO may not be the optimum alternative in the long run, reducing its significance to a 
fad. On the other hand, statistics indicate that the global FAO market has grown by more 
than forty-five percent since the beginning of 2005 and is predicted to grow in excess of 
thirty percent in 2007 (www.faoresearch.com)7. In this study, I maintain that this growth 
                                                 
7 FAO Research, Inc. is the only research firm worldwide focused exclusively on the Finance & 
Accounting Outsourcing (FAO) market. Headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts, FAO 
Research provides in-depth market research, custom analysis and consulting services to 
outsourcing service suppliers to help with critical decisions associated with their FAO business 
issues. With frequent publishing of reports and independent, unbiased viewpoints, FAO 
Research is a trusted source for impartial research and opinions. For more information, visit 
www.faoresearch.com. 
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stems from the visualization of potential value of FAO and will be sustained by attending 
to the factors that may impede its realization.  
The FAO market is grossly under-penetrated across all regions and verticals, and 
there is still substantial opportunity for growth (www.fao.com) provided the service 
providers take into account the costs and risks that are faced by their clients and are able 
to deliver valued services (Levina and Ross, 2003). The advent of FAO is indicative a 
recent development which may permanently alter the manner in which financial reporting 
is performed in the US.  New regulatory requirements such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and new practices such as outsourcing and offshoring will intertwine to reconstruct an 
environment of unexamined practices (Mani et al., 2005). FAO may strongly influence 
the choice of future organizational form and structure thus making it important to develop 
an early understanding of this industry. In this study, I develop a theoretical model that 
examines the factors that enable service providers to maintain market share by 
recognizing the issues that endanger the survival of FAO and developing competencies to 
address these issues.  In doing so, I examine issues that have received little prior 
theoretical or empirical attention.  
The method adopted in my study is theory generation in the manner written by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), Mintzberg (1979) and Miles and Huberman (1984) based on 
case study evidence of three leading FAO service providers in India. The three cases 
were selected from a list of fourteen suppliers (www.fao.com) in order to facilitate the 
analysis of different organizational cultures, operating models, and success stories among 
the leading service providers and interviews were conducted with top management 
personnel. The analysis of data entails constant comparison of data and theory in order to 
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develop adequate conceptual categories. Table 8 describes the analytical processes 
associated with each level of output. 
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Table 8. Data analysis phases 
Level  Dimension Description 
Within-case analysis Factors that individual service providers consider 
as their competitive advantage. 
(Firm-level Drivers) 
Description of the firm-level characteristics that 
help the firm to gain an edge over its 
competitors. Identify Key success factors that 
provide the firm with competitive advantage. 
Within-case analysis Factors that are identified in extant literature that 
will determine the survival of FAO in the long-run. 
(Industry-level Drivers) 
Four factors were identified from literature: 
Emphasis on client’s corporate governance, 
Emphasis on Compliance, Risk Management and 
Competition. 
Service providers rate industry-level factors 
based upon their assessment of the level of 
importance that can be attributed to that factor in 
ensuring the survival of the industry.   
Cross-case analysis Cross-case comparison between Firm-level drivers Comparison of factors within firm-level drivers 
that provide competitive advantage to individual 
service providers to search for commonalities 
and differences in competitive strategy. 
Cross-case analysis Cross-case comparison between Industry-level 
drivers 
Comparison of factors within Industry-level 
drivers that provide competitive advantage to 
individual service providers to search for 
commonalities and differences in ratings 
attributed to factors. 
Sharpening constructs and verifying 
relationships 
Developing comprehensive framework to explain 
the factors associated with sustaining competitive 
advantage in the field of FAO 
Based on the within case and cross case analysis, 
an overall framework will be proposed. 
 Within-case analysis was conducted for the first case study in order to become 
intimately familiar with the case as a stand-alone entity. The other two case studies will 
be analyzed in a similar manner followed by a cross-case analysis across all the three 
case studies. Cross-case search for patterns will consist of searching for within-group 
similarities coupled with inter-group differences across the categories to develop a 
comprehensive framework of factors that are necessary for sustaining competitive 
advantage in FAO markets. This study is interesting for several reasons. First, no 
published work to date explicitly examines the factors that lead a service provider in the 
FAO market to sustain its competitive advantage (Kremic et al., 2006). In the last fifteen 
years, academic research on IS outsourcing has evolved rapidly. However, the vast 
majority of this research examines issues of interest to the buyer of outsourcing services 
rendering research undertaken from the service providers’ perspective to become notably 
scarce (Dibbern et al., 2004). There is a dearth of studies in outsourcing that attempt to 
address the service provider’s perspective (Levina and Ross, 2003; Goles, 2001)8 . Also, 
studies generally explore IS outsourcing not finance and accounting (Dibbern et al., 
2004).  
Second, sources of sustained competitive advantage for firms have been studied 
extensively in the field of strategic management (Porter, 1985; Rumelt, 1984). There is 
lack of research that conceptually explores the competitive advantage construct in the 
                                                 
8 The study conducted by Levina and Ross (2003) explored the vendors’ perspective using the theory of 
core competency, concept of complementarity in organizational design and findings from the literature on 
vendor-client relationship to understand how vendors provide value to their clients through outsourcing. 
Goles (2001) explored the vendors’ perspective by conducting a survey based study of outsourcing that 
proposed that higher vendor-client alignment, teamwork, balance of control, and process agility in the 
relationship will lead to more successful outcomes. 
outsourcing literature. FAO markets are unique as they face regulatory constraints and 
governance requirements. Providers that attempt to succeed in these markets must 
possess certain attributes that are not possessed by the other firms in the same industry as 
well as similar firms in other industries. An analysis of the competitive advantage 
construct in FAO markets will provide useful insights to service providers and their 
clients into factors that drive the growth of FAO markets. Finally, this study specifically 
analyzes the performance of service providers in FAO markets in India. Many countries 
around the world are emerging as FAO service providers such as China, the Philippines, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and several Latin American countries. However, the 
research site is based in India since India is the world's leading offshore outsourcing 
destination (See Table 9). India's revenue from BPO operations is expected to grow from 
approximately $1 billion in 2002 to $13.8 billion in 2007, and its share of supply is 
projected to be 57 percent of the offshore BPO market (Scholl et al., 2003).
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Table 9. India's competitive position relative to other countries 
 
Country Ratings India China Israel Africa Ireland Ireland Republic Poland Hungary Russia 
Government 
Support 
E          F G F VG VG P F F P
Labor Pool E G G F G G F G G VG 
Infrastructure           F P VG F VG VG F F P P
Education 
System 
VG          F VG G VG VG G G F VG
Cost           E E F VG G F VG G VG E
Political 
Stability 
F          F P F G E VG G F F
Cultural 
Compatibility 
F          P VG E E E VG VG VG G
Data/IP 
Security 
G          P VG G E E F F F P
Overall Climate VG P F F G G F F P P 
Note: P = Poor; F = Fair; G = Good; VG = Very Good; and E = Excellent. 
Source: Gartner (2004). 
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide a 
background of the growth of the FAO markets and the competitive advantage construct. 
In section 3, I elaborate my choice of methodology for collecting and analyzing the data. 
Section 4 presents a within-case analysis of the three service providers which is followed 
by a cross-case analysis in order to build a comprehensive framework for understanding 
the sources of competitive advantage for the service providers. Section 5 provides a 
description of the conceptual framework while section 6 provides a summary and 
conclusion. 
 
Background 
Immaturity of FAO Markets and factors essential for success 
The Finance and Accounting outsourcing (hereafter FAO) markets are immature 
and face constraints and risks that are not faced by IT outsourcing markets (Masur, 2006). 
Findings from the core competency literature seem to suggest that the finance function 
should not be outsourced. Efficient firms allocate their own resources to those activities 
within the value chain for which they enjoy a comparative advantage over competitors 
(Shank & Govindajaran, 1992). Though there is debate in the outsourcing literature 
regarding the precise definition of a core function, there is widespread agreement that 
how core a function is should have a bearing on whether or not to outsource it (Quinn, 
1999; Drtina, 1994). Quinn suggests that those activities, usually intellectually-based 
service activities or systems, which the company performs better than any other 
enterprise are core (Quinn, 1999).  
Activities that are not core competencies should be considered for outsourcing 
with best-in-the-world suppliers, though some non-core activities may have to be retained 
in house if they are part of a defensive posture to protect competitive advantage 
(Gottschalk and Solli-Saether, 2005). The above argument supports the proposition that 
accounting and finance are functions that should be kept in-house even though they are 
not core functions, due to their proximity to the core9. Another consideration for keeping 
the accounting and finance function in-house is the rising costs of outsourcing. The 
increased governance and compliance issues faced by the public companies impose 
greater costs to the buyer. Moreover, measuring accounting activity is complex, since the 
quality and quantity of service output are difficult to quantify as compared to operational 
activities with dedicated inputs and more tangible outputs. The multiple common 
resources used in accounting to provide a variety of accounting outputs make the capture 
of complex interactions and outputs difficult enough to inhibit outsourcing (Barrar et al., 
2002). Accounting researchers recently have argued that companies are overly committed 
to outsourcing and underestimate potential drawbacks due to transaction costs (Chalos, 
1995).  
The growth in organizational investment in BPO is marked by an accompanying 
increase in dissatisfaction with BPO (Mani et al., 2005). A study conducted by Deloitte 
consulting contends that participants initially engaged outsourcers to cut costs, simplify 
project execution, and provide expertise they lacked in-house. Instead of simplifying 
operations, the study says, many companies have found that outsourcing activities can 
                                                 
9 According to John K. Halvey, renowned sourcing advisor and Partner at global law firm Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley & McCloy LLP "The closer you get to the core of the operation, the harder it is to get the decision 
made to outsource…and you don't get much closer than the finance function which is why this market has 
taken longer to evolve than some other BPO areas." 
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introduce unexpected complexity, add cost and friction into the value chain, and require 
more senior management attention and deeper management skills than anticipated 
(Chabrow, 2005). The aftermath of poor BPO performance is usually the transference of 
the failed outsourced operations back in-house. However, the economic ramifications of 
such failed BPO relationships are pronounced, including potential adverse impact on 
customer value and overall firm competitiveness.  
Mani et al. (2005) conducted a study that emphasized that developing an 
understanding of the drivers of BPO performance, including why certain outsourcing 
arrangements fail to deliver value, is critical because not only is the use of BPO rising 
across industries, but also firms’ boundary choices are increasingly shaping their 
competitive positions. They stressed that BPO performance stems, not necessarily from 
an inappropriate vision of potential value, but from the lack of attention to the right 
business model that will help realize value which is the bane of the survival of the 
outsourcing practice. This paper adopts a similar approach only focusing the lens 
specifically on BPO of finance and accounting services to determine the unique 
challenges faced by them.   
The Competitive Advantage Construct  
Alderson (1965) was one of the first to recognize that firms should strive for 
unique characteristics in order to distinguish themselves from competitors. He stated that 
differential advantage might be achieved through lowering prices, selective advertising 
appeals, and/or product improvements and innovations. A firm is said to have a 
competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy not 
simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors (Barney, 
 116
1986). A firm is said to have a sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing 
a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or 
potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of 
this strategy. Some authors have suggested that a sustained competitive advantage is 
simply a competitive advantage that has lasts a long period of calendar time (Porter, 
1985). In this study, I use the term ‘sustaining’ competitive advantage since the on-going 
growth and infancy of the FAO markets may make the advantages gained by service 
providers processual and vulnerable to depletion.  
 
 
Research Methods 
In the present study I use case studies of three leading BPO service providers to 
develop a grounded theory about the factors that enable service providers to enhance firm 
performance. This approach is considered most appropriate in the early stages of research 
on a topic. When little is known about a phenomenon, theory building from case study 
research is most appropriate because theory building from case studies does not rely on 
previous literature or prior empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). An initial definition of 
the research question, in at least broad terms, is the first step in Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
approach towards building grounded theory from case studies. The primary research 
question that guided the interviews in the study was to determine the principal factors that 
are instrumental in providing FAO service providers with the means to sustain their 
competitive advantage. The definition of a research question within a broad topic permits 
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investigators to specify the kind of organization to be approached, and, once, there, the 
kind of data to be gathered (Pettigrew, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1988).  
Although early identification of the research question and possible constructs is 
helpful, it is important to note that both are tentative in this type of research (Eishehardt, 
1989). The topic under consideration was researched by asking questions to members of 
the management in their natural settings, by means of what Yin (1984) termed multiple 
case design. Such a  design allows me to follow a replication logic (Yin, 1984), whereby 
multiple cases are treated as a series of experiments, each case serving to confirm or 
disconfirm the inferences drawn from previous ones. This study was undertaken with no 
theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test, an ideal in theory building research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Site Selection 
Selection of cases is an important step in theory building from case studies 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The three cases were selected from a list of fourteen suppliers in 
order to facilitate the analysis of different organizational cultures, operating models, and 
success stories among the leading service providers. The selection involved constraining 
the population to large corporations operating in specific type of environments in order to 
reduce extraneous variation and clarify the domain of the findings. The FAO Research, 
Inc. compiled a list of fourteen service providers based on the criteria that full-scale FAO 
services were provided on a global basis for a number of years and strong growth in the 
FAO arena was demonstrated by winning multiple, brand-name engagements over the 
past two years (Ross, 2006).  
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The criterion for ranking the largest players in the market was their dominance in 
serving segments of the FAO markets. Although, measuring the providers by FAO 
revenues, number of F&A transactions processed, number of clients served, or staff size 
should offer a fair snapshot of their position in the market place, it may not be an accurate 
basis for ranking the providers (FAO today, 2006). The reason is the providers listed 
occupy a unique stratum in the marketplace. Some are high-volume execution machines 
that process billions of transactions a year for their clients. Typically leveraging their IT 
heritage, these global companies provide FAO through a business process outsourcing 
unit, which itself might be a small portion of the overall business. They are market 
leaders in various respects from the total value of transactions processed to the number of 
service centers they operate and the number of workers employed. Conversely, there are 
providers who can be described as niche players since they focus on a particular function 
or industry.  
The majority of these fourteen suppliers offer FAO services globally, seek 
business from the Fortune 500/Global 1000 and serve multiple industries. The provision 
of BPO services comprises a major portion of their business, with FAO positioned as a 
key contributor to their future successes. The fourteen most significant F&A outsourcers 
on a global scale are listed in Table 10.  
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 Table 10. List of fourteen largest FAO service providers 
 
Name of 
Provider 
Revenues 
(2005) 
(Amounts in 
US dollars) 
Staff Size Number of 
countries in 
which the 
company is 
present 
Ownership Status 
Accenture  16.65 billion 146,000 49 Public (ACN) 
ACS   5 billion 55,000 100 Public (ACS) 
EDS 20 billion 100,000 60 Public (EDS) 
ExlService 95 million 5000 15 Private 
Genpact 135 million 19000 8 Private 
Hewlett-
Packard 
85.2 billion 4000 50 Public (HPQ) 
IBM 88.3 billion 6000 48 Public (IBM) 
OPI Not available 1000 2 Private 
Perot Systems 1.8 billion 17,000 20 Public (PER) 
Progeon 75 million 5700 8 Private (Infosys Public: 
INFY) 
TCS 2.24 billion 400 10 Private (Public in 
India) 
Wipro 1.5 billion 42,000 23 Public (WIT) 
WNS 165 million 9000 3 Private 
Xansa 130 million 13,000 40 Private (Public in 
India) 
 
They have a long track record of providing outsourcing services and possess 
strong capabilities surrounding risk management, contract governance, process transition, 
systems management and processing expertise. They differ in many ways and have 
unique strengths and cultures that make them the strongest candidates to win FAO 
engagements (Ross, 2006).  
Specifically, the research site is based in India since India is the world's leading 
offshore outsourcing country (Mehta et al., 2006, See Table 9).  In 2003, India accounted 
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for 75 percent of total BPO offshore delivery value, a value that is expected to increase 
by 55 percent annually over the next five years (Neale, 2004). India's revenue from BPO 
operations is expected to grow from approximately $1 billion in 2002 to $13.8 billion in 
2007, and its share of supply is projected to be 57 percent of the offshore BPO market 
(Scholl et al., 2003). According to a recent McKinsey analysis, India was nominated as 
the top location of choice for companies wishing to outsource their business processes 
based on consideration of two primary parameters. Firstly, people attractiveness such as 
size of talent pool, salaries, quality, and knowledge and comfort in English and secondly, 
location attractiveness such as infrastructure availability, bandwidth availability, 
electricity availability, political stability, government policies, and time zone differences 
(Patni, 2003).  
Data Sources 
The primary source of data employed in this study to facilitate theory-building 
were semi-structured interviews. The managers of three leading FAO service providers 
were interviewed with the aim of establishing differences or similarities in the strategies 
pursued by them to sustain their competitive advantage in the field of FAO. An interview 
questionnaire was developed for the study. Its contents were based on a conceptual 
framework developed prior to data collection. A conceptual framework explains, either 
graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied, the key factors, variables 
or constructs and the presumed relationships among them (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
The framework isolated factors that were identified in extant literature as 
necessary for the survival of finance and accounting outsourcing and predicted that 
presence of these factors would provide a service provider with a competitive advantage. 
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The questionnaire consisted of twenty six open-ended questions (See Appendix C). In 
addition, since this was an inductive study, I pursued any unexpected but interesting lines 
of discussion. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. The typical interview 
was sixty minutes; the length varied from thirty minutes to ninety minutes. Members of 
the top management team as well as managers at operational levels were interviewed. 
The interview began with asking the interviewee to identify and describe the primary 
factors that, in their opinion, contribute to maintaining their company’s competitive 
advantage as compared to other firms in the field of finance and accounting outsourcing.  
The interviewee was encouraged to exhaust all the factors to their knowledge 
before moving to the next question. Next, the interviewees were given a list of factors 
identified through extant literature as areas of concern that must be attended to in order to 
ensure the longstanding success of FAO providers. These factors emphasized a client’s 
corporate governance, compliance, risk adversity, and competition. The factor 
emphasizing client’s corporate governance consisted of sub-questions that probed a 
deeper understanding of the service provider’s approach in developing a well 
documented plan to understand and address every individual client’s corporate 
governance mechanisms (See Appendix C). The questions were aimed at understanding 
whether the service providers were making any conscious attempts at improving their 
client’s quality of financial reporting and whether there was an emphasis on building 
long-term trustworthy relationships with the clients. The second factor, compliance, 
aimed to understand the procedures that were in place to dispel the client’s fear that 
outsourcing could lead to breaches of compliance with regulatory requirements, 
particularly the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act requirements.  
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Questions were also asked to determine if the provider had any SOX related 
compliance measures in place. The third factor, client’s risk adversity consisted of 
questions that were directed at determining the specific risk reduction strategies that were 
adopted by the service provider to mitigate client’s risks associated with outsourcing their 
finance and accounting functions. The primary areas of concern identified were client’s 
fear of loss of control associated with outsourcing financial reporting and information 
security risks. Lastly, questions about the fourth factor, increased competition, were 
asked to gather information about strategies adopted by the service provider to cope with 
future competition from other low-cost countries. The managers of each company were 
asked to rate the four factors based on the level of importance attributed by them to each 
factor based on its ability to provide the service provider with a competitive advantage. 
The factors were rated on a scale of 1-3, 1 being very important, 2 being somewhat 
important and 3 being not important at all. Copies of presentations and policy manuals or 
any other documentation supporting the discussion were requested.  
 Qualitative Analysis 
The method of analysis used in my study draws on descriptions of how to 
generate grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Mintzberg, 1979; Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). The analysis of data entails constant comparison of data and theory in 
order to develop adequate conceptual categories. An important assumption underlying the 
method is that human creativity and intuition is required to develop data into theory 
(Mintzberg, 1979). As an investigator travels back and forth between theory and data, 
some initial ideas can be grounded in the evidence, others may be modified considerably 
on the basis of evidence, and still others may be abandoned for lack of evidence 
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(Mintzberg, 1979). This is the approach followed in analyzing data and generating theory 
in the present study. A within-case analysis of the first case study was conducted in order 
to become intimately familiar with the case as a stand-alone entity (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). A similar analysis will be conducted for the two remaining case studies as well. 
Conducting a within-case analysis allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge 
before the patterns can be generalized across cases. It also enables the researcher to gain a 
rich familiarity with each case which, in turn, accelerates cross-case comparison. 
The first step of the within-case analysis involved a latent content analysis of the 
transcripts of the interview data. Interviews, field notes, videotapes, and open-ended 
questions have been content analyzed to make inferences and develop new theory about a 
number of interesting organizational and managerial topics, including competitive actions 
(Birnbaum-More & Weiss, 1990). According to Berg (1989), latent content analysis 
represents an interpretive reading of the symbolism underlying the physically presented 
data and thus focuses on the deep structural meaning conveyed by the message. The next 
step entailed organizing the analyzed data into a conceptually clustered matrix with the 
rows and columns arranged to bring together items that belong together (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). The categories were constructed based on comparisons between extant 
literature and data at hand to identify the various factors that lead to sustaining the 
provider’s competitive advantage (See Table 4). Each column represents a factor that 
underlies the competitive advantage construct. 
Once within-case analysis of all the three case studies was completed, a cross-
case analysis was conducted. Cross-case search for patterns will consist of searching for 
within-group similarities coupled with intergroup differences across the categories. 
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Cross-case analysis will be conducted using a mix of variable oriented and case oriented 
approaches. In a variable-oriented analysis, one would read the table vertically, focusing 
on variables and their relationships and look for themes that cut across cases. In a case 
oriented analysis, a theoretical framework is used to study one case in depth, and then 
successive cases are examined to see whether the pattern revealed matches that in 
previous cases (Yin, 1984). Combining the two approaches will result in stacking the 
case-level matrix in a meta-matrix which will then be further condensed, permitting 
systematic comparison (See Table 11). 
 
The Study 
Sources of competitive advantage: Firm Level Drivers  
Provider One Case Analysis 
  In order to maintain anonymity, the service provider in the first case study will be 
referred to as Provider One. Provider One began as a small venture in 1988 and now it is 
a premier provider of diversified BPO and information technology outsourcing solutions 
to commercial and government clients worldwide. Provider One is a Fortune 500 
company of more than 58,000 people supporting client operations reaching nearly 100 
countries. Provider One provides its clients with superior BPO services including 
administration; finance and accounting; human resources; payment services; sales, 
marketing, and customer care; and supply chain management. Their world-class ITO 
offerings include applications solutions; data center management; disaster recovery; end-
user computing; network management; security services; storage solutions; technology 
review, assessment, and planning; and transition services for human resources. My 
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analysis of the transcribed interviews with the Provider One management enabled me to 
identify the factors that the top management considers as the main differentiators that 
Provider One possesses enabling it to achieve its competitive advantage.  
Table 11 lists the factors and their classification into the relevant sources of 
competitive advantage based on criteria identified in extant literature. 
 126
  
 
 
Table 11.Sources those are instrumental in sustaining competitive advantage in Finance and Accounting Outsourcing Markets 
 
Provider One 
 
Provider Two 
 
Provider Three 
Human 
Capital 
Strategic 
Business 
Units 
Organiza
-tional 
Design 
Proprie- 
tary 
Tech- 
nology 
First to 
Market 
Deep 
Domain 
Expertise 
Proprei- 
tary Tech-
nology 
Know- 
ledge Inte- 
gration 
and 
Transform
ation 
Repu-
tation 
and 
corpo-
rate 
image  
Deep 
Domain 
Expertise 
Custo- 
mized 
Risk 
Manage 
ment 
Internal 
Bench 
marking 
People’s 
Skills  
are a 
source 
of 
compe- 
titive 
advan- 
tage. 
Perfor 
mance 
based 
pay 
systems 
are used. 
Runs on a 
business unit 
concept. 
Each country 
for a 
particular 
company is 
treated as a 
separate 
business unit 
Flexible 
organi-
zations 
mandate 
that 
business 
processes 
are inte-
grated 
end-to-
end, 
enabling 
it to 
respond 
with 
flexibi-
lity and 
speed to 
any 
customer 
demand 
Proprietary 
Software 
developed 
in-house for 
the past 
fifteen years 
provides 
clients with 
considerable 
savings. 
The first 
mover can 
shape 
consumers' 
perceptions 
to its 
advantage, 
attain 
critical sales 
volumes and 
accumulate 
valuable 
research 
The 
know-
ledge and 
skills 
embodied 
in the 
employees 
of an 
organi-
zation are 
often 
viewed as 
strategic 
assets 
Provider 
Two 
leverages 
their com-
pany’s 
extensive 
techno- 
logy capa- 
bilities in 
financial 
platforms 
to deliver 
integrated 
business 
solutions 
Achieved 
through a 
process 
known as 
‘Lifecycle 
Managem
ent’ which 
involves 
partnering 
with 
customers 
through- 
out the 
out- 
sourcing 
process 
Indus- 
try 
leader-
ship 
and 
proven 
track 
record 
provide 
them 
with a 
compe-
titive 
advan-
tage 
Provider 
three 
considers 
domain 
know-
ledge and 
industry 
expertise 
as a 
source of 
their 
compe-
titive 
advan-
tage 
Provider 
Three has 
a 
dedicated 
team of 
risk 
manage-
ment 
specialists 
who focus 
only on 
managing 
risks for 
their 
clients' 
offshore 
programs 
Committed 
to 
improving 
its client 
processes 
through 
continuous 
improve-
ment 
projects 
designed on 
the basis of 
the Six 
Sigma 
framework 
The construction of categories helps in developing a classification table that is 
empirically grounded to help us understand how a firm achieves and maintains its 
competitive position in the market. An initial examination of the transcripts generated a 
list of factors that indicated the presence of firm-level effects as well as industry-level 
effects on firm performance. There are two opposing schools of thought that deny the 
possibility that firm as well as industry level effects can be simultaneously present. Firm 
effects and industry effects capture the degree of heterogeneity within an industry. They 
underlie several important concepts in strategic management such as distinctive 
competence and competitive advantage. Firm effects capture the unique firm 
characteristics which influence the variation in strategies and performance outcomes 
across industries and firms, and industry effects refer to attributes common to an industry. 
Yet two schools with significant influence in strategic management have been at 
odds with one another regarding the magnitude and persistence of firm effects. The 
resource-based view argues that firm heterogeneity is significant and persistent, whereas 
industrial organization suggests that industry effects dominate over time. The resource-
based view explains the firm effects on strategies and performance outcomes within the 
same industry (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993). However, industrial 
organization researchers argue that the common structural elements of an industry lead its 
members to share competitive characteristics. Thus, as successful firms develop resources 
producing competitive advantage, other firms are able to reduce competitive gaps by 
imitating these valuable resources. As a result, convergent patterns of competition can 
become common industry characteristics over time (Cohen and Klepper, 1992; Kotler 
1994).  
Mauri and Michaels (1998) conducted a study that argued that the above two 
hypotheses underlying resource-based view and the industrial organization schools within 
strategic management are complementary. Industry-level drivers that promote 
homogeneity coexist with firm-level drivers that generate heterogeneity, just as various 
forms of competition coexist within the same industry. Firms invest upfront in resources 
that permit differentiation from their competitors. However, as industries evolve, 
imitation reduces the gaps and differences in resources between firms (Demsetz, 1973). 
Mauri and Michaels (1998) results support the complementarities between resource-
based and industrial organizations perspectives. A number of studies support the above 
findings (Roquebert et al., 1996; McGahan and Porter ,1997; Chang and Singh, 2000).  
This theory provides a basis for understanding the emerging complementarities 
that was noted between the firm level and industry level drivers of the competitive 
strategy pursued by Provider One. Probing into strategic management literature revealed 
a body of evidence that addresses the complementarities between firm and industry level 
drivers of competitive advantage (Mauri and Michaels, 1998; Roquebert et al., 1996) 
confirming that they can co-exist and are not mutually exclusive. The list of factors that 
were identified as competitive advantage for Provider One was then further categorized 
into firm-level drivers or industry-level drivers of competitive advantage. 
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Strategic Business Units  
 The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm suggests that strategic deployment of 
capabilities allows strategic business units (SBUs) to exploit distinctive competencies and 
create sustainable competitive advantage. That is, the capabilities themselves help the 
SBU perform better, but performance is further improved for SBUs that have abilities to 
put these capabilities to best use. The SBUs that best develop and manage their resources 
and capabilities through time will outperform their competitors (Hitt and Ireland, 1985). 
The RBV defines capabilities as bundles of skills and knowledge that allow SBUs to 
make best use of the assets they possess and to efficiently coordinate their activities (Day, 
1990). SBU specific capabilities are deeply rooted in the SBU’s routines and practices 
and therefore are usually difficult for competitors to imitate (Dierckx and Cool, 1989). 
These SBU specific capabilities are the SBU’s main source of long-term competitive 
advantage and performance.  
Managers at Provider One claim that one of the greatest sources of competitive 
advantage is that the organization is designed as a complete matrix organization with 
multiple SBUs. SBUs help instill entrepreneurship to optimize client service. It also 
facilitates clear financial accountability and visibility, dedicated resources, proven 
industry and process expertise, flexibility to grow with the business and tailored solutions. 
The Director of F&A at Provider One elaborates on this differentiator: 
There are opportunities to grow in fact, ours is a complete matrix organization.  
Multiple strategic business units. More than 40 strategic business units that are 
operating in our Bangalore and Cochin locations.  So, All these 40 SBUs belong 
to five major what you call as towers.  Finance and Accounting is one of them.   
Through the F&A you have client related SBUs like ABC Inc10.  So people have 
the opportunity to work from one SBU to the other in order to gain more 
experience and to understand the process flow.  Even if they don’t like F&A, if 
                                                 
10 Names of service provider’s client organizations are not revealed to ensure anonymity 
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they have reached their peak and feel the need to understand something else, they 
do get an opportunity.  But we make sure that for  a minimum of a year they work 
in the same SBU so one can ensure whatever was gained in training is paid back 
to the client. 
 
Further elaborated by their CEO, 
 
I think we just discussed the SBU Concepts as a major differentiator.  I think most 
of our competition does not have the SBU concept. They have the shared services 
concept where they will be able to utilize the resources ….let’s say F&A, or HRO 
to multiple clients through which obviously there are cost savings   but what we 
have is….we excel in whatever we are doing specifically for our clients.  So it’s 
almost like we give the feeling to the client that we are the true extension of their 
existing team within the organization.  They don’t feel that it has been outsourced 
to somebody like Provider One and in fact the Provider One employees feel like 
they are ABC Inc. employees.  
 
Proprietary Technology 
 
Technology that can be kept proprietary has also been suggested as a source of 
sustained competitive advantage (Porter, 1980). Although proprietary technology can be 
protected through patents or secrecy (Porter, 1980), IT applications are difficult to patent 
(Jakes and Yoches, 1989). Moreover, even if they could be patented, there is evidence 
that patents provide little protection against imitation (Mansfield, 1985). Thus, secrecy is 
the only alternative for keeping IT proprietary. Clearly, if a firm possesses valuable 
proprietary technology that it can keep secret, then that firm will obtain a sustained 
competitive advantage. However, most research indicates that it is relatively difficult to 
keep a firm's proprietary technology secret, and thus, it is unlikely that proprietary 
technology will be a source of sustained competitive advantage.  
A wide variety of factors act to reduce the extent to which proprietary IT can be 
kept secret. Workforce mobility, reverse engineering, and formal and informal technical 
communication all act to reduce the secrecy surrounding proprietary technology 
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(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Stated differently, while a particular firm may gain 
a temporary competitive advantage from its proprietary IT application, competing firms 
are usually not disadvantaged in imitating that technology by history, causal ambiguity, 
or social complexity. Provider One maintains that it possesses proprietary technology that 
provides it with a competitive advantage but whether it can keep the technology a secret 
will determine the permanency of this competitive advantage. But presently it is treated 
as a competitive advantage for Provider One as explained by the Director of F&A: 
Technology – we have developed our own in house proprietary tools over the past 
15 years which specifically works for BPO operations. In the process, what we 
have done is, we have improved the processes of each steps as it is taken.  We 
automate it as we go along and we bundle those tools to our clients and we don’t 
charge anything for that.  For example, in some instances, we took out file length 
system for one of our clients which cost us 6 to 8 million dollars and we installed 
our own imaging system which generated a lot of savings for the client.  So, 
technology is something we keep abreast of, on the BPO side that applies 
specifically to F&A.  A good example would be ODM.  It is an Online document 
management system which is a workflow.  It is a proprietary work flow and that is 
a differentiator for our organization.   
 
Organizational Design 
 
The management literature argues that flexibility in organizations can enhance 
corporate responsiveness and can create competitive advantages. Flexibility is the ability 
to respond appropriately to a wide variety of business conditions. Flexible organizations 
mandate that business processes are integrated end-to-end, enabling it to respond with 
flexibility and speed to any customer demand, market opportunity or external threat (Shi 
and Daniels 2003, Sethi and Sethi 1990). Becoming flexible is becoming an imperative 
for survival. There are several dimensions to becoming a flexible organization including 
the following: creating a responsive internal environment that can quickly react to any 
change in the marketplace, planned or unforeseen, a threat or an opportunity. Second, an 
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organization should have variable cost structures to manage costs in proportion to growth 
of the organization or change in demand. Third, an organization needs to be focused on 
what is profitable and core to the enterprise’s success. Finally, the organization 
needs to have a resilient infrastructure that is available around the world and around the 
clock (Phan, 2001).  
The CEO of Provider One claims that size and flexibility are major differentiators 
for their company. The organizational structure is a matrix consisting of SBUs that are 
modeled around the needs of individual clients. This form enables expansion or reduction 
of business activities based on the client base of the business and provides a great deal of 
flexibility. Performance based compensation systems are designed to promote variable 
cost structures and global delivery models provide the infrastructure that provides 
geographical representation in every country of the world. Shifting operations to low-cost 
countries provides the flexibility needed to adjust to a shift in demand or any other 
extenuating conditions. This sentiment amplified by the CEO of Provider One in the 
following statement: 
On the differentiator, Provider One is always considered a low cost option.  We 
are flexible.  We are not too huge to be inflexible and at the same time we are not 
too small to be insignificant for our client.  We are somewhere in between.  We 
are 5 billion dollar company, 55,000 people, present in 400 countries.  We are 
nimble, we are flexible to our clients.  We cannot say that this is how we work 
guys and you either take it or leave it.  We don’t do that. We say ok this is how 
we provide service to our clients. We are flexible in terms of deliverables to our 
client. Being smaller that makes it easier and being smaller also helps .. People 
are more dedicated to their jobs and they are considerate. …..Personal 
organization. 
 
Human Capital 
Firms create value through either decreasing product/service costs or 
differentiating the product/service in a way that allows the firm to charge a premium 
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price (Barney and Wright, 1998) Thus, the ultimate goal of any HR executive is to create 
value through the human resource function. The HR executive must determine the 
manner in which the HR function can aid in either decreasing costs or increasing 
revenues. The CEO of Provider One claims that one of its major differentiators is the 
talent pool represented by its employees. Pay-for-performance is being more widely 
adopted because it provides a means of focusing performance on the accomplishments of 
business objectives, thereby increasing employee morale and controlling costs. As 
evidenced in the following statement by the CEO of Provider One: 
It goes all the way from keyer to all the way up to me for instance and even the 
management staff we are on performance based compensation but the percentage 
might vary.  Like let’s say keyer may be paid 50% of base salary and rest of the 
50% based on the performance. They get better all the time.  Their output is much 
higher than normal what you would have seen in the traditional way and they are 
making money too.  So, the productivity goes up and their earning goes up. One 
of the reasons for our attrition rate to be lower.  Right, that’s a major differentiator.  
Performance based compensation.   
 
Thus, the HR function in Provider One is designed to add value by decreasing 
attrition costs and boost revenues by improving output and is a source of competitive 
advantage for Provider One. 
Further, in order for any characteristic of a firm’s human resources to provide a 
source of competitive advantage, the firm must be organized to exploit the resource 
(Barney and Wright, 1998). An organization should have in place the systems and 
practices that allow human resource characteristics to bear the fruit of their potential 
advantages. The employment mode, the employment relationship and HR practices in 
place at Provider One bear similarities to characteristics displayed by firms in Quadrant 2 
of the HR architecture derived by Lepak and Snell (1999).Lepak and Snell (1999) drew 
upon several works in economics, organization theory, strategic management, and HRM 
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literature to develop the foundation of a HR architecture that aligns different employment 
modes, employment relationships, HR configurations and criteria for competitive 
advantage.  
Human capital in Quadrant 2 is valuable, yet widely available throughout the 
labor market and skills in this quadrant are not unique or specific to a firm. Hence, 
managers may be hesitant to invest in internal development of skills because employees 
with generic skills may leave and transfer the organization's investment to another firm. 
A problem common to BPO service providers who complain about attrition rates as high 
as 70-80%. Provider One reconciles these conflicting pressures by acquiring from the 
market human capital that does not require further investment. Consequently, the 
employment mode adopted at Provider One is the acquisition mode which enables firms 
to reap the benefits of valuable skills that have been developed elsewhere while holding 
them internally. In so doing, the acquiring firm simply pays the value reflected in the 
market price and realizes immediate benefits vis-à-vis productivity (Becker, 1976).  
The employment relationship for employees and organizations in Quadrant 2 is 
symbiotic employment which means it is based on the utilitarian premise of mutual 
benefit (Tsui et al., 1995). In essence, a symbiotic relationship rests on the notion that 
both the employees and the organization are likely to continue the relationship as long as 
both continue to benefit. Such a relationship is reflected between Provider One and its 
employees through its performance based pay systems. Finally, the HR configuration at 
Provider One is market based which means it is likely to include externally equitable 
wages. Provider One describes itself as a good paymaster that is capable of attracting 
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people with skills to join the company. The Vice-president of Provider One reiterates this 
argument in the following statement: 
People come from there to here, people go from here to there.  We are very 
competitive in pay. Our rates are somewhere around 75th to 78th percentile in the 
industry.  So, we are not low pay masters and we are not high pay masters either.   
 
Provider 2 case analysis: 
 
First to Market 
 There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the idea that "first-
to-market" leads to an enduring market share advantage (Rahman and Bhattacharyya, 
2003). A first mover can be formally defined as a firm “that is first to produce a new 
product, use a new process or enter a new market” (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1990). 
A large number of papers discussing the relative advantages of a first mover have been 
published in management journals. These papers suggest that though a first mover may 
not benefit from spectacular gains, it certainly enjoys several competitive advantages. 
(Robinson and Fornell, 1985; Robinson, 1998; Rogers, 1983; Tellis and Golder, 1996). 
Consumers may pay more attention to a first mover over a late entrant since, in the early 
stages of market evolution, consumers have minimal knowledge about the ideal product 
attributes and their ideal combination. Consequently, the first mover can shape 
consumers' perceptions to its advantage, attain critical sales volumes and accumulate 
valuable research and development and market experience before any other competitor. It 
may reap benefits from cost advantages associated with scale and experience economies 
(Rao and Rutenberg, 1979; Simley and Ravid, 1983). These cost advantages may be 
utilized either to achieve higher margins or lower product prices to discourage 
competitors from entering the market. Additionally, a first mover can secure patents and 
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pre-empt domination of distribution and communication channels (Rahman and 
Bhattacharyya, 2003).  
Provider Two initiated the discussion regarding the factors that differentiate their 
company from their competitors by identifying the company’s approach to entry in the 
BPO market. At a time when the competitors forayed into BPO with the intent of 
capturing market share in call center outsourcing, Provider Two positioned their entry at 
a higher point allowing them to straddle the value chain. They predicted that as the 
industry matures, future growth of BPO would comprise transaction processing thus 
providing them with a position of advantage in a market with high exit barriers and 
greater profit margins. The following statement by the head of Solution Design and 
Implementation (SDI) for the F&A function of Provider Two elaborates their strategy as 
explained above: 
We started our operations in April 2002 and we started most of the companies were going 
after the call center business so there were 10000 people good revenues but for us that 
was an industry with no exit barriers and high profit margins so at that point of  
processing kind of business and then we consciously decided to stay away from the call 
center business so our philosophy at that point of time being we will go at a higher point 
we will go into transaction processing and if there is any quality requirements managing 
transaction process we will do that so our focus was at managing transaction process if 
you see the industry started off here and right now has moved to here which is high exit 
barriers and more complex functions  and we directly started work in this area. It is not 
that we do not have call centers we  do have call centers but it’s about 20% of our 
revenues 
 
Deep Domain Expertise 
 Knowledge and information are among the most important sources of competitive 
advantage and success an organization can have (Turner and Jackson-Cox, 2002). 
Employee know-how, innovative capabilities and skills play a predominant role in 
defining the productive power of an organization (Quinn, 1992) accounting for an 
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increasing proportion of an organization’s capital, even in traditional industries (Sveiby, 
1997). As Coff (1997) observed, the knowledge and skills embodied in the employees of 
an organization are often viewed as strategic assets. The combined intelligence, skills and 
expertise possessed by the people within an organization lend it a distinctive character. 
The first step required to measure the store of knowledge embodied in an organization is 
to understand the composition of each individual's explicit, or domain, knowledge. 
Despite individuals being significant sources, conduits and generators of knowledge, the 
quantum of organizational knowledge is not just simply the aggregate of each individual 
employee's domain knowledge (Howells, 1996). Knowledge creation within an 
organization centers on the crucial presumption that human knowledge is created and 
enlarged by means of social interaction. This interaction converts the domain knowledge 
of individuals into collective structural and procedural, or tacit, knowledge within the 
organization (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). From an organizational perspective, this form 
of knowledge has a more permanent dimension and the organization may build on it a 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
 Provider Two states that developing ‘Deep Domain Expertise’ and ‘Centers of 
Excellence’ are one of the key differentiators for their organization. Provider Two’s F&A 
practice is built on an in-depth understanding of the finance & accounting domain. Their 
employees and managers are recruited from finance and accounting backgrounds and are 
continually exposed to current and emerging best practices. They claim to have a Finance 
& Accounting Center of Excellence to centralize and advance specialized domain 
knowledge across individuals and customer engagements through extensive training and 
certification programs. As stated by F&A head of solution design and implementation: 
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Provider Two has always focused on developing deep domain expertise and that is what 
we have also focused on for F&A we have come up with Center Of Excellence which 
starts by training our people for making sure they are ready for working on client 
engagements which means everything that comes … 
One of the other things that is a key differentiator is the transaction expertise the  biggest 
challenge that we think you would place in any outsourcing engagement is the transition 
because if there are any problems which is not taken care of during transition or if the 
transition is not done well, you would be saddled with an engagement that will be 
deprived of the profits throughout the engagement life. You would have an unhappy 
client, you would have an unhappy associate because even if they are working to their 
best they would not be meeting the clients expectation and it would eat into the 
management profits at both locations: the clients and on our end. 
Proprietary Technology 
 As elaborated under the Provider One case analysis, technology that can be kept 
proprietary has also been suggested as a source of sustained competitive advantage 
(Porter, 1980). Provider Two leverages their company’s extensive technology capabilities 
in financial platforms to deliver integrated business solutions. Provider Two has also tied 
up with best-of-breed vendors to deliver leading edge F&A focused technology solutions 
to their clients. Provider Two’s proprietary methodologies like nFlux (Biz-IT 
alignment), Proton (Operations improvement), InFlow (Infrastructure management) help 
it achieve continuous improvement and transformation 
One of our differentiators is technology solution and ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning). 
we have the best practices implemented from our parent company which helps us to come 
up with process improvement ideas which can be immediately rolled out to the clients 
with minimal time spent going back and forth, whether something is doable or not. In 
certain areas where parent company does not have capabilities or did not develop 
capabilities things we have gone ahead and struck deals or made alliances with a leading 
independent solution providers. So far, we have alliance with Bottom Line Technologies 
which is a leader in procurement to pay solution.  
 
Knowledge Integration and Transformation 
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Firms of even moderate size and scope must address the problem of integrating 
contributions from multiple specialty areas. Moreover, firms are beginning to appreciate 
the benefits of close interactions with suppliers, partners, and customers throughout the 
value stream (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003). The currency of these interactions and 
communication is information, at the least, and more likely complex forms of specialized 
knowledge. As the scale and scope of the integration task increase-perhaps as a result of 
product complexity, technical advances, or the difficulty of the regulatory environment-a 
firm's effectiveness in knowledge integration (Grant 1996) will distinguish it from its 
competitors. Many organizations face competitive environments where novelty is high 
and the nature of the product or service creates many dependencies and differences. 
These situations are more challenging because increasing novelty creates the need to 
transform knowledge (Carlile 2002). Integrating and transforming knowledge is a 
cyclical process that requires adaptation and transformation (Carlile and Rebentisch, 
2003). For an organization to effectively integrate knowledge in complex settings in the 
long term, it must build the capacity to manage knowledge storage, retrieval, and 
transformation over multiple cycles. 
 Provider Two describes knowledge transformation and integration as one their 
major differentiators. They describe this process as ‘Lifecycle Management’ which 
involves partnering with customers throughout the outsourcing process in a structured 
and transparent process that proceeds in three phases—Discovery, Transition, and Steady 
State Operations. The first stage, discovery, requires companies considering business 
process outsourcing to look beyond the obvious cost arbitrage and address several 
enterprise-wide issues such as the regulatory and operational risks, ensuring lack of 
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business disruption, estimating the amount of investments needed in technology and 
determine procedures for management of change. Lastly, companies must gauge their 
readiness to assume change. Provider Two’s ‘Discovery’ stage helps their customers find 
answers to these and similar questions over a four to six week period. 
 The second stage, described as ‘Transition’ is a ISO (International Organization 
for Standardization) certified transition methodology which is based on successfully 
transitioning over 500 company owned or third-party provided processes across multiple 
geographies and languages. Provider Two also reverses transition processes. Provider 
Two’s transition methodology is divided into three phases, planning, execution, and 
parallel run and managed through four tracks, program management, knowledge, 
operations, and technology. This matrix ensures that processes are migrated rapidly and 
smoothly. The third stage, ‘Steady State Operations’,  involves continually monitoring 
remotely running processes through online portals, and through daily, weekly and 
monthly calls to ensure two-way communication to flag and manage issues. Provider 
Two has a structured escalation matrix and process for dispute resolution and routinely 
runs quality improvement initiatives under the Six Sigma framework and commits to 
ongoing yearly efficiency improvements on all data processes. The above process was 
described by the principal consultant in F&A function of Provider 2: 
We have our sales organization which primarily pursues the client, kind of introduces the 
concept to them and what we can do. But basically my team works with the sales team to 
understand the client’s requirements, for instance, what is the road map to achieve their 
stated goals, what are some of the processes you should be look to outsource, how you 
would go about outsourcing. Thus, we are actively involved in the sales cycle and once 
the deal is finalized, my team takes over. In terms of our transformation process, we say 
there are three steps of transformation and we pride  ourselves on being a transformation 
BPO.  
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Provider 3 Case Analysis: 
 
 Reputation and Corporate Image 
 
Corporate audiences routinely rely on the reputations of firms in making investment 
decisions, product choices and career decisions (Dowling, 1986). Reputations signal 
publics about how a firm’s products, job, strategies and prospects compare to those of 
competing firms. Favorable reputation can therefore generate excess returns for firms by 
inhibiting the mobility of rivals in an industry (Caves and Porter, 1977).  Wilson (1985) 
confirmed that  a firm’s reputation is an asset that can generate future rents. Reputation 
building behavior is strategically important in incomplete information settings (Weigelt 
and Camerer, 1988).  
 Provider Three claims that their industry leadership and proven track record 
provide them with a competitive advantage. Their business leaders are experienced 
outsourcing industry professionals from global companies. They have an exceptional 
track record of attracting and retaining senior talent with both global exposure and 
domain expertise to meet our clients' unique business needs. They have a history of 
success and high recognition, growing from a single-client organization to a leading pure-
play BPO provider with more than 100 clients and a  ten-year record of running critical 
business operations for global corporations in diverse industries. They are regularly 
placed at the top of several industry rankings. These rankings range from top performers 
in the Indian offshoring industry to best rated human capital development practices 
globally. 
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Deep Domain Expertise 
 
Similar to Provider two, Provider three considers domain knowledge and industry 
expertise as a source of their competitive advantage. They strategically focus on select 
industries and invest proactively to strengthen our competencies in these segments. Our 
industry focus has yielded significant dividends in terms of growth and market leadership 
has led them to be ranked amongst the leading global players in finance and accounting 
services. They claim that their focus has helped us develop deep domain expertise to 
become true partners for their clients. Their domain knowledge is also reflected in the 
wide range of industry-specific, specialized and complex processes they carry out in out 
focus industries. 
 
Customized Risk Management 
 Risk management has been described as one of the factors that will be crucial to 
the growth of F&A (FAO, 2005). Provider Three states that risk management poses a 
different set of challenges for a client planning an offshore capability. It is important for 
global companies moving operations offshore to be assured their processes will continue 
to run in the event of a disaster, their information is secure and they are complying with 
all regulatory requirements. Provider Three visualizes risk management as a factor that 
will provide it with a competitive advantage. Provider Three has a dedicated team of risk 
management specialists who focus only on managing risks for their clients' offshore 
programs. The team engages with the clients early in their offshoring process to 
understand how various processes impact the client's business, assess criticality of the 
offshore operations, and design cost effective solutions to mitigate risks. Utilizing a 
proprietary model, Provider Three plans and provides back up capacity in the centers to 
meet the business continuity requirements of the clients.  Information Security is assured 
by assessing the inventory of information assets, testing their vulnerability and 
establishes controls to ensure clients' data and Provider Three’s own confidential and 
sensitive data is protected. Provider Three follows the BS7799 standard for its own 
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information security. In addition, specific security controls are built to suit individual 
client needs. The Associate Vice-president of Provider Three reiterates the importance of 
the risk management factor in the following statement: 
I would rate risk management in the days to come as one of the most important factors 
because unless the suppliers become adamant at managing the clients risk and not the 
suppliers risk they are not going to get any competitive advantage
 
 
Internal Benchmarking 
 To translate knowledge into value organizations need to focus. O'Dell (1998) 
suggests that there are three reasons why this is critical. First, focus ensures that valuable 
resources are applied to high payoff areas. Second, focus helps ensure that the right 
knowledge is being acquired and transferred as well as demonstrating the need for this 
activity. Third, focus gets the attention of management and funding. Management's 
attention is diverted to success within their organization or competitor organizations, a 
compelling competitive need and demonstrated results. Three themes are evident in all 
successful internal benchmarking and transfer efforts. First, internal transfer is a people-
to-people process; relationships seem to precede and to be required for meaningful 
sharing and transfer. Second, learning and transfer is an interactive, ongoing, and 
dynamic process that cannot rest on a static body of knowledge. Employees are inventing, 
improvising, and learning something new every day. The wellspring of best practices 
need never run dry. Third, specific skills and capabilities are needed as a foundation 
(Dell , 1988) California management review for reference) 
 Provider Three claims that one of its key differentiators is their continuous 
improvement focus. They are committed to improving its client processes through 
continuous improvement projects designed on the basis of the Six Sigma framework. It is 
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presently running several Six Sigma projects that lead to cost savings ranging between 
30-60% for its clients. In addition Provider Three regularly seeks opportunities to 
increase process efficiency through redesign and application of technology tools. 
Provider Three works with clients to understand their business drivers, analyzes its 
transactions to generate relevant management information and share it with clients to 
jointly evaluate new improvement opportunities. Provider Three has transferred several 
client processes from time and materials-based billing to transaction-based pricing, which 
allows it to vary costs based on volume. By using a proprietary variance tree to monitor 
productivity across the client programs, clients are encouraged to use a similar model for 
their offshore initiatives. This model focuses on measuring and monitoring the 
fundamental performance metrics that determine the success of the program and reveal 
the underlying factors that lead to improved performance levels. 
Sources of competitive advantage: Industry Level Driver ratings for all three providers 
 
The following four industry-level factors presented in Table 12 were identified 
from extant literature at the outset of data collection and the interview questions were 
designed to address the importance of these factors in gaining competitive advantage in 
FAO markets. The interviewees were asked to rate the factors based on the level of 
importance attached to these factors in ensuring the survival of FAO markets in the long 
run, 1 being very important, 2 being somewhat important and 3 being not important at all. 
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 Table 12.Industry-Level Drivers Ratings by Top Management 
Industry-level 
Drivers 
Provider One 
rating* 
Provider Two 
rating* 
Provider Three 
rating* 
Emphasis on 
Corporate 
Governance 
2 1 2 
Emphasis on 
Compliance 
2 1 2 
Risk Management  1 2 1 
Increased 
Competition 
1 2 1 
* The ratings are based on a scale of 1-3, with 1 being very important, 2 being somewhat 
important and 3 being not important 
 
Risk Management 
Outsourcing a critical process is risky, and risk analysis begins by attempting to 
understand the risk profile, or specific risks associated with outsourcing a particular 
process (Aron et al., 2005). Greater requirements to educate buyers on risks, perceived 
and real, of outsourcing could impede the FAO businesses of service providers (Finance 
and Accounting Outsourcing Market Review Report, 2006). Service providers must 
communicate the risk free nature of offerings to the buyers. They must identify the 
specific risks and controls on a process by process basis and maintain these controls to 
the level specified by the client. Risk management consists of three closely related 
actions: risk identification, risk analysis and risk control Risk identification is identifying 
risks that confront a system or project. Risk analysis is analyzing data collected about 
risks, including the impact and probability of occurrence. Risk control is identifying and 
verifying the existence of measures to lessen or prevent the impact of a risk.  
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There are many potential risks confronting outsourcing agreements. These risks 
can fall into one of three categories: legal, operational, and financial. After identifying the 
risks, the next action is to determine their relative importance to one another and their 
respective probability of occurrence. There are three categories of controls: preventive, 
detective, and corrective. Preventive controls mitigate a threat from exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of a project. Detective controls disclose the occurrence of an event and 
preclude similar exploitation in the future. Corrective controls require addressing the 
impact of a threat and then establishing controls to preclude any future impacts. In FAO 
markets, the prime risks are confidentiality and security of data and fear of loss of control 
over processes (Finance and Accounting Outsourcing Market Review Report, 2006). Risk 
reduction strategies involve getting certifications that ensure that certain procedures are 
in place. Mitigating physical risks and all other kinds of risks through certification gives 
the client a sense of comfort. The Vice-President of Provider One explained: 
We are a BSI 7799 certified organization which stands for British standards for 
Information Security. Certifying mitigates at least 80% of their concerns. Not only do 
we get certificated but we have also have to be assessed with BSI. There are a lot of 
compliances from IT perspective, physical security perspective, business contingency 
plan, and disaster recovery. Now the trick is to maintain that. So we have periodical 
assessments done by the BSI at our cost to make sure we are still in compliance. This 
process gives a lot of comfort to the client. 
 
The second major risk identified in FAO is fear of loss of control over functions 
that are close to the core.  The clients that have been with the company for a number of 
years are reasonably comfortable and knowledgeable about the security of data and 
control over processes. Provider One has systems that ensure that the client still maintains 
control on quality standards by conducting their own audits. Outsourced operations are 
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subjected to regular monthly, quarterly audits and soft compliance reviews. The Director 
of F&A testifies to the fact that loss of control is not a major concern for their clients: 
No they do not lose control at all and that is the reason they have these multiple 
audits taking place particularly Client X... Client X being our major client they 
put their own quality people on our floor. We have given them space. They are on 
Client X rolls but working with us. Client X wants to make sure that they have 
control over their matters 
 
Further, Provider One’s management asserts that clients need not fear the loss of 
control because outsourcing of financial reporting simply involves the conversion of 
client data into information. The decision making power remains with the company’s 
management.  
Some companies may look at it as a fear of loss of control but some companies 
may think of it as a practical and strategic matter because they could say that I 
cannot make a sense of the 10 sheets of data sitting in my office but if somebody 
can make sense of that data and pick out the information and tell me in one page 
on a daily basis where my business is at, I may love that. They still don’t lose 
control over the organization. We are only doing transactional work by converting 
data into information and giving them decision making capability. We don’t make 
the decisions for them. 
 
Thus, alleviating client risk adversity is recognized by Provider One as an important 
factor that will ensure survival of FAO markets and is rated as 1, i.e. very important, by 
members of top management team. Provider Two recognizes fear of loss of control as 
one of the major impediments to the growth of F&A outsourcing. The head of F&A 
solution design and implementation explains his concern below: 
I think the biggest block we faced with outsourcing was the perceived loss of control.  
Yes that’s exactly what I was talking about. So I say it’s a perceived loss of control 
because whether we do it here or people do it over there. In fact, the way we do it is a 
lot more structured and a lot more controlled since we are bound with high service 
levels whereas if they were doing it internally they would not have any service levels 
to achieve. 
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However, Provider Two rates risk management as 2, somewhat important. As stated by a 
top management team member of Provider Two 
Now clients risk adversity is something I would say, is still very important but if I 
were to compare it to the first two factors ( Emphasis on corporate governance and 
compliance) its not that important because if you have taken care of the first factor 
and the second factor, in some respects you have taken care risk management as well. 
So the rating would be 2. 
 
Provider Three lists the same reasons as provider one and rates this factors as 1, i.e. very 
important explaining that managing risk will be a key factor in gaining a competitive 
advantage in the future years. As stated by the Associate Vice-president of Provider 
Three: 
I would rate that as 1 in the days to come because unless the suppliers become 
adamant at managing the clients’ risk and not the suppliers’ risk they are not going to 
get any competitive advantage … 
 
Emphasis on compliance 
The Sarbanes-Oxley (hereafter SOX) rules require public companies to report on 
the strength of their internal financial-reporting controls, to better prevent fraud and to 
ensure accuracy of financial filings. The FAO providers have to familiarize themselves 
with the varying degrees of SOX compliance demands which vary extensively from 
client to client. From an overall management system perspective, the implications of the 
SOX requirements are quite similar to other quality and regulatory requirements. They 
contain well-defined management system and processes, proactive approach to problem 
and risk management, clearly defined responsibilities for implementation, and self-
assessment and appropriate checks and balances. If the provider has to sustain its 
competitive advantage, it will have to establish clear lines of accountability and conduct 
periodic compliance review of controls.  
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Service level agreements will have to be established that support defined 
processes and key compliance requirements. These steps will lead to an outsourced 
environment that seems to provide more clearly defined and transparent business 
processes than the in-house processes that have evolved over time. Director of F&A 
recognizes SOX compliance as important and agrees that perceptions regarding the 
failure of a company to be able to meet SOX requirements have to be managed in order 
to ensure the long term success of FAO. Emphasis on SOX compliance is rated as 2, 
which it is considered somewhat important by majority of the members of the top 
management team of Provider One.  However, Provider Two rates this factor as 1, 
reinforcing the argument that it is extremely important. As stated by the senior manager 
at Provider Two: 
If you talk about F&A outsourcing you would typically see not a lot of activity 
happening in the last quarter because everybody is focusing on maintaining SOX 
compliance and SOX compliance is something that nobody can afford not to 
maintain. It is definitely one of the key factors that are on everybody’s mind when 
outsourcing their process… I would rate this factor as 1.  
 
Provider Two explains that SOX compliance is a factor that can provide competitive 
advantage because it has aided the outsourcing of F&A rather than impede it. This 
argument is explained below by the F&A Head of Provider Two: 
It’s not a block. In fact, we welcome SOX because what it has done for us is, it has 
brought some level of documentation into our clients’ organizations. Four years ago, 
if you went to the client’s organization you had to start from scratch to understand 
how the processes were done since nobody understood how they were done. So, it 
actually has introduced a well defined process of checks and balances which is 
similar to what we do in an outsourced environment. So I wouldn’t say regulatory 
issues with SOX compliance has impeded us or stopped the outsourcing but it has in a 
way helped in increase the outsourcing. 
 
Provider Three, in agreement with Provider One states that SOX compliance is a factor 
that should be treated as a given. It is a factor that may not bestow a competitive 
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advantage but may be necessary to ensure the very survival of the industry. Therefore, it 
is a factor that will become common to all providers of F&A and it should be rated as a 2 
in terms of providing a competitive advantage. 
Emphasis on Corporate Governance 
One of the greatest challenges facing the BPO providers is the increased 
regulatory requirements around FAO. FAO providers will have to overcome a number of 
challenges in order to build customer confidence in their capabilities. There has been 
considerable debate in recent times concerning the need for strong corporate governance 
(McConomy and Bujaki, 2000), with countries around the world drawing up guidelines 
and codes of practice to strengthen governance (Cadbury, 1997). The underlying reason 
for this emphasis lays in concerns over the integrity of securities markets (Millstein, 
1999). The accounting profession has been proactive in attempting to improve audit 
quality by issuing standards focused on discovery and independence. For example, in the 
United States (US), greater responsibility for the discovery of fraud has been placed on 
the auditor by the issue of SAS no. 82. Independence has received the attention not only 
of the profession but also of regulators and stock exchanges around the world (Goodwin 
and Seow 2002).  
FAO service providers have to assure their clients that they understand the risks 
faced by the clients due to increased regulatory requirements and are committed to 
working with the clients to solve related issues. The service provider will be able to 
sustain its competitive advantage if it can establish an effective, long-term relationship 
which can lead to a trusted advisor status.  At Provider One, emphasis on client’s 
corporate governance is considered an imperative that is treated as a given and therefore 
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is rated as a 2 since it will not provide a competitive advantage to the firm in the long run. 
Attempts are made to cultivate long term relationships with clients and trust evolves over 
a period of time. The top management teams classifies it as a factor that is basic to the 
survival of the company and describes it as a basic building block without which it would 
be difficult to operate. Provider Two rates this factor as 1 and considers it very important. 
Finally, Provider Three rates this factor as 2 since they do not believe it will provide them 
with a means to gain a competitive advantage. The associate vice-president vocalized this 
argument in the following paragraph: 
I see that these factors are becoming very important and a lot of clients will consider 
when deciding to choose a particular supplier, corporate governance and emphasis on 
compliance aspect. Now competitive advantage, I really don’t know if you get a 
competitive advantage through a governance structure because it’s kind of a given, I 
would say … it is basic. If you don’t have it, you are not worth being in this game at 
all. 
 
Increased Competition 
Increased competitive requirements to capture new FAO customers in a market 
that is still immature yet growing at a healthy rate worldwide could impede the FAO 
businesses of service providers (Finance and Accounting Outsourcing Market Review 
Report, 2006). India has dominated the outsourcing market but is now facing competition 
from China, the Philippines, Hungary, the Czech Republic and several Latin American 
countries. Service providers must pay attention to their competitive landscape in order to 
sustain their competitive advantage in the FAO industry. However, competition is a 
factor that was rated as 2, that is, somewhat important by Provider One for two reasons. 
First, according to them, the market is large enough to accommodate all the players 
thereby enabling them to maintain their current market share. Second, the problem of 
competition from low cost countries is already combated by adopting an organizational 
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structure consisting of global delivery models which allow them the flexibility to operate 
from the lowest cost center demanded by the client. As stated by the CEO, 
Depending upon where you would the client would like their operations to be based, 
we could do that for them. If they want us to be based in china we have a center in 
china, if they want us be based in Malaysia we have a center in Malaysia and if they 
want us to be based in Kochi, where the labor cost is the lowest, we can do it there. If 
cost is the only criteria for them, we can take them to the lowest cost center. If they 
are looking for something beyond cost, say, a knowledge process outsourcing kind of 
operation, we can do it in some other country where cost would not be as cheap but 
their ultimate goal can be achieved. If opportunity arises and there is a huge cost 
difference we can capitalize on it. So, instead of expanding our operations in India we 
could expand in that country. This seems to be becoming a strategy for each of the 
service providers. Today Global Delivery Models have to be adopted by any 
organization. Only then, can you be competitive. 
 
Similarly, Provider two rated competition as 2. Provider Three, on the other hand rated 
competition as 1 and considered competition as a factor that may provide them with a 
competitive advantage. 
 
Environment and Strategy: A conceptual framework 
 
 After conducting the within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons, the emergent 
theory comprised varying managerial perceptions of industry level factors and consequently, 
varying competitive strategies. The distinctive competencies of each of the three providers 
differed with the exception of a few parallels that could be drawn. A set of research questions 
suggested itself from the foregoing. For example, does every firm have an objective 
environment that places constraints on the way it operates, i.e. an industry group has certain 
technical characteristics that must be attended to. Further, which perspective of the construct 
of ‘environment’ is most relevant to the current study, the industry-level drivers treated as 
objective characteristics of the environment or manager’s perceptions of environmental 
characteristics? Also, does the managers’ perception of the environment have an impact on 
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strategy formulation within the firm? My reading of the interview transcripts brought forth 
three important observations: top management executives of all three providers agreed that 
the four industry level drivers identified by me were important industry characteristics,  their 
perception of the degree of importance that should be given to each of these four 
characteristics differed, the strategies pursued by each provider to develop distinct 
competencies in order to gain a competitive advantage varied with the exception of one or 
two factors that were common within the providers. In order to investigate the above stated 
research questions, I further interpreted the narrative developed in prior phases and linked it 
to conceptual ideas derived from the data and to wider theoretical debates in the literature. I 
read and reread interview transcripts to link empirical evidence to recurring themes and 
develop new themes.  
Finally, I compared my grounded framework to various theories from economics of 
organization and strategic literature, treating them as another data set and doing comparative 
analysis as suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The analysis involved consideration of 
various management perspectives on strategy formulation, external environment and the 
treatment of these factors in the business policy and organization theory literature. I 
concluded that the concept of  integration of strategy and environment (Bourgeois, 1980) 
along with Dill’s (1958) definition of the components of top management’s task environment 
provided the greatest conceptual insights in analyzing how a provider develops and sustains 
its competitive advantage. 
According to Bourgeois (1980), strategy can be sub-divided into primary (domain 
selection) and secondary (competitive approach). The concepts of strategy and environment 
are integrated in that primary strategy concerns opportunities in the general environment and 
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secondary strategy involves navigating within a task environment. Bourgeois (1980) argued 
that strategy content and environment have been joined empirically but there has not been 
much work that joins the strategy formulation process and environment. Bourgeois 
synthesized the two concepts, strategy and environment by relating them at their hierarchical 
levels. Bourgeois defined strategy as ‘determining how an organization defines its 
relationship to its environment in the pursuit of its objectives’. Strategy is further divided into 
domain definition strategy and domain navigation strategy. 
Domain definition strategy refers to the organization’s choice of domain or change of 
domain that occurs when, for example, a firm diversifies into or exits from particular 
products or markets. Domain navigation strategy refers to competitive decisions made within 
a particular product-market or task environment. Since domain selection and navigation 
occur more or less sequentially (Gilmore, 1971) Bourgeois (1980) refers to them as primary 
and secondary strategies. Further, Bourgeois relied on the four environmental components 
outlined by Dill (1958), customers, suppliers, competitors and regulator groups and the fifth 
one, technology, added to by Duncan (1972) to demonstrate that one can use objective 
indicators of the environment and still be able to consider management’s perceptions of these 
components. Therefore, Bourgeois concluded that perceptions about environmental factors 
are relevant to domain navigation decisions made by strategy makers. 
Based on the above argument, my conceptual framework identifies the primary strategy 
pursued by each of the three providers as entry into the F&A markets to gain a foothold in a 
market which is positioned towards significant growth. Next, each provider’s secondary 
strategy includes identifying distinctive competencies to negotiate with the environment 
based on the management’s perception of the environment. The four environmental factors 
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that were identified at the outset of this study, comprising the task environment for the three 
service providers in the F&A markets, were emphasis on corporate governance (regulator), 
emphasis on compliance (regulator), increased competition (competitor) and risk 
management (technology). Each provider, then developed secondary strategies (distinct 
competencies) based on the top management’s perception of their task environment. These 
sequential relationships are depicted in Figure 1. The four factors comprising each provider’s 
task environment are listed in the order of importance attributed to them by each provider’s 
senior management. The task environment as perceived by the provider’s managers thus 
dictates the secondary strategy adopted by each provider to develop distinct competencies 
and sustain their competitive advantage. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 The FAO market is grossly under-penetrated across all regions and verticals, and 
there is still substantial opportunity for growth provided the service providers take into 
account the costs and risks that are faced by their clients and are able to deliver valued 
services. The advent of FAO is indicative of a recent development which may 
permanently alter the manner in which financial reporting is performed in the US.  In this 
study, I develop a conceptual framework that examines the factors that enable service 
providers to maintain market share by recognizing the issues that endanger the survival of 
FAO and developing competencies to address these issues. The primary source of data 
employed in this study to facilitate theory-building were semi-structured interviews with 
managers of three leading FAO service providers Within-case analysis was conducted for 
each case study in order to become intimately familiar with the case as a stand-alone 
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entity followed by a cross-case analysis across all the three case studies. The analysis of 
the transcripts brought forth three important observations: top management executives of 
all three providers considered the four industry level drivers identified by me as 
important industry characteristics,  their perception of the degree of importance that 
should be given to each of these four characteristics differed, the strategies pursued by 
each provider to develop distinct competencies in order to gain a competitive advantage 
varied with the exception of one or two factors that were common within the providers.  
In this study, I develop a conceptual framework based on the concept of integration of 
strategy and environment (Bourgeois, 1980) along with Dill’s (1958) definition of the 
components of top management’s task environment since these studies suggested similar 
conceptual insights. The findings of my study suggest that the task environment as 
perceived by the provider’s managers thus dictates the secondary strategy adopted by 
each provider to develop distinct competencies and sustain their competitive advantage. 
As Bourgeois (1980) suggests, the development of strategies to guide organizational 
activities is a key managerial function, and that guidance is accomplished through the 
effective co-alignment of organizational resources with environmental conditions. My 
study attempts to achieve a theoretical understanding of the process by maintaining that 
primary strategy (domain selection) is concerned with decisions about opportunities in 
the general environment, while secondary strategy (a competitive approach) involves 
navigating within a task environment. Further, environmental perception is an element 
distinct from the objective task environment and is a prime input to secondary strategy 
making. Exploring relationships between strategy and environment is very timely, given 
the competitive conditions faced by firms of all sizes in today's economy. My goal has 
 157
been to build on prior theory and research in order to provide additional insight into the 
competitive advantage construct in the relatively new FAO markets that have received 
little prior attention in research. 
 158
References 
Accenture Finance Solutions Report (2004) Available at www.accenture.com 
 
Alderson, W. (1965) Dynamic Marketing Behavior: A Functionalist Theory of Marketing. Homewood, 
IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
 
Aron, R., Clemons, E. and Sashireddi (2005). Just Right Outsourcing: Understanding and Managing 
Risk. Journal of Management Information Systems 22 (2): 37-55.  
 
Barney, J. (1986). Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck and business strategy. Management 
Science 32(10): 1231–1241. 
 
Barney, J. and Wright, P. (1998) On becoming a strategic partner: the role of human resources in 
gaining competitive advantage. Human Resource Management 37(1): 31-47 
 
Barrar P., Wood, D., and Jones, J. (2002).The efficiency of accounting service provision. Business 
Process Management Journal 8(3):195 
 
Bellman, E. (2005).Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: Jul 14, pg. C.1 
 
Beck, G. (2006). Consultant/Advisor, PA Consulting Group www.paconsulting.com. 
 
Becker, G. (1976) The economic approach to human behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Brown, R. and Stone, L. (2004) Business Impact of the BPO Market in 2005. Research Note 
(December): Gartner Research, Document G00123781. 
 
Cadbury, A., (1997) Board focus - the governance debate. TheEgon Zehnder International Leadership 
magazine.  
 
Chabrow, E. (2005) Outsourcing woes trouble leading companies. A Deloitte survey reveals that 70% 
of large companies had dismal experiences with outsourcing projects. Information Week, April 
19 
 
Chang, S. and Singh, H. Corporate and industry effects on business unit competitive position. Strategic 
Management Journal 21(7): 739-752 
 
Chalos, P. (1995). Costing, control, and strategic analysis in outsourcing decisions. Journal of Cost 
Management. Winter 31–37. 
 
Cohen, W. and Klepper, S. (1992) The anatomy of industry R&D intensity distributions. American 
Economic Review 82: 773–799. 
Day, G. (1990) Market driven strategy: processes for creating value. Free Press. New York 
 
 159
Defond, L., Hann, R.and Hu, X. (2005) Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit 
Committees of Boards of Directors? Journal of Accounting Research 43 (2):153-193. 
 
Demsetz, H. (1973). Industry structure, market rivalry and public policy. Journal of Law and 
Economics 16(1): 1–9. 
 
Dibbern J., Goles, T, Hirschheim,R., and Jayatilaka, B. (2004) Information Systems Outsourcing: A 
Survey and Analysis of the Literature. Database for Advances in Information Systems 35(4): 6-
102. 
 
Dierckx, I. and Cool, K. (1989) Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage. 
Management Science 35(12): 1504-1511. 
 
Dill, W. (1958) Environment as an influence on managerial autonomy. Administrative Science 
Quarterly (2): 409-443. 
 
Drtina, R. (1994) The outsourcing decision. Management Accounting 75(9): 56-62. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989) Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of Management Review 
14(4): 532-550. 
 
Finance and Accounting Outsourcing Market Review Report (2005) Available at 
www.faoresearch.com 
Goodwin, J., Seow, J. (2002). The influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of 
financial reporting and auditing: Perceptions of auditors and directors in Singapore. Accounting 
& Finance 42 (3): 195-223. 
 
Gottschalk and Hans Solli-Saether (2005). Critical success factors from IT outsourcing theories: an 
empirical study. Industrial Management & Data Systems 105(6): 685-702. 
 
Glaser, B., and Strauss, A. (1967) The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative 
Research, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1967. 
 
Goles, T. (2001) The Impact of client-vendor relationship on outsourcing success, Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Houston, Houston, TX. 
 
Hamel, G., and Prahalad, C. K. (1996) Competing for the Future, Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston. 
 
Harris, S.and Sutton, R. (1986) Functions of parting ceremonies in dying organizations. Academy of 
Management Journal 29: 5-30 
 
Hitt, M. and Ireland, D. (1985). Corporate distinctive competence, strategy, industry, and performance. 
Strategic Management 6: 273-293. 
 
 160
Jakes, J. and Yoches, E. (1989) Legally speaking: basic principles of patent protection for computer 
software. Communications of the ACM 32(8): 922-924. 
 
Kerry A. (2006). Offshoring The Offshorers. Forbes Vol. 177(8). 
 
Kotler, P. (1994). Marketing Management (8th ed.): Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
 
Kremic, T., Tukel, O, and Rom, W. (2006) Outsourcing decision support: a survey of benefits, risks, 
and decision factors. Supply chain management: An International Journal 11/6: 467-482. 
 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1988) Synergistic design for case studies: Longitudinal single-site and replicated 
multiple site. Paper presented at the National Science Foundation Conference on Longitudinal 
Research Methods in Organizations, Austin. 
 
Lepak, D. and Snell, S. (1999) The human resource architecture: toward a theory of human capital 
allocation and development. The Academy of Management Review 24 (1): 31-48. 
 
Levina, N. and Ross, J. (2003) From the vendor's perspective: Exploring the value proposition in 
information technology outsourcing. MIS Quarterly 27(3) 331-361. 
 
Lieberman, M. and Montgomery, D. First-mover advantages. Strategic Management Journal 9: 41-58. 
 
Mani, D., Barua, A. and Whinston, A. (2005) Firm-level evidence on the impact of governance choice 
on performance in business process outsourcing (BPO) relationships. Presented at the 2005 
International Conference on Information Systems, University of Texas at Austin, Texas. 
 
Mansfield, E. (1985) How rapidly does new industrial technology leak out. Journal of Industrial 
Economics (34): 217-233. 
 
Mauri, A. and Michaels, M. (1998) Firm and industry effects within strategic management: an 
empirical examination. Strategic Management Journal 19(3): 211-219 
 
Masur, D. (2006) Finance & Accounting Outsourcing Market Overview and Analysis of Leading 
Service Providers. Finance & Accounting Outsourcing Market Overview and Analysis of 
Leading Service Providers. Available at 
http://www.outsourcingcentral.com/Provider/Articles/ft_article_det_fpage.asp?Channel_id=7&
TextSearch_id=0&Story_id=36 
 
McConomy B. and M. Bujaki (2000). Corporate governance. CMA Management 74(8), 10–13. 
McGahan, A. and Porter, M (1997) How much does industry matter really? Strategic Management 
Journal 18: 15-30. 
 
Mclvor, R (2005). The Outsourcing Process, Cambridge University Press, New York 
 
Miles, M., and Huberman, A.(1984) Qualitative Data Analysis: A Sourcebook of New Methods, Sage 
Publications, Beverly Hills, CA. 
 
 161
Millstein, I. (1999). Introduction to the report and recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
improving the effectiveness of audit committees. Business Lawyer 54(3), 1057–1066. 
 
Mogel, G. (2003). National Underwriter. Property & casualty/risk & benefits management ed.Vol. 107 
(2): 12 
 
Patni Computer Systems (2003) A Patni White paper 
 
Peteraf, A. (1993) The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view. Strategic 
Management Journal 14(3): 179–191. 
 
Pettigrew, A. (1988) Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and Practice. Paper presented at 
the National Science Foundation Conference on Longitudinal Research Methods in 
Organizations, Austin. 
 
Phan D. (2001) E-Business management strategies: a business-to-business case study. Information 
Systems Management, 18(4):61-69. 
 
Porter, M. (1980) Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors, Free 
Press, New York, NY. 
 
Porter, M. (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: 
The Free Press. 
 
Radnor, J. (2006) Groundbreaking Research Predicts Explosive Growth in the Outsourcing of 
Corporate Finance Departments. www.faoresearch.com 
 
Ross, L. (2006) Taking a Survey of the FAO Supplier Landscape. FAO Today Jan/Feb. 
 
Roquebert, J., Phillips, R. and Westfall, P. (1996). Markets vs. management: what drives profitability? 
Strategic Management Journal 17(8): 653–664. 
 
Rumelt, R. (1984) Towards a strategic theory of the firm - Competitive Strategic Management, 1984 - 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 
 
Quinn, J. (1999) Strategic outsourcing: leveraging knowledge capabilities. Sloan Management Review 
40(4): 9-21. 
 
Scholl, R., Chohan, S., Sinha, D. and Datar, R. (2003) India Will Generate $13 Billion from Offshore 
Exports in 2007. Gartner Dataquest, June: Gartner Research, Document ITOU-W-R-115 
 
Sethi A. and Sethi S.(1990) Flexibility in manufacturing: a survey. International Journal of Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems 2(4): 289–328. 
 
Shank, J. and Govindajaran, V. (1992). Strategic cost management: the value chain perspective. 
Journal of Management Accounting Research Vol. 4, pp. 179–197 
 162
 
Shi D. and Daniels R.(2003) A survey of manufacturing flexibility: implications for e-business 
flexibility. IBM Systems Journal 42(3): 414-426. 
 
Tapper, D.(2004) Worldwide and U.S. IT outsourcing services 2004-2008 forecast: a potential perfect 
storm. Market Analysis: IDC, Document 31089 Available at www.idc.com. 
 
Tsui, A., Pearce, J., Porter, L., & Hite, J. (1995) Choice of employee-organization relationship: 
Influence of external and internal organizational factors. In G. R. Ferris (Ed.) Research in 
personnel and human resources management: 117-151 Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
 
Varadarajan, P. and S. Jayachandran (1999). Marketing Strategy: An Assessment of the State of the 
Filed and Outlook. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 27 (2): 120-143. 
 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984) A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal 5(2): 171–180. 
 
Yin, R. (1984) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1984. 
 
Zahler, R., Casey, G. and Pandare, A. (2006) Pillsbury Global Sourcing. Finance & Accounting 
Outsourcing Market Overview and Analysis of Leading Service Providers. Available at 
www.outsourcingcentral.com. 
 163
APPENDIX A: ETHICS RULINGS NO. 112, 12 AND 1 UNDER RULE 102, 201, 301 
RESPECTIVELY.  
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ET Section 102 - Integrity 
and Objectivity 
ET Section 191: Ethics 
Rulings on Independence, 
Integrity, and Objectivity 
112.    Use of a Third-Party 
Service Provider to Assist a 
Member in Providing 
Professional Services  
 
 
 
 
 
112.225   
Answer—Yes. The concept of integrity set forth in Rule 102, Integrity and Objectivity [ET 
section 102.01] and Article III, Integrity [ET section 54] requires a member to be honest and 
candid. Clients might not have an expectation that a member would use a third-party service 
provider to assist the member in providing the professional services. Accordingly, before 
disclosing confidential client information to a third-party service provider, a member should 
inform the client, preferably in writing, that the member may use a third-party service provider. 
This disclosure does not relieve the member from his or her obligations under Ethics Ruling No. 
1 [ET section 391.001-.002] under Rule 301, Confidential Client Information [ET section 
301.01]. If the client objects to the member’s use of a third-party service provider, the member 
should provide the professional services without using the third-party service provider or the 
member should decline the engagement.  
A member is not required to inform the client when he or she uses a third-party service provider 
to provide administrative support services (for example, record storage, software application 
hosting, or authorized e-file tax transmittal services) to the member. 
See Ethics Ruling No. 12 under Rule 201, General Standards, and Rule 202, Compliance With 
Standards [ET section 291.023-.024]; and Ethics Ruling No. 1 under Rule 301, Confidential 
Client Information [ET section 391.001-.002], for additional responsibilities of the member 
when using a third-party service provider. 
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 Rule 201—General 
Standards 
Rule 202—Compliance 
with Standards 
 
291 - Ethics Rulings on 
General and Technical 
Standards 
 
12.    Applicability of 
General and Technical 
Standards When Using a 
Third-Party Service 
Provider  
.024 
Answer—Using a third-party service provider to assist the member in providing professional 
services to clients does not in any way relieve the member from his or her responsibilities to 
comply with the requirements of Rules 201 and 202. Accordingly, the member remains 
responsible for the adequate oversight of all services performed by the third-party service 
provider and for ensuring that all professional services are performed with professional 
competence and due professional care. In addition, the member must adequately plan and 
supervise the professional services provided by the third-party service provider, obtain sufficient 
relevant data to support his or her work product and comply with all technical standards 
applicable to the professional services. 
This ruling does not extend the member's responsibility for planning and supervising the work of 
a third-party service provider beyond the requirements of applicable professional standards, 
which may vary depending upon the nature of the member's engagement. 
See Ethics Ruling No. 112 under Rule 102, Integrity and Objectivity [ET section 191.224-.225], 
and Ethics Ruling No. 1 under Rule 301, Confidential Client Information [ET section 391.001-
.002], for additional responsibilities of the member when using a third-party service provider.  
 
301 - Confidential Client 
Information 
 
391 - Ethics Rulings on 
Responsibilities to Clients 
 
1.    Use of a Third-Party 
Service Provider to Provide 
Professional Services to 
Clients or Administrative 
Support Services to the 
Member  
.002 
Answer—No. Rule 301 is not intended to prohibit a member in public practice from disclosing 
confidential client information to a third-party service provider used by the member for purposes 
of providing professional services to clients or for administrative support purposes. However, 
before using such a service provider, the member should enter into a contractual agreement with 
the third-party service provider to maintain the confidentiality of the information and be 
reasonably assured that the third-party service provider has appropriate procedures in place to 
prevent the unauthorized release of confidential information to others. The nature and extent of 
procedures necessary to obtain reasonable assurance depends on the facts and circumstances, 
including the extent of publicly available information on the third-party service provider’s 
controls and procedures to safeguard confidential client information. 
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 APPENDIX B: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO IRS DISCLOSURE SECTION 7216 
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Guidance Necessary To Facilitate Electronic Tax Administration-Updating of Section 7216 
Regulations 
 
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. 
 
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 
 
Sec. 301.7216-3 Disclosure or use permitted only with the taxpayer's consent: 
(a) In general--(1) Taxpayer consent. Unless section 7216 or Sec.  301.7216-2 specifically authorizes 
the disclosure or use of tax return information, a tax return preparer may not disclose or use a 
taxpayer's tax return information prior to obtaining consent from the taxpayer, as described in this 
section. The consent must be knowing and voluntary. As an example, a tax return preparer may not 
condition its provision of preparation services upon the taxpayer's consenting to a use of the taxpayer's 
tax return information. Except as provided in paragraph (a) (2) of this section, conditioning the 
provision of services on the taxpayer's furnishing consent will make the consent  
involuntary, and the consent will not satisfy the requirements of this section. 
(2) Taxpayer consent to tax return preparer furnishing tax return information to another tax return 
preparer. A tax return preparer may condition its provision of preparation services upon a taxpayer's 
consenting to disclosure of the taxpayer's tax return information to another tax return preparer for the 
purpose of performing services that assist in the preparation of, or provide auxiliary services in 
connection with the preparation of, the tax return of the taxpayer. 
 Source: www.irs.gov
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PROVIDERS IN THE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING OUTSOURCING INDUSTRY IN 
INDIA 
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General 
Strategy 
Questions 
1. Can you identify and describe the primary factors that, in your opinion, contribute to maintaining your 
company’s competitive advantage as compared to other firms in the field of FAO?  
 2. What is the position of your company in the Industry and what percentage of the market share is controlled 
by your company? 
 
 3. Can you rate the following factors individually, on a scale of 1-3, with 1 being very important, 2 being 
somewhat important, and 3 being not important, as factors that are essential to maintain your company’s 
competitive advantage in the field of FAO? 
 
i. Emphasis on Client’s Corporate Governance 
 
ii. Emphasis on Compliance 
 
iii. Client Risk Adversity 
 
iv. Increased Competition 
 4. Increased regulatory requirements faced by the clients should translate into procedures specifically designed 
to ensure effective governance and compliance. Is there a well documented plan to understand and address 
every individual client’s corporate governance mechanisms?  
 
 5. Have you invested in a stated governance structure and framework to monitor and manage ongoing FAO 
engagements? If so, can you please describe the same? 
 6. Are there formal systems in place to help the client prevent and detect the occurrence of fraud, errors or 
other irregularities in the financial statements?  
 
 7. Are there any conscious attempts to take steps to improve the quality of client’s financial reporting? 
 
 8. Most FAO contracts are drawn for duration of 3-5 years. What steps do you take to build an effective long 
term relationship with the client? 
9. Is there a conscious attempt to build the client’s trust? What measures, if any, are taken to gain a trusted 
advisor status? 
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Emphasis on Compliance 10. Do you have procedures in place to deal with the client’s fear that outsourcing will lead to 
failures of compliance with regulatory requirements? 
 
 11. What are the SOX compliance measures that are in place? 
 
 12. Do you conduct periodic compliance reviews? 
 
 13. Are there clear lines of accountability? 
 
 14. What is the procedure for establishing Service level agreements (SLAs) that support defined 
processes and key compliance requirements? 
 
 15. In order to provide services relating to Sarbanes-Oxley, does the company have the 
following core competencies? Please check as many boxes as apply. Also, please elaborate 
on how each competency that is applicable to your company is being addressed.  
o Expertise in company processes, especially financial management. 
o Accounting skills, including having CPAs on staff. 
o A database that knows what the key corporate internal controls are. 
o Deep comprehension of the Act itself. 
o Supporting technology to store the processes, identify and document risks, and 
query those accountable. 
 16. Does your company have one or more of the following SOX related procedures in place? 
o Facilitate compliance with record-retention rules. 
o Assist in meeting requirements relating to mandatory Web access of corporate filings. 
o Help to comply with rules requiring insiders to electronically report stock trades. 
o Develop codes of business ethics. 
o Help to comply with financial reporting requirements and deadlines. 
o Offer fraud examinations, forensic and security auditing, and vulnerability analyses. 
o Rate and rank corporations' governance practices. 
o Provide whistleblower reporting systems. 
 
 
Client Risk Adversity 17. How does your firm specifically deal with issues such as risk mitigation, business 
continuity, privacy, and information security? 
 
 18. What are the specific risk reduction strategies that are in place to mitigate client’s risks 
associated with outsourcing F&A? 
 
 19. How are specific risks identified? Are controls established on a process by process basis and 
are these controls maintained to the level specified by the client? 
 
 20. What about security risks? 
 
 21. Are there clear objective metrics and deliverables? 
 
 22. How do you address client’s worry about loss of control associated with FAO? 
 
Increased Competition 23. Who are your primary competitors? 
 
 24. Do you face competition from the buyer organizations themselves whether they own/operate 
captive centers offshore, or have shared service centers? How do you cope with these 
competitors? 
 
 25. Do escalating costs of bidding place barriers on capturing new FAO clients?  
 
 26. How are you coping with competition from other low-cost countries? 
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Behavioral Characteristics of ‘contractual man’ 
Bounded Rationality      Opportunism 
   
Identity matters 
 
Veiling the identity  
of the TPSP 
Deception  
 
Concealing  
Privately held information 
Defeasance 
 
Failure to procure  
specific client consent  
Defection 
Reciprocity 
 
 
Normative expectations of contractual 
schemes 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 
 
Figure C.1. Contracting problems and Disclosure 
 
Note: Contracting problems identified by Oosterhout et al. are presented in the cells’ northwestern corner and contracting problems identified as 
existing in the AICPA member-client relationship are presented in their southwestern corner in bold font. 
Source: Adapted from Oosterhout et al. (2006) 
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Primary Strategy 
Entry into F&A markets  
Provider One 
Task Environment 1 
 
-Risk management 
-Increased 
competition 
-Emphasis on 
corporate 
governance 
-Emphasis on 
compliance 
Provider Three 
Task Environment 3 
 
-Risk management 
-Increased competition
-Emphasis on 
corporate governance 
-Emphasis on 
compliance 
 
Secondary strategy 2
 
-First to market 
-Deep domain 
expertise 
-Proprietary 
technology 
-Knowledge 
integration and 
transformation 
Secondary strategy 1
 
-Human capital 
-Strategic business 
units 
-Organizational 
Design 
-Proprietary 
Technology 
 
Provider One 
Task Environment 2 
 
-Risk management 
-Increased 
competition 
-Emphasis on 
corporate 
governance 
-Emphasis on 
compliance 
Secondary strategy 3
 
-Reputation and 
corporate image 
-Deep domain 
expertise 
-Customized risk 
management 
-Internal 
benchmarking 
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Domain Definition
Figure C. 2 Domain Model 
 
 
                                                 
i Facilitators provide the website and access to Chartered Accountants (CAs) needed for offshore outsourcing. Four prominent facilitators are the Commerce 
Clearing House (CCH), Outsource Partners International (OPI), SurePrep and Xpitax. The basic process of tax outsourcing requires six steps which are described 
below. The CPA gathers the client’s tax information and scans it into electronic files. Next, the CPA uploads these files to the facilitator’s website. The facilitator 
encrypts the files and makes them available to the CA partner (or partners) in India. CAs in India prepare and review the return, and, post the returns, work 
papers, notes, and reconciliations to the facilitator’s website. The CPA downloads the completed return and documents from the facilitator’s website. The CPA 
reviews and signs the return, and, forwards it to the client for filing. (Robertson et al. 2004). Examples of services that may be outsourced include tax preparation 
and processing, bookkeeping, certain audit procedures performed by contract staff, outside specialist services in connection with an audit, human resources 
services, investment advisory services, workpaper storage or destruction services (Miller and Anderson, 2004). 
 
ii Ethics Interpretations and Rulings promulgated by the AICPA do not have the force of law. At most, they are binding only on AICPA members, and even then 
an AICPA member is free to disregard ethics interpretations and rulings, provided they can carry the burden of justifying their departure in a disciplinary hearing. 
However, they do provide some guidance for ethical conduct and many accountants, whether AICPA members or not, are often hesitant to blatantly disregard 
such AICPA pronouncements. 
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